Israel's policies in the West Bank and Gaza: a study of underdevelopment, 1967- 1986, 1988 by Abed, Ali Jalal (Author) & Holmes, Robert (Degree supervisor)
ISRAEL'S POLICIES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA:
A STUDY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT, 1967 - 1986
A DISSERTATION
SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF ATLANTA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
ALI JALAL ABED







ABED, ALI J.. B.A., Frederick College
Portsmouth, Virginia
M.A., Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia
ISRAEL'S POLICIES IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA;
A STUDY OF UNDERDEVELOPMENT
Advisor: Professor Robert Holmes
Dissertation dated July, 1988
This dissertation centers on the impact of Israeli policies in the occupied
territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip between 1967 and 1986. The focus of
the study is to determine the effects of Israeli laws and practices on four major
aspects of life in the occupied areas: political, economical, educational and
demographical.
The methodology employed in this research comprised a descriptive and
comparative analysis of Jordanian rule over the territories with that of Israeli
occupational policies. To substantiate our thesis, we examined a number of
indicators under each area of discussion using statistical data, governmental
documents, newspaper accounts, and personal interviews whenever that was
possible. The data collected from Palestinian, Israeli, and independent sources
confirmed the research hypothesis which contended that Israeli policies were
largely responsible for the underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza in
several areas of life besides economics.
The significance of the study lies in the fact that it demonstrated
unequivocally that Israel's occupational policies were systematic, coherent, and
had aims far beyond the routine goals of political domination and economic
exploitation which are salient features of colonialism. According to the
collected data, the ultimate Israeli objective in the occupied territories was not
merely to benefit economically from its underdevelopmental policies but rather
to use them as an instrument to tear down the fabric of Palestinian society and
subsequently de-Palestianize the West Bank and Gaza.
Our findings indicated, however, that the debilitating effects of the Israeli
policies on the occupied territories were bound to radicalize the captive
Palestinian population and bring about further resistance to the occupation. In
the meantime, underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza will continue until
the occupation itself is terminated.
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STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
In 1948 the Zionist movement succeeded in occupying most of Palestine and
in creating the state of Israel in the area. The two regions of Palestine that
remained under Arab control were the eastern sector and the Gaza strip, with the
former being the larger and more populous of the two. Shortly afterwards, the
eastern sector of Palestine was annexed by Jordan and came to be known as the
West Bank, and the Gaza strip fell under Egyptian administration. In 1967, Israel
invaded these two territories and brought them under its occupation. Unlike the
Sinai of Egypt or the Golan Heights of Syria, which were also occupied by Israel
in 1967, the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza has evoked more controversy,
received more media attention, and has remained the thorniest issue in resolving,
even on a limited scale, the Arab-Israeli conflict.
As one begins to ponder the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza
from 1967 to 1986, the period under study, one is bound to ask some pertinent
questions regarding the rationale for the occupier's policies as well as their
effects on the indigenous population of the subjugated area. Questions that are
likely to arise are the following: Why did the West Bank's Palestinian population
fail to increase appreciably in spite of its high birth rate? To what extent had
the occupied territory's economy been integrated into Israel's economy? Who was
benefiting from that arrangement? On the political level, why did Israel refuse
to accept the Palestinian leadership which came to power in the West Bank and
Gaza through elections run under its own auspices? How successful had Israel
been in finding an alternative Palestinian leadership to the Palestine Liberation
Organization? On the educational plane, what did Israel hope to gain by
suppressing the Palestinians' educational institutions in the occupied territories?
Also, to what extent had the building of Jewish settlements on the West Bank
affected the demography of the area? And finally, were the Israeli policies and
practices formulated in a haphazard manner, or were they deliberately designed
to bring about underdevelopment in the occupied territories?
It is not the intent of this work to chronicle every aspect of the Arab-Israeli
dispute nor to dwell on possible solutions to this vexing problem. The purpose of
this endeavor is to assess the impact of the Israeli occupation on the West Bank
and Gaza in the areas of economics, politics, education, and demography.
Although this study will concentrate on the occupied territories of the 1967 War,
particularly the West Bank, it is nearly impossible to discuss them in complete
isolation from the rest of Palestine. Hence, occasional reference will be made to
the territory which was occupied in 1948 whenever thought to be functional.
Hypothesis
The hypothesis of this work is that the Israeli occupation of the West Bank
and Gaza, through its laws and practices, had largely contributed to the
underdevelopment of the said territories in the areas of economics, politics,
education, and demography. It seems that whenever attention is given to certain
Israeli policies in the occupied territories such as laws regarding residency and
traveling, the expropriation of land, the building of Jewish settlements, denial of
political freedom, closing of universities and the like, these policies are almost
always discussed independently of each other. It is the contention of this writer
that many,if not all, of these policies are interrelated and have caused significant
changes in the occupied territories to warrant an in-dept study of their effects on
the West Bank and Gaza.
Obviously, the thrust of this work will be focused on the impact of the
Israeli occupation on the specified areas under study. Nevertheless, to determine
the effects of the occupation and simultaneously test the stated hypothesis, it
will be inevitable to compare the prewar conditions with the postwar conditions.
In doing so, this work will attempt to specifically reveal the extent of the role
which Isreali laws and practices have played in causing such conditions. The
study will also attempt to answer the two questions which make-up the nucleus of
its antithesis. First, what logical rationale could be offered to explain the
relative improvement in the standard of living on the West Bank during the Israeli
occupation? And second, what argument could satisfactorily explain the seeming
contradiction of the proliferation of colleges and universities in a milieu of
underdevelopment?
Conceptual Framework
The parameters of this study are largely set by the above hypothesis. To
avoid obfuscation, two main concepts in the hypothesis require further
clarification so that the reader will appreciate their contextual meaning. The two
concepts are "occupation" and "underdevelopment." The concept of occupation in
this study refers to the Israelis' conduct toward the Palestinians in the West Bank
and Gaza in terms of laws and practices. The differentiation between laws and
practices is made here because on many occasions Israeli practices in the
occupied areas exceeded the realm of Israeli laws. The term "practices"
encompasses governmental and non-governmental sanctions. Nevertheless, since
these practices did affect the Palestinian population within the occupied
territories, they deserve to be looked at with equal scrutiny to those of Israeli
laws.
The concept of "underdevelopment" in this study does not merely mean a
failure to reach an anticipated potential level but connotes decline and
stagnation as well. Furthermore, in reference to countries or areas such as the
West Bank and Gaza, the term underdevelopment suggests exploitation of one
group by another and lack of control by the exploited over its human and material
resources. Like most economic issues, the concept of underdevelopment has
attracted both socialist and non-socialist writers. Non-socialist writers, on the
one hand, tend to view the problem of underdevelopment merely as domination of
one economy by another. Socialist writers, on the other hand, contend that the
precepts of underdevelopment are directly linked to capitalism, imperialism and
colonialism. In this regard, Walter Rodney minced no words when he stated:
A second and even more indispensable component of modern under
development is that it expresses a particular relationship of
exploitation: namely, the exploitation of one country by another.
All of the countries named as 'underdeveloped' in the world are
exploited by others; and the underdevelopment with which the
world is now preoccupied is a product of capitalist, imperialist, and
colonialist exploitation. 1
The symbiotic relationship between capitalism and underdevelopment was clearly
articulated by Andre Gunder Frank in his work Capitalism and Underdevelopment
in Latin America. He said:
Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite
sides of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and contem
porary manifestation of internal contradictions in the world
capitalist system . . . One and the same historical process of
IWalter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Washington, D.C.:
Howard University Press, 1981), p. 14.
the expansion and development of capitalism throughout the world
has simultaniously generated - and continues to generate - both
economic development (in the capitalist core states) and structural
underdevelopment (in the dependent peripheral states).2
Echoing a similar sentiment, Ernest Mandel had observed:
While capitalism has spread all over the world, the greater part
of the world has experienced only its disintegrating effects without
benefiting from its creative side. Indeed, the unlimited industrial
advance of the Western world has been possible only at the expense
of the so-called underdeveloped world which has been doomed to
stagnation and regression.3
While the collected data of this investigation conclusively confirmed the
socialist analysis of underdevelopment, the concept appeared to beget a
characteristically unique connotation under the imprint of Israeli occupation.
What differentiated the underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza from other
colonial and neo-colonial settings was its underlying purpose. On the face of it,
Israeli occupational policies appeared to be seeking political subjugation and
economic domination of the occupied territories. Closer examination, however,
indicated that the orchestrated underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza
was used as a vehicle for a more sinister goal - to de-Palestianize the occupied
areas. It is this particular feature which distinguished the Israeli
underdevelopment of the occupied territories form virtually all others in recent
history.
Before assessing the effects of Israeli policies and practices on the West
Bank and Gaza, it is necessary to at least briefly describe the conditions which
2Andre Frank G., Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967), p.9.
3Ernest Mandell, Marxist Economic Theory. Vol.2 (New York: Monthly
Review Press, 1971), p.441.
existed in the said areas prior to the occupation. This is essential if we are to
understand the extent of transformation which occurred under Israeli occupation.
As Walter Rodney pointed out, underdevelopment invariably entails comparisons.
Once the conditions on the West Bank and Gaza prior to June 5, 1967 have been
clearly described, it becomes imperative to begin studying the data which links
Israeli laws and practices to the underdevelopment of the occupied territories.
The concept of occupation rests on two independent variables: laws and
practices. The laws affecting the occupied areas are literally hundreds of
military orders pertaining to all aspects of life. However, since many of the
more recent military orders are modifications of earlier orders and the fact that
scores of orders simply deal with relatively minor matters relating to a specific
locale, our interest in this study will focus on the orders which had the greatest
impact on the indigenous populace in the areas of demography, economics,
politics and education — the dependent variables of underdevelopment. The same
process will be followed in evaluating the effects of Israeli practices on the
dependent variables of underdevelopment. The components of this second
independent variable are basically actions, some of which are violent, carried out
by non-governmental groups or individuals noted for their extremism. This
particular element plays a major role in increasing the fear factor in the
occupied territories and subsequently increases emigration among the
Palestinians. Thus, this independent variable is directly linked to the dependent
demographic variable.
As for underdevelopment, its dependent variables (demography, economics,
politics, and education) must be operationalized to confirm or reject our
hypothesis. The most obvious measurement for the demographic variable is the
emigration factor. The proliferation of Jewish settlements is another equally
clear measurement. The economic variable can be measured in terms of decline
in industrial growth, reduction in cultivated land, unemployment, and the
extremely slow growth of new businesses. Political underdevelopment could be
measured by the number of elections held in the occupied territories since 1967,
the degree of free political expression, and the Israeli treatment of the locally-
elected Palestinian leadership. The educational variable will be measured by
looking at the number of forced closings of colleges and universities, the degree
of censorship throughout the educational system, and the stringent regulations
imposed on faculty and administrators. As each variable is discussed,
comparisons with the pre-1967 conditions will be made and all findings will be
noted.
Methodology
Since the hypothesis of this work contends that the Israeli occupation was
largely responsible for the underdevelopment of the West Bank and Gaza, it
becomes essential that the conditions of the four areas under study be fully
explained as they existed prior to the occupation as well as under it. Hence, the
methodological approach used in this endeavor is basically a comparative analysis
of the economical, political, educational, and demographical conditions that
existed in the West Bank and Gaza on the eve of the 1967 War with the most
recent data available today on the same areas.
This study employed the following methods for generating data:
1) Literary review and content analysis of government documents, books,
journals, and newspapers 2) Discussion with Palestinians from various parts of
the occupied areas including students, businessmen, college administrators, and
deported mayors. While these individuals may not constitute a representative
sample of the West Bank population, their testimonies and observations provided
me with valuable insights on the effects of Israeli policies in their respective
fields. For the most part, gathering of data from the field was not an easy task.
The very nature of a military occupation, with its attendant restrictions on
speech and travel, had hampered, to some degree, my ability to collect
information with ease. While there was no difficulty in speaking with ex-mayors
whose views were well-known, the situation was vastly different in canvassing
the attitudes of common folk Palestinians. This latter group, while willing to
share information and give honest reaction to questions about the occupation's
impact on their lives, was generally reluctant to be identified by name and visibly
uncomfortable by the sight of paper and pen in the hands of the interviewer.
Many of those interviewed told this writer that they did not wish their identities
revealed for fear of jeopardizing their business licenses, identity cards, or travel
permits. Others were concerned that their identification in print would lead to
imprisonment, physical harm, or deportation. Whether these fears were real or
imagined, they, along with other general restrictions, were sufficient to preclude
me from carrying out a scientific survey or even quoting many of these
interviewed by name. Therefore, the use of random sampling and unstructured
interviews seemed to be the most productive tools for gathering and distilling
field information under the circumstances. Employing this method, over three
hundred people in various walks of life were interviewed by this writer on the
West Bank and Gaza in the course of this investigation.
For the prewar period, Jordanian sources were studied to ascertain the
population growth and economic status of the West Bank and Gaza. Similarly, for
the postwar period, Israeli records and reports published by the Central Bureau of
Statistics were consulted along with other sources to determine any economic or
demographic changes. In the areas of politics and education, various sources
were utilized for both the prewar and postwar periods. Among the economic
variables compared were the agricultural output, industrial expansion, tourism,
construction, and the gross domestic product. In the political arena, the
comparison entailed scrutinizing the degree of freedom enjoyed by the local
governments in running their affairs, number of local elections held, and the
constraints placed on the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.
Educationally, the variables considered were the closing of schools, extent of
censorship, and other restraints on academic freedom. Unstructured interviews
of academicians and administrators were used to obtain data in this field. The
demographic variables included Palestinian emigration and the growth of Jewish
settlements in the occupied territories. While census reports and statistical
abstracts were used to extract the quantitative aspect of this area, other sources
were employed to clarify the qualitative aspect of it. Throughout this
comparative analysis, it was indispensable to identify and discuss the relevant
Israeli laws and practices and determine the correlation, if any, between them
and underdevelopment in the four areas under study.
Outline of Study
This study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter One provides the
framework for this effort. Chapter Two focuses on the economic and political
developments in the West Bank and Gaza between 1948 and 1967. This is
essential if we are to be cognizant of the conditions that prevailed in the said
areas prior to the Israeli occupation. It is data collected on the latter part of this
period which will be instrumental in determining whether the occupied territories
experienced development or underdevelopment under Israeli control. Chapter
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Three scrutinizes the impact of Israeli policies on the political life of the
occupied territories. The main components of this chapter encompass a review
of the constraints on political activities imposed by the military commander of
the occupied areas and Israel's search for an alternate Palestinian leadership to
the Palestine Liberation Organization. The second component of this chapter
includes a discussion of the 1976 municipal elections and the creation of the
Village Leagues. The fourth chapter examines the effects of the Israeli
occupation on the economy of the West Bank and Gaza. It entails looking closely
at the military orders and restrictions which had bearings on both agriculture and
industry.
Chapter Five provides an examination of the effects of the Israeli
occupation on the educational aspects of the West Bank and Gaza. The aim here
is to study the cultural dimension of underdevelopment under Israeli occupation.
Chapter Six dwells on the occupation's effects on the physical and human
resources of the West Bank and Gaza. The chapter highlights the most pernicious
features of the occupation — Palestinian expulsions, expropriation of land and
water resources, and the building of Jewish settlements.
Finally, Chapter Seven gives a summary and conclusion of the study. The
objective here is to assess the data presented and to convey a picture of the true
nature and workings of the Israeli occupation.
Review of the Literature
A tremendous body of literature has been written on the Arab-Israeli
conflict from both sides of the fence as well as from third and independent
parties. The gigantic task of sifting through this incredible amount of literature
for relevant data is further complicated by the differing views presented and by
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the biases of the authors.
Notwithstanding the various viewpoints, most works dealing with the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza tend to fall under one of two broad
categories: either as part of the macro-historical perspective of the Arab-Israeli
conflict as a whole or within the micro-view of just one of its facets. Although
the macro approach tends to deal with the occupation chiefly as a link in the long
chain of the Arab-Israeli struggle, it serves a most useful purpose for those who
seek to comprehend how the occupation fits into that struggle. The advantage of
the micro-view approach, however, lies in the fact that the focus is generally
limited to one aspect of the occupation thus lending itself to much greater detail
than found in the macro approach.
One of the earliest works that examined the Israeli occupation from the
macro-historical perspective was Khalid Kistainy's Wither Israel? A Study of
Zionist Expansionism (1970). This work was based on Israeli and Zionist sources
and dealt with the early history of Palestine as well as with Israeli policies in the
areas occupied following the 1967 war. Fred J. Khouri's book, The Arab-Israeli
Dilemma (1985), is a classic illustration of the cursory manner in which some
authors, using the macro-view, treated the effects of the Israeli occupation on
the West Bank and Gaza. In this work, Khouri, delineated the Arab-Israeli
conflict from biblical times to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 and its
aftermath. Throughout this discourse, Khouri's concern was largely focused on
the numerous attempts that had been made to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The impact of the Israeli occupation on the West Bank and Gaza was not
accorded even one chapter in the entire book.
Since the subject of this study dealt specifically with the effects of the
Israeli occupation on the West Bank and Gaza, it became imperative that a closer
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look should be focused on literature which employed the micro-view in this area.
As a result, a number of works which examined the effects of the occupation on
the politics, law, economics, education, an demography of the West Bank and
Gaza were selected to demonstrate the tension in the literature and possibly
indicate the areas which demanded further exploration. In general, the vast
majority of works on the Israeli military rule of the West Bank and Gaza were
critical of the occupation for two major reasons: the debilitating effect it has
had on the occupied areas, and for seeing it as the chief obstacle to peace
between Palestinians and Israelis. However, some Israeli writers have portrayed
the Israeli occupation as benign, and others have viewed the occupied areas as an
integral part of Israel and thus felt no need to address the issues of the West Bank
and Gaza in the framework of occupation.
In the political arena, Shmuel Sandier and Hillel Frisch, authors of Israel,
the Palestinians, and the West Bank (1984), seemed to deliberately but awkwardly
blur the political realities of the West Bank in their attempt to analyze the
Palestinian nationalist movement. While acknowledging the widespread support
enjoyed by the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the West Bank, the
authors described the PLO as an "external entity" and charged that it controlled
the politics of the occupied areas with an iron fist. Unlike many Israeli writers,
however, Moshe Ma6z argued in Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank (1984)
that Palestinian nationalism was not on the way out during the latter part of the
Jordanian Period, and that the 1976 municipal elections on the West Bank gave
cohesiveness to the local Palestinian leadership. Maoz affirmed that:
A major theme in Israeli policy toward the West Bank was to
forbid, by both word and deed, Arab political activities and
to curtail the establishment of an all-West Bank leadership,
be it Palestinian-nationalist or Jordan-oriented (p. 87).
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According to Maoz, Israel's reason for allowing the municipal elections was an
attempt to promote stability without fomenting political leadership. The value
of Ma6z's work went far beyond its analysis of the 1976 municipal elections on
the West Bank in that it touched on the dynamics of Palestinian politics inside as
well as outside the occupied areas.
In the economic sphere, a number of books and pamphlets have been
published with varying points of view, facts, and conclusions. Israel's Ministry of
Defense, for example, put out a publication in 1982 titled, Coordinator of
Government Operations in Judea-Samaria, Gaza District. Sinai: A Fourteen Year
Survey (1967-1981). which expressed in laudatory terms the effects of the
occupation on the Palestinians' economic sector. The Israeli publication asserted
that:
Since 1967 economic life in the area has been characterized
by rapid growth and a very substantial increase in living
standards, made possible by the interaction of the economies
of the areas with that of Israel. Economic development has
proceeded without the jolting dislocations that might have
been expected from the drastic political change that occurred in 1967
(p.3).
Fawzi A. Gharaibeh arrived at a diametrically opposite conclusion to the above
Israeli survey in his book, The Economies of the West Bank and Gaza (1985). The
book's most salient feature was its analysis of how Israel reshaped the West
Bank's and Gaza's economies to serve its own interests. Gharaibeh argued that
Israel induced the occupied territories' dependency on it through three major
avenues: recruitment and exploitation of Palestinian labor, restriction on
movement of products from the territories to Israel, and the free flow of Israeli
goods into the occupied territories. Despite overwhelming evidence to the
contrary, Israeli writers Sandier and Frisch maintained in Israel, the Palestinians.
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and the West Bank (1984) that Israel's domination of the occupied areas did not
prevent the West Bank from having "economic autonomy" (p.49).
In Benefits and Burdens; A Report on the West Bank and Gaza Strip
Economies Since 1967 (1977), Brian Van Arkadie used disparate sources such as
Arie Bregman's Economic Growth in the Administered Areas, 1968-1973
(Jerusalem: Bank of Israel Research Department, 1975), and Jamil Hilal's The
West Bank; Its Social and Economic Structure 1948-1974 (Beirut; Palestine
Liberation Organization Research Center, 1975) to purportedly present an
objective analysis of the occupied areas' economies. Van Arkadie observed that
the ecomomies of the West Bank and Gaza developed noticeably during the first
nine years of Israeli occupation. Van Arkadie attributed the modest increase in
the occupied territories' GNP to employment of West Bankers and Gazans in
areas occupied in 1948 rather than to actual growth in the West Bank and Gaza
themselves. He also ascribed the lack of growth in the industrial sector of the
occupied areas chiefly to lack of investments. What conditions or policies
precluded investment? Van Arkadie was not quite specific about that beyond
pointing to the inhospitable economic climate which Israel created in the West
Bank and Gaza (p.107). In The West Bank Data Project; A Survey of Israel's
Policies (1984), Meron Benvenisti claimed that Israel's policies on the West Bank
were neither well-thought-out nor were they part of a "grand design." Benvenisti
asserted that:
All major decisions shaping the economic history of the
occupation were taken on the spur of the moment, as a
reaction to immediate pressures, usually by politicians who
did not perceive the long-term implication of their decisions or by low-
level bureaucrats who lacked high-level guidance (p.ll).
I found Benvenisti's claim vacuous and misleading at the same time. Evidence
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presented by this study clearly demonstrated that policies regarding all aspects of
life on the West Bank flowed directly from the West Bank Area Commander and
not from low-level subordinates as Benvenisti contended.
In the realm of law, two divergent works dealing with the West Bank have
typified the wide gap which frequently separated the two primary antagonists.
While Allan Gerson's book, Israel, the West Bank and International Law (1978),
largely defended Israel's position in the West Bank, Raja Shehadeh and Jonathan
Kuttab's book, The West Bank and the Rule of Law (1980) exposed the many
illegalities committed by the Israelis against international law. Gerson's bias was
so blatant that he failed to deal with Israel's violations of international law in the
areas of deportation, detention, and torture. Furthermore, Gerson desperately
looked for loopholes in international law to justify Israel's settlement-building in
the West Bank. He argued that since there was no evidence that Jewish
settlements were being built on land of displaced people, then international law
was not violated. Shehadeh and Kuttab did not merely prove Gerson wrong on
this latter point but also presented a concise explanation of how Israel
formulated a code of laws to serve its interests on the West Bank by adopting
and/or amending out-dated Turkish, British, and Jordanian laws. Whenever a
situation arose, they asserted, whereby an "appropriate" law from the three
systems could not be found, the Israeli Military Commander of the Areas was
able to legislate it through military orders.
The educational field in the occupied areas has yet to receive the scholarly
attention it truly deserves. Sarah Graham-Brown's book, Education. Repression.
Liberation; Palestinians, was probably the best work on this subject through the
early 1980's. Her study did not only reveal the inequality of education between
Arabs and Jews in the occupied areas, but also exposed the constraints under
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which Palestinian education had to operate in countries like Jordan,
Syria,Lebanon, and Kuwait. Aside from being highly informative, Graham-Brown
raised some provocative questions which dealt with the challenges facing
Palestinian education such as relevance, linkage with employment, and control.
It was in this connection that Graham-Brown observed that "Education is not
simply a tool for liberation. It is at the same time, part of the terrain on which
the struggle for liberation must take place." Munir Fasheh's essay on education
m Occupation: Israel Over Palestine (1983), edited by Naseer H. Aruri, was
insightful since it was largely based on personal experiences in the occupied
territories.
Unlike the issue of education, Jewish settlements in the occupied territories
have greatly inflamed emotions on both sides of the conflict and have engendered
large number of works on this subject. In Taking Root: Israeli Settlement in the
West Bank, the Golan and the Gaza-Sinai (1980), William Harris used extensive
Israeli sources to explain in depth the issues most directly related to Israel's
settlement policy such as security, agricultural development, an land and water
resources in terms of effects on Arabs and Jews. Harris went beyond criticizing
the building of Jewish settlements to suggesting that stability in the region could
only come about if a Palestinian-Israeli agreement was reached on the basis of
self-determination for the Palestinians in exchange for recognition of Israel by
the Arabs. Perhaps more forcefully than Harris, Merle Thorpe argued in
Prescription For Conflict (1984) that the continued expansion of Jewish
settlements in the occupied territories could very well lead not merely to the
annexation of the West Bank and Gaza but also embroil Israel in a perpetual war
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with the Arabs. Thrope also addressed the role of the United States of America
in this regard in these words:
It is also important for Americans to understand that our
government's aid to Israel assists the Israeli government in
pursuing this plan, and that the United States therefore
shares responsibility for its immediate as well as long-term
effects (p. 12).
Desmond Stewart's emotions occasionally surfaced when he discussed the
issue of Jewish settlements in The Palestinians; Victims of Expediency (1982).
Contrasting Israeli settlements on the West Bank with Palestinian villages,
Stewart said:
Yet here, too, an air of menace blows from settlements
imposed on strategic hilltops since the occupation, and at
an accelerated rush since the Camp David agreement. And a
sense of intrusion. For the villages you see from the
Nablus road grow from a beautiful head. The settlements,
by contrast, are the false eyelashes, the nylon wigs of a
transvestite spy (p. 34).
To Rabbi Meir Kahane, the picture drawn by Desmond Stewart on the issue of
Jewish settlements in the occupied territories was totally erroneous. In They
Must Go (1981), Kahane made the following assertion:
I do not feel sorry for the Arabs of Eretz Yisrael (Land of
Israel), no matter how much they feel that the land is
theirs. I do not feel for them because I know that the land
is not theirs, that it is Jewish (p.57).
Significance of Study
As shown above, several studies have already examined the effects of the
Israeli occupation on various aspects of Palestinian life on the West Bank and
Gaza, but hardly any one of them has provided an in-depth analysis of the
multifarious instruments employed by the occupation authorities to achieve such
effects. Nevertheless, evidence presented in some of these works buttressed the
hypothesis of this study and even confirmed it in certain areas. Gharaibeh's
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work, for example, attested to the severe impact that the Israeli policies have
had on the economies of the occupied territories. In The Economies of the West
Bank and Gaza. Gharaibeh argued convincingly that the Israeli occupation was
directly responsible for hindering economic development on the West Bank and
Gaza. Evidence presented in this study has led to a conclusion quite similar to
that of Gharaibeh's. The study's contribution in this respect was that it
delineated the military orders and directives which constituted the body of Israeli
policies in this field. Moreover, the interviews with Palestinians in all walks of
life provided a glimpse of the resulting human agony from these policies.
Data which was gathered by Israeli writers such as Meron Benvenisti and
Moshe Ma6z came unwittingly close to confirming the study's hypothesis.
Benvenisti stated in The West Bank Data Project; A Survey of Israel's Policies
that Israel's occupational policies "dealt a blow to the economic viability of the
Palestinians as a community" (p.9) and were in the process of turning the West
Bank into Israel's "suburbia" (p.63). In Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank.
Ma6z provided material and insights into Israel's hostile stance and ceaseless
efforts to prevent the rise of a genuine Palestinian leadership in the West Bank.
This study's findings, coupled with the information provided by Ma6z, Benvenisti,
and Van Arkadie clearly refuted the arguments presented by Shmuel Sandier and
Hillel Frisch in Israel, the Palestinians, and the West Bank. These two writers
had asserted that the West Bank was enjoying "economic autonomy" under Israeli
occupation, and that "benefits and services were accorded by the Israeli
authorities on the basis of non-political administrative rules" (p. 61).
On the question of Jewish settlements and demographical changes, the
modest contribution made by this study, along with the persuasive discussion of
Merle Thorpe in Prescription For Conflict and the powerful arguments of Raja
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Shehadeh and Jonathan Kuttab in The West Bank and the Rule of T.aw. exposed
the glaring flaws in Allan Gerson's book, Israel, the West Bank and International
Law. Overall, what differentiated this study from most prior research in this
area was that it focused on the mechanisms utilized by the Israelis in the West
Bank and Gaza not only as devices to perpetuate the occupation but also as tools
of underdevelopment in the occupied territories. Furthermore, the study exposed
the contours of Israeli laws and practices on the West Bank and Gaza as a




In less than two decades, the West Bank suffered two severe blows — the
first in 1948 and the second in 1967. This chapter examines the aftermath of the
1948 war as well as the effects of the Jordanian Period (1950-1967) on the
political and economic life of the West Bank.
It is quite evident that Emir Abdallah of Transjordan had harbored
annexationist designs on all of Palestine prior to the Arab-Israeli war of 1948. In
two meetings with Golda Myerson (later Meir), one in November of 1947 and the
other in May of 1948, Abdallah made it abundantly clear that he wished to
incorporate all of Palestine into his kingdom and that he was willing to give the
Jewish community local autonomy. In a similar vein, Abdallah's foreign minister,
Tawfiq Pasha, tried to persuade the British that the Palestinian state envisaged
by the United Nations would be "politically and economically unviable"; and thus,
Transjordan should move into the bulk of the area allotted to the Arab
community of Palestine.1 Some suspect that the architect of this particular plan
was John Bagot Glubb, the chief British advisor to Abdallah and the commander
iTerrance Prittie, "Jordan and the War of 1948," in Anne Sinai and Allen
Pollack, eds., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank; A




of Transjordan's Arab Legion.2 Others argue that King Abdallah's interest in
Palestine was part of his grandiose plan to extend his influence over all of
"Greater Syria." The latter was to include Transjordan, Palestine, Syria, and
Lebanon. Regardless of who devised the plan, or whether the plan encompassed
all or part of Palestine, it is quite clear that Abdallah was seeking to satisfy his
personal ambitions or his British sponsors at the expense of the Palestinians.
Four days after Abdallah's second meeting with Golda Meir, the Arab-Israeli
War of 1948 started. The 1948 War resulted in splitting Palestine into two
unequal parts. In the larger part, approximately 72 percent of the total area, the
state of Israel was established. In the remaining area, comprising about 28
percent, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip were created. These results failed to
satisfy the Palestinians' hopes of asserting their sovereignty over the whole
country, and fell short even of the United Nations General Assembly's plan of
partitioning Palestine into two relatively equal Arab and Jewish states.4
The 1948 War had such a tremendous impact on the West Bank that
practically every major aspect of its life was substantially changed. For the first
time in its history, the eastern, hilly portion of Palestine lost its economic,
political, and communication links with the coastal areas of the country. And
since the West Bank's links with Transjordan were virtually nonexistent, its new
2Prittie,pp.l25-126.
3lsrael Gershuni, "King Abdallah's Concept of 'Greater Syria'." in Anne
Sinai and Allen Pollack, ed., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West
Bank; A Handbook, pp. 139-140.
4john P. Richardson, The West Bank; A Portrait (Washington, D.C.: The
Middle East Institute, 1984), p. 43.
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situation was described as "an island isolated between Israel and the East Bank."5
This left only the east side open for the West Bankers to have access to the
outside world. Naturally, the West Bank, and shortly afterward Jordan, became
highly dependent on routes through Syria and Lebanon to maintain their trade
links.6 Demographically and economically speaking, the new situation on the
West Bank was drastically altered by the influx of 350,000 refugees who were
forced out of their homes from the occupied areas. Moreover, the situation was
further aggravated by the cease-fire lines which caused dislocations affecting
144 square miles of land and 150,000 residents of the West Bank. As a result of
the cease-fire arrangement, many Palestinians living along the demarcation lines
found their homes in the West Bank and their farmland in Israeli hands.7 These
Palestinian West Bankers suffered a fate no less miserable than their refugee
brothers who lost all of their possessions. The fact that they continued to live in
their own homes precluded them from qualifying for any United Nations
assistance as other refugees. As a result, for many years they had to live in
abject poverty, and on occasion suffer death for their attempts to harvest their
crops across the cease-fire lines.8 In short, the 1948 War wrought havoc with the
West Bank's political economy and rendered it vulnerable to outside influences.
King Abdallah of Transjordan was awaiting such an opportunity
5The West Bankt An Assessment (Washington, D.C.: The Middle East
Institute, 1983), p. 36.
6shaul Mishal, West Bank/East Bank; The Palestinians in Jordan.




Following the 1948 War, Abdallah moved quickly to translate his ambitions
into reality by taking several steps to annex the east-central part of Palestine.
The initial preparatory step was accomplished on October 1, 1948, when many
Palestinian "notables," who were invited to Amman by King Abdallah, declared
that no Palestinian government would be formed until all of Palestine was
liberated.9 The second step occurred on December 1, 1948, when a large number
of the Hashemite supporters in the West Bank gathered in Jericho and called for
unity between the West Bank and Transjordan under the leadership of King
Abdallah. Abdallah, who attended the meeting, declared himself "King of
Palestine."10 On April 24, 1950, a Jordanian parliament composed of East and
West Bankers ratified the union of the two banks. n It is important to note here
that neither a plebiscite nor a referendum was employed before the Jericho
Meeting or after it to involve the Palestinians of the West Bank in determining
their future. King Abdallah had no intention of affording the Palestinians such an
opportunity. In fact, the formation of an "all-Palestine government" and a
Palestinian National Council in Egyptian-administered Gaza might have prompted
Abdallah to hasten the annexation of the West Bank. 12
9Clinton Bailey, Jordan's Palestinian Challenpe, 1948-1983; A Political
History (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 198), p.27 ~ ~
10Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan
and the West Bank; A Handhnnk (New York: American Academic Association
for Peace in the Middle East, 1977), p.27.
Ma6z, Palestinian Leadership on the West Bank (London: Frank
Cass and Co., 1984), p. 24.
From the very outset, the basic difference between the Palestinians and the
Jordanian regime has been the way they viewed and assessed the 1948 War and its
consequences. For the Palestinians, the 1948 War was a national disaster that
could be remedied only through the liberation of their land.13 It is worth noting
that even the endorsement which Abdallah extracted from the Jericho
Conference lacked a sense of permanency in that it considered any solution that
failed to take into account all of Palestine would not be viewed as final.14
Therefore, Palestinians in general, including many of those who supported King
Abdallah, regarded their "unity" with Jordan as a temporary arrangement. The
Jordanian rulers, on the other hand, felt that the war had served their interest in
that it increased their power and thus were quite content to maintain their status
quo. 15 These two diametrically opposing views regarding occupied Palestine set
the stage for a continuing conflict between the Jordanian monarchy and the
Palestinians. Based on their two divergent views, the Palestinians and the
Hashemite regime pursued different and irreconcilable political goals. The
primary objective of the Hashemite regime was to solidify its rule over both
banks of the Jordan River and to gain a shroud of legitimacy for that rule. The
Palestinians' avowed goal was to liberate occupied Palestine using Jordan
as a
13shaul Mishal, "Jordanian and Israeli Policy on the West Bank," in Anne
Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., The Hashemite Kingdon of Jordan, p. 211
. P. Richardson, The West Bank: A Portrait, p.45..
Mishal, "Jordanian and Israeli Policy on the West Bank," in Anne
Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, p. 211.
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springboard to achieve this aspiration.16 It is within this framework of differing
views and contradictory goals that the Palestinians and the Hashemite regime
had to formulate their relations with each other throughout the Jordanian period.
In the remaining part of this chapter, we will examine how the West Bank fared
both politically and economically during the Hashemite era.
Political Aspects
The Palestinians' political development on the West Bank between 1950 and
1967 was largely determined by the degree of success or failure they had in
steering Jordan's policy toward nationalistic goals and by the degree of freedom
they had in expressing themselves and running their local affairs.17 To achieve
their political goals, Palestinians on the West Bank utilized basically two
instruments: political parties and municipalities. Political parties served as the
Palestinians' chief vehicle in their attempt to guide Jordan toward a nationalistic
stand in regional and international affairs. For domestic matters, the
municipality was the most commonly used tool to improve the lot of the
Palestinians.
To maintain its monarchial structure, the Hashemite regime labored
incessantly to keep the Palestinians from getting into sensitive political and
military positions. These posts were generally held by East Bankers. However,
to placate the Palestinians, many were assigned to nonsensitive areas within the
l6Bailey, pp. 2-3.
17Shaul Mishal, "Jordanian and Israeli Policy on the West Bank," in Anne
Sinai and Allen Pollack, eds., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West
Bank, p.211. "
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Jordanian bureaucracy18. Also, a false sense of political equality was
perpetuated by the Jordanian regime in keeping the Chamber of Deputies equally
divided between the West Bank and the East Bank, even after a significant
increase of population in the latter. It is estimated that the number of eligible
voters in the East Bank rose from 129,000 in 1950 to 274,571 in 1954, while the
number for the West Bank dropped from 175,000 to 171,357 during the same
period.19
Formal equality in the kingdom of Jordan, however, did very little in
alleviating the Palestinians' sense of alienation and discontent. The assassination
of King Adballah on July 20, 1951, was viewed as a clear reflection of the
Palestinians' unhappiness with the annexation.20 Being more politically concious
then their brother on the East Bank, the Palestinians demanded "curtailment of
the King's power and that the Cabinet be made responsible to parliament."21
Following the demise of King Abdallah at the hands of a Palestinian
nationalist, Prince Talal ascended to the throne and some changes were effected.
Among these changes were Talal's approval of amending the constitution whereby
dismissing the cabinet required only a simple majority instead of the original
two-thirds.22 This change in effect made the Cabinet more accountable to
18Maoz, p. 25.
19Aqil Hasan Abidi, Jordan. A Political Study. 1948-1957 (New Delhi:
Asia Publishing House, 1965), pp. 54-59.
Cohen, Political Parties in the West Bank Under the Jordanian
Regime. 1949-1967 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1982), p.17.
21Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and
the West Bank, p.28.
22ibid.
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parliament. King Talal also sought a more harmonious relationship with both
Egypt and Syria." These internal and external modifications in Jordan's policies
reflected, to some degree, the political influence enjoyed by the Palestinians at
that time. But even these cosmetic changes and the somewhat dubious influence
of the Palestinians in Jordan were of a short duration. When King Talal was
declared mentally ill and thus unfit to rule, Hussein, his son, was handed the
reigns of power in May, 1953.^
Hussein's rule heralded a period of uncertainty for the Palestinians in
general and the West Bankers in particular. This uncertainty and even frustration
was no more apparent than in the relationship that developed between the central
government and the municipalities. One of the major outlets for political
expression utilized by the Palestinians within the Jordanian system of
government was the municipalities. Shortly after the annexation of the West
Bank in 1950, there was a growing demand for revising the restrictive
Municipalities Law of 1934. In a petition to the district governor in 1951, a
number of Hebron residents outlined the necessary changes in the law which
included "a lowering of the voting age from 21 to 18; called for the abrogation of
a city tax qualification for voters; recommended fixing the number of municipal
councillors in accordance with the size of the population; suggested that council
members have the right to choose the mayor; and, finally, maintained that the




the recommendations offered by the Hebron petition amounted to a call for
greater autonomy and a redistribution of power between the local and national
governments. However, the very nature of the Jordanian monarchial system
which stressed "the overwhelming power residing at the centre, as opposed to a
division of powers toward the periphery"2^ precluded any meaningful
development of a Palestinian local automomy.
In 1954, Jordan adopted the Town Municipalities Law which incorporated
many of the reforms that were suggested in the Hebron petition. This legislation
was very short-lived,however, since the central government feared that it could
very well undermine its authority on the West Bank. To regain control, the
government enacted a new Town Municipalities Law of 1955 which restored to
the central government the power to specify the number of councillors in each
municipality as well as the authority to dismiss them.27 In addition, a major
revision of the 1954 law was to give the Minister of the Interior the power to
appoint the mayors and set their salaries. Council members were left with the
minor task of selecting the deputy mayor from among themselves.28 All efforts
by the West Bank mayors to change the Municipalities Law of 1955 proved to be
fruitless. The central government in Amman formed a committee in 1956
ostensibly to reconsider the law, but it remained unchanged throughout the
Jordanian period. " Nevertheless, the central government's appointments of
26Ma6z,p. 27.
2Vlbid., pp.28-29.
28jordan, Law of Municipalities. No. 29, 1 May 1955, Article 34 (1 and
2), and Article 35 (1).
29Ma6z, p. 29.
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mayors and councillors were not always unchallenged as was the case in Ramallah
in 1956 and Araba in 1966. The most effective method used by local councils in
influencing the selection of the centrally-appointed functionaries was to threaten
collective resignation if the appointees were unacceptable to them.30 This
occasional demonstration of defiance, however, did not generally serve to
buttress their efforts to strengthen local rule. On the contrary, all conflicts
pertaining to city council appointments resulted in the intervention of the central
authorities, and thus deepened their involvement.3 *
To facilitate the control exercised by the minister of the Interior, a support
structure was created in the late 1950's to augment his role. The West Bank was
divided into three administrative-territorial regions, each called Muhafaza, which
consisted of smaller units called Liwas. This system was modified somewhat
shortly after it was established to increase local participation. The earliest
reform was introduced in I960 whereby the Muhafiz, the regional official, was
given power to make the local appointments instead of the Minister of the
Interior, and thus "opened up more civil service positions for West Bank
candidates rather than central 'imported' functionaries."32 Further "reforms"
followed in 1962 which empowered the Muhafaza to appoint a Public Advisory
Council that represented many local groups and organizations. This body, which




purportedly represented genuine local concerns, had merely powers of
recommendations.
Nevertheless, the cosmetic appearance given to the Jordanian municipal
system did not camouflage its true unitary and restrictive nature. The Hashemite
regime controlled the entire municipal structure through the office of the
Minister of the Interior. In 1957, the Minister of the Interior issued an order
which required mayors and other city employees to obtain official permits if they
wished to travel outside the boundaries of their towns.34 This close supervision
extended to all levels of the administrative hierarchy and was maintained through
the district governor.35 Even when it came to carrying out its daily and routine
functions, a city council found itself shackled by the administrative need to
obtain approval from district officers. Decisions such as purchasing asphalt,
paving a schoolyard, or buying fodder for animals required approval from the
district office.00 The ultimate administrative tool of coercion in the hands of
the Amman government, however, was the power to dismiss the local councils.
Although used sparingly, the central government did not hesitate to employ this
measure in dismissing the city councils of Jerusalem in 1950, Nablus in 1951,







occurrence was to selectively replace mayors or council members for the the sole
purpose of having the view of the central government represented in city
councils. The dismissal of the mayor of Tulkarm by the Minister of the Interior in
1952 demonstrated such a point.38 In other words, Amman's dealings with local
councils amounted to nothing less than a "heads, I win, tails, you lose"
arrangement, which in effect reminded the latter to tow the line of the former or
else. This particular mechanism, more than any other, made a mockery of the
so-called local rule.
In addition to constitutional controls, the central government also exercised
financial controls. The annual town budgets were approved by the minister of the
Interior, and any further loans or even transfer of funds within the approved
budget required the sanction of the central government.39 Moreover, the
Minister of the Interior determined the amount of taxes to be collected from the
municipalities as well as the share to be kept by each. This strict financial
supervision imposed by the central government was a flagrant violation of the
1955 Municipalities Law which stated that municipalities have "independence in
financial matters."40 Aside from near total dependence of the municipalities on
the central government, West Bank towns suffered from outright discrimination
at the hands of the authorities in Amman. This was clearly illustrated in the
allocation of fuel and transit taxes by the Minister of the Interior. In the early
38A1-Difa. February 7, 1952.
39ltihad, June 16, 1965. (Arabic)
40jordan, Law of Municipalities. No. 29, 1 May 1955, Section 3 (1).
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1960's, the Interior Ministry divided the said taxes whereby Amman received
twenty-eight percent, while Nablus and Hebron received six percent and three
percent respectively.41 In fact, a preponderance of evidence indicates that West
Bank municipalities rarely had adequate revenues to cover their basic needs.
Jabari, mayor of Hebron in the early 1960's, accompanied his request for 5,000
dinars from the fuel taxes with a plea that "The municipality of Hebron is
suffering from extreme financial difficulty that makes it hard for it to fulfill its
duties." In another situation, the mayor of Jenin complained that he had to
request a mere 400 dinars from Amman for three consecutive years just so they
could pay the rent on a primary school. Complaints about discrimination were
also voiced by West Bank parliamentarians such as Anwar Nusseibeh who stated
that "Jerusalem municipality was discriminated against by the government as it
was almost the only town in Jordan that did not receive assistance from the
government." But, as shown earlier, Jerusalem certainly was no exception.
The final mechanism used by the Jordanian regime to keep the West Bank
municipalities under its thumb was the rigging of municipal elections through its
agents who frequently served as heads of local election committees. These
"election officials" had control over the registration of voters. On at least two
occasions, Hebron in 1951 and Araba in 1966, government officials were accused





elections of their favored candidates.44 The most outrageous form of
governmental interference was its occassional attempt to fix elections in
exchange for bribes. In an interview with Moshe Ma6z, Mustafa al-Masri recalled
that he was approached by the district's Muhafiz in the 1964 mayoral elections in
Salfit and was offered a guaranteed victory in return for 2,000 dinars. When al-
Masri rejected the proposal, the Muhafiz offered the same deal to one of his
opponents.4^
In 1965 the Jordanian regime introduced what was hailed as a reform
measure designed to promote local councils and diminish the powers of the
district governors. To accomplish this goal, the central government established a
Public Advisory Council to assist the Minister of the Interior in matters relating
to local budgets and unfulfilled council recommendations.46 But aside from
adding local color to the government's machinery, the measure was meaningless
in terms of giving local councils more control over their affairs. It is worth
noting that the Public Advisory Council, which was expected to convene monthly,
met only once in Nablus in May, 1965.47 Fearing that the Advisory Council
could become a true forum for local government, the central government
cancelled the rest of the meetings but kept the Council on paper. It appears that
this last effort by the Jordanian regime was just another fig-leaf in its policy of
creating an illusion of autonomy on the West Bank in return for gaining
44ibid., p.38.
45Ma6z, p. 35.
46The New Administrative Order of 1965, No. 1 (1966).
47Maoz, p. 39.
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legitimacy among the Palestinians. As it turned out, neither autonomy for the
Palestinians nor legitimacy for the Jordanian regime resulted from this policy on
municipalities. The only clear consequence was that the Jordanian government,
through its monopoly on legal authority and use of intervention at various levels
of the electoral process, played a pivotal role in the shaping of structure and
direction of local rule on the West Bank. In Essence, the net result of such
manipulations had been the complete and utter dependence of the municipalities
on the central government which reduced local rule to little more than its name.
While the Palestinians found little room for political expression in the
government-dominated municipalities, their situation was not so bleak with
regard to political parties. Two chief factors can be discerned as the underlying
causes for this configuration: first, political parties' positions were often
supported by neighboring states or regional movements; and second, they had the
capacity to function without the central government's assistance and in spite of
its restrictions. Following the 1948 War, a new Palestinian leadership emerged
and set out to correct the course of Jordan's relations vis-a-vis Israel, its Arab
neighbors, and the rest of the world, with greater emphasis on the first two. The
new leadership was well aware of the infamous role of King Abdallah in the 1948
War in which he surrendered the towns of Lydda and Ramlah, abandoned the
Egyptian army at Faluja, and gave up to the Israelis 400 square kilometers at the
Rhodes Armistice Talks.48 Hence, the new leadership sought to bring about
major political changes through opposition politics within and without the
parameters set by the Hashemite regime.
48Abdallah al-Tall, Karithat Filastin (The Calamity of Palestine), Cairo,
1959, pp.467-68, 528-29. (Arabic)
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The early years of the Jordanian era were characterized by the rise and
development of political parties led mostly by noted Palestinians. Foremost
among them was the Jordanian Bath (Renaissance) Party which derived its
philosophy and guidance from the Bath Party of Syria. This group was led by
Bahjat Abu Gharbiyyah and Abdullah Nawas of Jerusalem, Abdallah al-Rimawi of
Ramallah, and Kamal Nasir and Musa Nasir of Bir Zeit. The National Socialist
Party (NSP) was led by Anwar and Rashad al-Khatib of Hebron, and Hikmat al-
Masri of Nablus. The National Front Party, similar to the NSP but with greater
leftist leanings, was founded by Qadri Tuqan and Abd al-Qadir al-Salih of Nablus
and Rashad Maswadah of Hebron. Unlike the preceding three parties, the
Communist Party was founded during the British mandate and was led by Dr.
Abdal-Majid Abu Hijlah of Nablus, Faiq-Warad of Ramallah, and Dr. Yaqub Ziya
al-Din of Jerusalem. And finally, the Tahrir (Liberation) Party, a rightest,
religious movement which was founded by Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani of Jerusalem
and Ahmad al-Daur of Tulkarm.4^ Without exception, all of the parties' leaders
were from the West Bank.
In considering political parties as an outlet for Palestinian political
expression, three major questions need to be raised: What gave rise to their
growth? What kind of relationship existed between the parties and the Jordanian
government? And finally, how successful were they in serving as a vehicle for
Palestinian political thought? The volatile political climate which persisted in
Jordan during the 1950's was most definitely charged by several regional and
international events as it was with local factors. Paramount among these were
the nationalization of the Suez Canal, the 1956 Tripartite attack on Egypt, and
49Bailey, p.8.
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the rising tide of nationalism that was sweeping the Arab world. The West Bank,
where the expectations and frustrations were high, appeared to be more affected
by the regional and international developments than the East Bank. As for
domestic factors, many Palestinians were not merely anti-Hashemites but also
resented the subordinated position they had to accept within the kingdom of
Jordan.50
Throughout the Jordanian period, relations between most of the political
parties and the Hashemite regime were marked with a great deal of tension.
Aside from the assassination of King Abdallah in 1951 and the Prime Minister
Hazza al-Majali in I960, this period witnessed an attempted military coup d1 etat
in 1957 and numerous demonstrations and riots.51 Nationalist political parties
were suspected of being the moving force behind such events. For the most part,
however, the Hashemite regime tolerated the activities of political parties, both
legal and illegal, as long as they did not constitute a serious threat to the
government. The fact that the Communist Party was allowed to operate,
naturally under the watchful eyes of the Jordanian security forces, was an
excellent illustration of the government's policy at that time.52 To ensure
containment of political parties, the government used suppression and co-
optation of party leaders.
The Jordanian constitution which was decreed on January 2, 1952, provided





must be "peaceful and non-violent; it must be directed toward lawful ends; and
the internal regulations of the parties must conform to Jordanian law."53 This
last stipulation wa~ interpreted to give the Jordanian government the right to
investigate political parties and determine their eligibility for acquiring a permit
to operate. The ease or difficulty in which a political party obtained an official
permit reflected in a large measure the degree of coziness between the party and
the state. Political parties that were supportive of the Jordanian regime, such as
the National Socialist Party, National Party, and the Arab Constitutional
Party,had no difficulty securing such a permit.54 The political parties which
encountered varying degrees of difficulty in getting official governmental
sanction were the Arab Renaissance Party and the Liberation Party. The
application of the former was repeatedly rejected because of its leftist leanings
and its links with Syria, and the latter was refused at least once because of its
emphasis on religion and its contention that the type of government a nation
wants should be a matter of choice.55 A third category included the political
parties which did not even attempt to apply for a permit to operate. Paramount
among these were the Arab Nationalist Party (al-Qawmiyun al-Arab), the
Communist Party, and the Moslem Brothers. Since the Moslem Brothers referred
to themselves as an association rather than a party, and were on relatively good
terms with the Hashemite regime, they were exempted from the permit





government and hence did not bother to apply. The Communist Party had no
choice in the matter since it was already outlawed by the Jordanian War on
Communism Law of May 2, 1958.56 Whether sanctioned or not, all nationalist
political parties were generally kept under close surveillance by the Jordanian
security services. It is important to note that the Jordanian government had
planned to move against the nationalists long before it actually did in April 1957.
On January 13, 1957, the director general of Jordan's security services ordered a
compilation of lists of all political activists opposed to the regime so as to
expedite their arrest when deemed necessary.
The question of how successful the political parties were in serving as a
vehicle for Palestinian political goals is a complex one. This is particularly true
since nationalist forces and events beyond Jordan's frontiers played a significant
role, which could not be discounted, in affecting the course of developments
within the Hashemite kingdom. Nevertheless, it was the nationalist political
parties that were largely responsible for creating the proper conditions for
political changes, especially in regional affairs.
Throughout the Jordanian era, Palestinian nationalists made it their
business to "expose and publicize government policies considered detrimental to
their cause—policies involving the curbing of armed infiltration into Israel, the
maintenance of secret contact with the Jewish state, or the adherence to
Western political initiatives that sought to end the Arab-Israel conflict."^8
56ibid., p. 232.
57The West Bank: Ferment, Resistance, Suppression (Jerusalem: Israeli
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Information Division, n. d.), p. 25.
58Bailey, p. 4.
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Exposure of such policies was invariably followed by street demonstrations which
casted a shadow on the legitimacy of the Jordanian regime in Palestinian eyes. It
is this capability of the Palestinian nationalists to organize the masses and
actually create instability which coerced the Jordanian government to pursue a
policy of "moderate hostility toward Israel—moderate as a precaution against
being destroyed by its western neighbor, but hostile as a precaution against being
overthown by the Palestinians."5^
Political parties in Jordan had their apex between 1954 and 1957. Gamal
Abed al-Nasser's ascendancy to power in Egypt and the subsequent British
withdrawal from the Suez Canal Zone signaled the start of an upsurge of Arab
nationalist movements. Nasser's interest in uprooting the remnants of colonialism
from the Arab world and his concomitant goal of Arab unity made him a natural
ally of the Palestinians and virtually all of the nationalist political parties.
Moveover, Jordan appeared as a logical choice for the confluence of Nasser's
anti-imperalist drive and the Palestinian-dominated political parties' interest in
changing the direction of Jordan's foreign policy. The two forces found a
tangible target in 1955 in the British-sponsored defense organization called the
Baghdad Pact. Several Arab countries, particularly Egypt, and all nationalist
political parties in Jordan, viewed the Baghdad Pact as a vehicle to strengthen
Britain's hold in the Middle East. When Jordan was "invited" to join the Pact,
Palestinian nationalist elements flexed their muscles in conjunction with the
outside pressure applied by Egypt to ensure an outright rejection. The
59Bailey, p.5.
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nationalists had their way.60 Capitalizing on their victory of keeping Jordan out
of the Baghdad Pact, Palestinian nationalists began to press for severing Jordan's
connection with Britain. The most obvious symbol of that connection was the
presence of British officers in the country's armed forces. Recognizing how
precarious his throne had become, King Hussein complied with the nationalists'
demands and ousted the British officers in March of 1956.61 Under further
pressure, new parliamentary elections were held in June of 1956. The results of
that election were a resounding success for the nationalist forces. A solid
majority of anti-regime representatives took their seats in parliament and formed
a nationalist government under the premiership of Sulayman al-Nabulsi, a
politician of West Bank origins.62 Nabulsi's nationalist polices earned him
increased popular support and the suspicion of King Hussein simultaneously.
Seeing that Jordan was drifting in a direction not to his or his western
friends' liking, Hussein decided to move against the Nabulsi government in
particular and nationalist political parties in general. Hussein viewed the
establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, the release of jailed
communists, and the election of two known communists to the Chamber of
Deputies as ominous developments. When Nabulsi largely ignored the young
king's objections to his policies, Hussein swiftly dismissed his cabinet.6-* This






Feeling threatened, following Nabulsi's downfall, the nationalist military officers
of the Jordanian army plotted to overthrow the king. Being informed in advance
of the attempt by his loyal Bedouin troops, Hussein was able to thwart the
revolt. 4 Following the abortive attempt to overthrow the government, Hussein
quickly imposed martial law, banned political parties, and jailed hundreds of
political activists.65
These setbacks notwithstanding, Palestinian nationalists still felt that their
best hope of liberating their occupied land was through Arab unity. Their
strategy was to work toward getting Jordan into an alliance with Syria and Egypt
and possibly Iraq before confronting Israel.66 To this end, at least on paper, the
nationalists made some progress. In October of 1956, Jordan joined Egypt and
Syria in an agreement to unify their military commands as a contingency plan in
the event of a war with Israel. This was followed by a cultural agreement among
the same countries in March of 1957 for the purpose of unifying their curriculums
and inculcating their students with a nationalist spirit.67 For the Palestinians,
these steps portended good things to come, including the goal of Arab unity. But
64Kmg Hussein of Jordan, Uneasy Lies the Head; The Autobiography of
His Majesty King Hussein I of theHasemite Kingdon of Jordan (New York:





these and other steps never materialized into a durable, tangible structure for
unity. The dissolution of the union between Egypt and Syria in 1961 and a host of
other conflicts between the Arab countries led to general disillusionment among
the Palestinians who had counted on Arab unity as the key for solving their
dilemma.68 By the mid-1960(s, the Palestinians were divided into two main
groups: those who were assimilated by the Hashemite regime and those who felt
that the liberation of Palestine could be attained only when the Palestinians
themselves become the vanguard of that struggle rather than waiting for Arab
unity.
Among those co-opted by the Jordanian government were Anwar al-Khatib
of the National Socialist Party and his cousin, Rashad al-Khatib. The former
served as Jordan's ambassador to Egypt in 1964 and the latter became the
minister for national economy. Also, Hanna Atallah of the NSP and Qadri Tuqan
of the National Front Party served in the capacity of foreign ministers of Jordan
in the 1960's. Even Ali Abu Nuwar, the purported leader of the coup d1 etat
attempt in 1957, was allowed to return from exile and was later assigned Jordan's
ambassadorship in France.69 Among the Palestinian nationalists, on the other
hand, the concept of Arab unity was rapidly losing ground to the new concept of
Palestinian entity as the key for liberating Palestine. One of the most ardent




Arafat. Arafat strongly believed that "the liberation of Palestine was the road to
Arab unity" u and not vice versa. The Qawmiyun, however, held on to the
concept of Arab unity as the key to liberation until early 1964. This attitude was
clearly reflected in a statement regarding the concept of "Palestinian entity"
which the party issued in April, 1964 - "We believe that the Palestine problem is
the problem of the entire Arab nation, and that our struggle for Palestine is at
the very heart of our struggle for the realization of its objectives; unity,
liberation, socialism, and the redemption of Palestine."71 This very position was
largely abandoned in just a few short months.The Qawmiyun, recognizing the
futile attempts at Arab unity in the late 1950's and early 1960's, embraced the
new concept of Palestinian entity late in 1964 and set their conditions and
guidelines for this development. The basic precepts demanded by the Qawmiyun
for supporting a "Palestinian entity" were: "a genuine Palestinian leadership, the
right of this leadership to represent the Palestinians in all Arab and international
forums; total political, financial, and administrative independence; and finally,
that the Palestinian organization be allowed to participate in political events
affecting the Arab world as a whole."72 In short, the Palestinian nationalists
were basically adopting a new strategy for the liberation of their homeland and
also for dealing with their Arab brothers. This transformation in Palestinian
politics was embodied in the establishment of the Palestine Liberation
70Yehoshafat Harkabi, Fedaveen Action and Arab Strategy (London: The
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1968), pp.8-11.




Organization in May of 1964, thus posing the greatest challenge to the Hashemite
regime over the representation of the Palestinians since the annexation in 1950.
It is safe to conclude that political parties during the Jordanian period, in
spite of their small size, enjoyed considerable support among the Palestinian
population. This was illustrated by the fact that most of the parties' leaders, as
well as rank and file, were from the West Bank. While political parties engaged
in many varied activities, the most memorable one usually resulted from their
collision with the Hashemite regime, taking the form of mass demonstrations,
occasional street violence, arrests and trials. At the very least, political parties
of the Jordanian era served as an "outlet for the Palestinians' feelings of
frustration, desire for social change, and search for a political solution to their
predicament."?3
Economic Aspects
The 1948 War and the subsequent annexation by Jordan in 1950 left an
indelible mark on the West Bank's economy. The extent of the West Bank's
economic integration into the Jordanian economy remains debatable.
Nevertheless, for the purpose of this study my concern lies in assessing the
growth and development of the West Bank during this period, so as to facilitate
my work in drawing a comparison between the West Bank's Jordanian era and that
of the Israeli occupation.
The severance of the West Bank and Gaza from the rest of Palestine as a
result of the 1948 War was a crippling blow to the economies of the two
73ibid., p. 251.
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territories. To both territories, the creation of Israel meant a loss of markets,
raw materials, and a disruption of their domestic trade links. In addition, the
West Bank lost its access to the Mediterranean Sea.7* Meanwhile, the economies
of the West Bank and Gaza were virtually isolated from each other and existed
under two distinctly different sets of conditions.^ The fate of the economy of
the Gaza Strip was even worse than that of the West Bank. The Strip's economy
was shattered as it lost its links with the rest of Palestine, and had to cope with
an influx of dislocated Palestinians which was greater than its native
poPulation.Having the Strip administered by the Egyptian government as a "unit
quite distinct from that of Egypt"™ did not alleviate its problems in the least.
The next obvious question is: how did the West Bank economy fare under
Jordanian rule?
Following the annexation, the West Bank and the East Bank did not develop
on equal footing. The unequal development of the two banks, however, was not in
the least accidental. In its efforts to strengthen the center as opposed to the
periphery, the Jordanian government concentrated on building the infrastructure
of the East Bank. This entailed the building of a transportation and
communication system which greatly enhanced the economic outlook on the East
Bank. Further, this huge construction project was followed by the deepening of
it a *Wzi A< Ghariabeh, The Economics of the W*st Bank and
(London: Westview Press, 1985), p.2.
?5lbid.
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the port of Aqqaba on the Red Sea, Jordan's only seaport.77 This center-
periphery configuration characterized the East Bank-West Bank economic
relations in virtually all aspects except tourism.
At the very outset of the Jordanian annexation, the West Bank enjoyed a
definite economic edge over the East Bank in the areas of agriculture and
industry. The West Bank economic edge was very short-lived, however, as the
emphasis shifted to the East Bank.78 The shift was far more apparent in the
industrial sector than it was in the agricultural field. Throughout the Hashemite
rule, the West Bank's agricultural production accounted for 33 to 40 percent of
Jordan's output. The size of the agricultural output fluctuated widely from year
to year, depending on the amount of precipitation.7? The weather notwith
standing, the agricultural sector, thanks to improvements in farming techniques,
registered an annual growth rate of 13.4 per cent in the years 1959-1966.80
Despite the healthy growth rate, preferential treatment was definitely accorded
to the East Bank in the area of irrigation. The East Ghor Canal, built exclusively
on the East Bank, irrigated land equivalent to one third of the irrigated land on
the West Bank. In the meantime, the amount of total irrigated land on the West
77Naseer H. Aruri, Jordan: A Study in Political Development. 1921
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972), pp.6l-63.




Bank remained basically unchanged.81West Bank industry during the Jordanian
era consisted largely of small businesses employing an average of less than ten
workers each. Most of these businesses were concentrated in the Jerusalem
where tourism served as the main gravitating source of revenue. The industry's
chief products included textiles, furniture, soap, food processing, matches, shoes,
and artifacts for the
tourist trade.82 The industrial development that Jordan nurtured after the
annexation of the West Bank was almost exclusively concentrated in the East
Bank 83 Statistics show, however, that in 1966 the West Bank had 53 percent of
all the manufacturing and mining operations in Jordan, although the vast majority
were of the small-scale variety. It was not surprising, therefore, that the West
Bank contributed a mere 20 percent of Jordan's industrial production between
1959 and 1966.84 Despite this imbalance, the West Bank economy benefited
somewhat from the booming Jordanian economy which averaged eight to ten
percent annual increases by 1965.85 In fact, the West Bank industrial sector
developed more rapidly than any other in the economy at a rate of 16.6 per cent
81Michael P. Mazur, Economic growth and development
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for the years 1965 and 1966.8^
As for tourism, this was one particular area in which the West Bank
maintained a definite edge over the East Bank during the Jordanian period. The
West Bank's tourist trade, largely based on its historical and religious sites,
accounted for 80 to 90 percent of the country's tourism income.87 As if to
explain the good fortune of the West Bank in this area, one embittered
Palestinian commented that "since they could not transfer Jerusalem, the only
thing they allowed was the development of the tourist industry.1'88 Tourism in
Jordan was definitely on the rise throughout the early and mid-1960's. Nearly
600,000 tourists visited Jordan in 1966 and spent over 30 million dollars, an
increase of 200 percent over I960. While the whole country benefited from
tourism, however, the West Bank profited the most.89
The Jordanian economic policy of strengthening the center over the
periphery had other repercussions on the West Bank, not all of which are easy to
measure. Since most of the economic activities in terms of construction,
transportation and communication building, along with agricultural and industrial
projects were taking place on the East Bank, many West Bankers felt they had
86Gharaibeh, p. 13.
87Department of Statistics, The Contribution of the Wpst Bank in Jordan's
Economy (Amman, 1969), p.3.Co., 1981), p .36.
88Avi Plascov, The Palestinian Refugees in .WHsn (London: Frank Cass
and Co., 1981), p. 36.
89Bailey, p. 20.
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little choice but to migrate eastward and work.9^ Statistics show that the West
Bank's share of Jordan's population fell from 62% in 1948 to 56% in 1952, and
down to 47% by 1961.91 Migration of Palestinian labor outside of Jordan was
also considerable during this period. According to the 1961 census, over 50, 000
of the nearly 63,000 Jordanian emigres were Palestinian.9^
Palestinians in the West Bank were quite cognizant of the discriminatory
treatment that they were being subjected to by the Hashemite regime. West
Bankers often cited the fact that the government refused to utilize the potash of
the Dead Sea or to open a university on the West Bank as proof of their claims of
injustices.93 Others pointed to the deliberate neglect of the city of Jerusalem as
a vivid illustration of the Jordanian regime's two -track policy for the two banks.
Despite all protestations, it took the Jordanian government nearly ten years to
confer an administrative status on Jerusalem, the capital of mandate
Palestine.^ The new status was meaningless, however, since it was devoid of
any financial or political clout. Of the three banks operating in Palestine and
Transjordan in 1946, only one was headquartered in Amman. This situation was
drastically changed by 1965, as eight of the nine banks operating in the country
90piascov, p. 37.
91Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, p. 121.
92lbid.
93piascov, p.36.
Sandier and Hillel Friseh, Israel, the Palestinians, and the West
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were headquartered in the capital.95 Furthermore, the Jordanian government
utilized economic f?.'-ors as a weapon to prevent the West Bank from acting as
one political unit. The city of Nablus was occasionally favored economically over
Jerusalem and Hebron for the purpose of deepening any political divisions that
may have existed between them.96 this method was largely successful for the
Jordanian regime since "the Palestinians themselves had conflicting notions of
their priorities, every town seeing itself as the one most entitled to any
development scheme."97
Despite the subtle and not so subtle discriminatory practices of the
Jordanian regime toward the West Bank, the latter became an integral part of
the kingdom's economy by 1967. The economic outlook of the West
Bankimproved considerably during the last six years of Jordanian rule. The
annual growth rate for this period was estimated at 8.8 percent, not far behind
the 9.1 percent for the national average.98 The difference in per capita output
between the West Bank and the East Bank was also narrowed appreciably during
the same period. While per capita output in the West Bank rose from fifty-three
Jordanian Dinars (JD) in 1961 to sixty-seven JD's in 1966, it remained constant at






West Bank exceeded the population growth thereby accounting for the twenty-six
percent increase in the per capita income. In the East Bank, however, the
economic expansion was swallowed up by the substantial increase in population."
Moreover, it is estimated that by the mid-1960's the West Bank produced sixty to
eighty-five percent of the country's agricultural yield and forty-eight percent of
its industrial output. These figures, when converted to currency, accounted for
forty percent of the government's revenues and nearly one third of its foreign
currency income.^^
The 1948 War and its aftermath left the West Bank and the Gaza Strip in
such a quandry that its long term effects are still being felt today. Many
Palestinians looked upon the 1948 setback as well as the Jordanian annexation as
a temporary state of affairs that soon would be rectified through Arab unity. The
Jordanian government, however, did not necessarily view the 1948 War as a
defeat and certainly did not think of its hold on the West Bank as temporary. The
Hashemite regime looked upon the West Bank as a prize for its involvement in
the war, and aimed to gain both control and legitimacy in the newly acquired
territory. The Jordanian government, through its coercive machinery, managed a
fair hold on the West Bank, but its claims of legitimacy were, at best, very
tenuous. After nearly fourteen years of fruitless efforts to move Jordan into a
genuinely nationalistic posture through political parties, parliamentary pressure,
99lbid., p. 10.
100Anne Sinai and Allen Pollack, p. 12.
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and street demonstrations, the Palestinians opted to be the vanguard of the
struggle through direct revolutionary action. The rise of the Palestinian
resistance movement, manifested namely in the Palestine Liberation
Organization, was clear evidence that the Jordanian regime failed to gain
substantial legitimacy among the Palestinian masses. On the economic level, the
Jordanian government locked the West Bank into a subordinated position in a
two-tier system. Despite the discriminatory practices, however, the West Bank
managed through improvements in the agricultural sector and remittances from
abroad, to average over eight percent growth rate in the period 1961-1967.
Generally speaking, the struggle between the Jordanian government and the
Palestinians of the West Bank resulted chiefly in sapping the strength of the
latter which undoubtedly slowed down its political and economic development.
Nevertheless, by the time the 1967 War broke out, the West Bank economy was
relatively stable and healthy; and the Palestinians had finally found a framework
for their political expressions in the Palestine Liberation Organization.
CHAPTER THREE
ISRAELI OCCUPATION AND POLITICAL REPRESSION
The Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 1967 drastically
altered the situation in these two areas in practically every respect. The
political sphere was certainly no exception. In the course of this study, however,
it became apparent that economical, educational, and demographical issues could
not be meaningfully discussed before a clear delineation of the political aspects
were revealed. Hence, an examination of the Israeli occupation's impact on the
West Bank's political scene will be presented in this chapter. Of particular
interest is the extent of political freedom that the Palestinians were able to
exercise locally and nationally under the existing conditions. This entailed
answering at least two salient questions. First, what obstacles did the West Bank
Palestinians encounter in voicing their support for a national representative
body? Second, how well did local governments, particularly the municipalities,
serve as an avenue for political expression and in exercising authority over their
respective domains? To determine the Palestinians' political status during the
occupation period, though, it was imperative to understand and assess the
framework under which the Palestinians had to function. More specifically, this
required a close look at the effects of Israeli military orders and practices on the
occupied territories.
FRAMEWORK OF MILITARY RULE
Israel was fond of giving the impression that its administration of the West
53
54
Bank was carried out with little interference in the lives of the indigenous
population who "largely run their own affairs in accordance with Jordanian law."1
Of course, nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, Israel's role in the
political underdevelopment of the West Bank began on the very first day of the
occupation. Section 2 of Military Order Number 2 clearly stated that:
All laws which were in force in the Region on June 7, 1967
shall remain in force as long as they do not contradict this
Proclamation or any other proclamation or Order issued by me
(West Bank Area Commander), or conflict with the changes
resulting from the establishment of a military government by
the Israel Defense Forces in the Region.2
It is worth noting that since the issuance of this proclamation the military
government decreed hundreds of military orders which have "resulted in
extensive alterations of the Jordanian law in force in the area."3 The laws that
the Israeli military government chose to retain, however, were basically punitive
regulations that were promulgated by the British in Mandatory Palestine and
were never rescinded by Jordan. Among these Regulations were the following:
Under Regulations 72,75 and 76, the power of search and
arrest is granted to military personnel as well as to police.
Regulations 86-100 are the legal grounds for the maintenance
of censorship.
Regulations 109-111 authorize a military commander to
restrict, by Order, the movements of an individual and his
employment, to impose police control on his residence, and to
require his administrative detention for an unlimited period of time.
iRaja Shehada, "Israel's Usurpation of the Law," Middle East International
(June 20, 1980), p. 10.
^Military Orders. 1967-68. Vol.1 (Ramallah, West Bank: Law In The
Service of Man), p. 3.
3jonathan Kuttab and Raja Shehadeh, Civilian Administration In The
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Regulation 112 authorizes the High Commissioner to order the
deportation of a person from the country and the prevention of a
person's entry into the country.
Regulation 119 authorizes a military commander to order the
forfeiture of property where there is reasonable ground to believe
that such property has been fired from; and also to order its
demolition.
Regulation 124 authorizes a military commander to impose a
curfew.
A military commander is authorized to order the closing of
an area so that ingress thereto and egress therefrom shall be by
permit only.
Regulation 129 authorizes a military commander to open
businesses closed as a result of an organized strike, and to order the
closing of business premises.4
Israeli military courts justified the adoption of the above regulations on the basis
of Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, which stipulates that
"the penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force."5 Israel's
adherence to the Fourth Geneva Convention, however, was very selective and
perfunctory at best. For example, Israel, a signatory of this Convention, had
completely ignored the provision which states that "Individual or mass forcible
transfers, as well as deportation of protected persons from occupied territory to
the territory of the occupying power or to that of any other country, occupied or
not, are prohibited, regardless of their motive."^1 Deportation, as we shall see
later in this chapter, was a tool employed rather frequently by the Israelis in the
occupied territories. In other words, when it comes to local or international law,
^Regulation in Force on the West Bank, quoted in Anne Sinai and Allen
Pollack, eds., The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank (New York:
American Academic Association for Peace in the Middle East, 1977),
pp. 228-229.
5lbid., p. 230.
6Seth Tilman, "The West Bank Hearings," Journal of Palestine Studies.
Vol., VH, No. 2 (Winter, 1978), p. 75.
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Israel applied whatever suited it at any given time and amended or rejected the
rest. Israel's view of the Geneva Convention's applicability to the West Bank was
a case in point.
Israeli control of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is regarded as
"beligerent occupation" in the legal terminology of international law as codified
in the Geneva and Hague Conventions. The law pertaining to "beligerent
occupation" looks upon the seizure of territory as "a tactical but temporary
necessity of war; until a peace treaty is signed and the territory is returned, the
law tries to balance the military needs of the occupying power with the human
needs of the inhabitants of the occupied territory."7 Israel's laws and practices in
the occupied areas were simply designed to exclusively serve the interests of the
occupying power. In fact, as is the case with all colonial powers, there was no
evidence to indicate that a serious effort had been made to "balance" the
military needs of the occupier with the human needs of the occupied. For its
part, Israel even rejected being characterized as a "beligerent occupier" and
instead viewed itself as a "liberator" of the West Bank and Gaza. This view was
clearly articulated by Israel's Minister of Justice, Y.S. Shapiro, who on June 27,
1967, said that "Israel should not view herself as a military occupant in territory
which Israel defense forces liberated from foreigners and which are
recognizedportions of Eretz Israel."8 Any pretense that Israel would deal with
^Michael Reisman, "International Law and the Israeli Occupation," The
Nation, 233 (December 5, 1981), p. 616.
8Allen Gerson, Israel, The West Bank and International Law (London:
Frank Cass and Col, 1978), p. 111.
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the occupied territories according to international law was dropped on October
22, 1967, with the issuance of Military Order No. 144, which officially "deleted"
the Geneva Convention as having supremacy over security legislation.^ Although
the "liberator" role was easily refuted according to international law and to the
Jordan-Israel Armistice Agreement of 1949,10 this Israeli view could very well
shed some light on the motives behind Israel's actions in the occupied territories.
Less than five months after the West Bank was occupied, an Israeli military
government was established to administer it. The military government consisted
of two major components: a military sector to oversee political and security
matters, and a "civilian" sector to supervise economic and administrative
matters. The final authority in both sectors, however, rested with the Military
Commander of the West Bank. * Keeping in line with their policy of maintaining
the occupation through cost-effective methods, the Israeli Military Government
ruled the occupied territories indirectly. In addition to the 500 Israeli officials
who held all the key supervisory positions, approximately 12,500 local inhabitants
were engaged in the daily administering of the areas' affairs. Naturally, as with
all military governments, the use of force or the threat of force was the Israelis'
ultimate tool for resolving problems in the occupied areas.12 No one described
9lbid.
lOHenry Cattan, Palestine and International Law (London: Longman
Group Ltd., 1973), pp. 120-121; also see Bin Talal, Hassan, Palestinian Self-
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the political configuration on the West Bank more succinctly than Moshe Dayan
did on February 2, 1979, when he stated that, "The Israeli army dominates; no
forced Israelization, we are the government."13 It is interesting to note that the
Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza shared many similarities with other
occupations, but obviously more with some than with others. For example, the
similarities between the United States' occupation of Japan following World War
II and the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza were limited to political
and economic domination of the occupied by the occupier. The U.S. occupation
of Japan, for instance, was largely concerned with the demilitarization of the
occupied territory to prevent it from becoming a security threat to the U.S. or to
its Asian neighbors. Even when the U.S. imposed economic "reforms" on Japan,
one of the chief objectives was to eliminate the Japanese war production
capacity.15 While this did not necessarily apply to either the West Bank or Gaza,
Israel did use the pretext of security as a fundamental reason for its occupation.
Unlike the U.S. occupation of Japan, however, the Israeli occupation of the West
Bank was used as a framework for a creeping annexation and a Judaization
process. In this respect, the attempt at settlement by the Israeli occupation was
more akin to the French occupation of Algeria and the English and Dutch
settlement of South Africa. In all three cases the occupying power established
13Geoffrey Aronson, "Israel's Policy of Military Occupation," Journal of
Palestine Studies, Vol. VH, No. 4 (Summer, 1978), p.80.
14Edwin O. Reischauer, The United States and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard University Press, 1965), p. 32.
Schaller, The American Occupation of Japan (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1985), p.31.
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and tried to maintain two separate societies—ruler and ruled. John Henrick
Clarke described the similarities between Israel and white South Africa as
follows:
Both Israel and white South Africa are artificial settler states
created by the political backwash of Europe. While mentally and culturally
they are parts of Europe, they are removed from it geographically.
This is the basis of the schizophrenia that prevails in Israel and South
Africa. These European settlers are involved in a perpetual
contradiction. They are stubbornly trying to establish a
nationality in nations that never belonged to them. They are
doing this at the expense of the indigenous population in the countries
where they have settled. 16
It was under and against these tremendous constraints that the Palestinians of the
West Bank and Gaza had to wage a struggle to survive and develop politically.
National Resistance and Israeli Repression
In discussing political development, or lack cf it, in the occupied territories,
a distinction must be made between the affective and effective aspects of this
phenomenon. The affective aspect was manifested in a tremendous growth of
national consciousness among the Palestinians during this period and was
reflected in their demonstrations, strikes, and writings. The effective or
operative aspect here refers to the Palestinians' struggle to build a structure
through which affective political behavior was channeled. Affective political
behavior was bound to remain disorganized and underdeveloped without a vehicle
to give it shape and direction. This author contends that Israel had consistently
l6Richard P. Stevens and Abdelwahab M. Elmessiri, Israel and South Africa.
The Progression of a Relationship (New Brunswick, N. J.: North American, Inc.,
1977), p.7.
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worked, through its military orders and practices, to prevent the emergence of a
genuine political vehicle for the Palestinians in the occupied territories.
When Israel took control of the occupied territories, local government was
structured according to Jordanian rule in the West Bank and to Egyptian
administration in the Gaza Strip. The local leadership of the West Bank basically
played the role of "middle man" between the local inhabitants and the central
regime in Amman. Moreover, the local leadership was largely composed of
members of prominent families which enjoyed economic or social status in their
immediate areas.17 Recognizing that the local political structure of the West
Bank could generally fit into its occupation design, the Israelis took several
political and administrative measures to maintain the configuration which existed
in the area prior to 1967. This entailed buttressing the Mukhtars (village
mayors)in rural areas and reinforcing the local authority of city and town
councils in the urban areas.18 In 1967, the military government issued Military
Order No. 80 which extended the "Tenure of the Local Administrative
Authorities" and authorized them to "operate on less than full quorum."^ This
was followed later in the same year by Order No. 191 which enabled the "'Person
Responsible1 to appoint a Mukhtar instead of having him elected, and to remove a
duly elected or appointed Mukhtar if he believes him to be unfit for his job,
l?Isa Al-Shuaibi, "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness,"
Journal of Palestinian Studies. Vol, IX, No. 2 (Winter 1980), p.61.
18lbid.
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61
delinquent in his duties, or abusing his position."20 Military Order No. 237 of
1968 and Nos. 266 and 365 of 1970 simply expanded the authority of the "Person
Responsible" in administering the rural areas.21 Military Orders 194 and 236
largely empowered the "Person Responsible" to do with the municipalities what
he had already been given power to do with regard to Mukhtars and village
councils.22 It should be noted that the title "Person Responsible" referred to the
military governor or any official designated by him to carry out his orders. As
these military orders indicated, all political power in the occupied territories
rested with and flowed from the office of the military governor. All others
working with the military governor were merely functionaries who simply
implemented the military government's policy. Among other things, the 1967
War and its consequences clearly exposed the serious leadership deficiency in the
Arab world as a whole. The need for a strong and genuine leadership was no
where more urgent than in the West bank and Gaza to resist the occupation. As
early as February of 1968, the Israeli Minister of the Interior declared that all of
the areas occupied by Israel in 1967 were no longer "under enemy sovereignty,"
and that "for practical purposes they had become Israeli areas."23 The purpose
behind the statement, it was explained, was not annexation but simply to
"legalize" the movement of people between Israel and the occupied areas.
20lbid., p. 38.
w N 21Military Orders: 1968-1971, Vol. 2. (Ramallah: Law in the Service of




On the other hand, to buttess its own claims of sovereignty, Jordan continued to
"pay the salaries of the officials of its former administration in the West Bank
and to sanction both annual and extraordinary financial allotments to various
economic, social, and municipal institutions registered in Jordanian records and
laws."24 The West Bank inhabitants at that time sided with Jordan on the
question of sovereignty because the threat of annexation and Judaization was
very real. The general Palestinian attitude was that "if the Israeli aims on the
West Bank were to be thwarted, it was essential to adhere to legal formulas and
previous situations which enjoyed some kind of restriction on Israeli freedom of
action."25 Another plausible reason for the Palestinians' attitude was the
absence of a coherent Palestinian leadership in the occupied areas at the time.
This was the case for two reasons: pro-Jordanian elements were still in control
of municipal positions, and the PLO was still in the embryonic stage.
One of the earliest efforts at "political" resistance in the occupied
territories was a clumsy and feeble attempt by thirty pro-Jordanian West Bankers
who offered to cooperate with the occupation authorities in exchange for
promises of a West Bank state. As a result of the Israeli snubbing, the pro-
Jordanian elements suffered a loss of prestige among the Palestinian populace.2^
24ibid.
25A1-Shuaibi, p. 59.
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Another minor attempt of political resistance was the formation of an Islamic
Committee which protested the Israeli annexation of East Jerusalem.27 A more
serious effort to organize the West Bank politically to resist the occupation was
embodied in the establishment of the Higher Committee for National Guidance in
September, 1967. This group took some practical steps in organizing
demonstrations and strikes and in encouraging the formation of local committees
to work against the occupation. The deportation of the High Committee's leaders
in December, 1967, however, coupled with the failed effort by the Communist
and other leftists to form a National Front, resulted in a seemingly political
paralysis on the West Bank for most of the first year of occupation. A spurt of
political expression occurred in late March 1968, following the PLO's successful
fight against the Israeli forces in the Battle of Karameh on the East Bank.28 But,
once more, deportations and administrative detentions were primarily responsible
for blocking and even inhibiting any substantive effort to organize politically.2''
Political activity remained largely dormant on the West Bank until King Hussein
unleashed the Jordanian army against the PLO and Palestinian refugee camps in
Amman in September, 1970. This event sent shock waves across the West Bank
27John P. Richardson, The West Bank; A Protrait (Washington, D. C:
The Middle East Institute, 1984), p. 82.
28jan Metzger, Martin Orth, Christian Sterzing, This Land is Our Land.
The West Bank Under Israeli Occupation (United Kingdom: World University
Service, 1984), p. 151.
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and crystalized the differences between the pro- and anti-Hussein forces. While
traditional leaders such as Muhammad Ali Al-Jaabri of Hebron and Anwar
Nusseibeh of Jerusalem, called for a cease-fire, the new leadership blamed
Hussein for the massacres and called for his overthrow.^
Though largely ineffectual, the sprouting of new Palestinian leaderships on
the West Bank in the first five years of the occupation was an area of concern to
the governments of both Israel and Jordan. To strengthen the hand of the
traditional leadership, which did not pose a threat to the occupation authorities,
and simultaneously project a liberal occupational policy, the Israelis announced in
November, 1971 that municipal elections were to be held on the West Bank.
Knowing that voting was limited to property owners as it was under the Jordanian
regime, leftist groups were reluctant to participate in an election that heavily
favored one segment of Palestinian society over the others. The PLO also feared
that the elections could confer legitimacy on the traditional leadership, which in
turn could be used to justify their collaboration with the Israeli occupiers.
Therefore, both local leftist groups and the PLO called for a boycott of the
elections to deny them legitimacy. 1 Needless to say, with the exception of the
mayors of Ramallah and Tulkarm, who ran on a nationalist platform, the 1972
elections were swept by the traditional leadership. Despite the election results
and the repressive Israeli measures, the resistance movement continued to enjoy




widespread support in the occupied territories. When scores of West Bankers
attended the Palestinian National Congress in Cairo in 1972, the Israeli military
governor declared that all the participants had to "forfeit" their right to return to
their homes.33 As far as the ^^^ CQDCm^^ Palestinians ^^
section three of Military Order No. 284 (September, 1968) which stipulated that
"it is prohibited for any resident of the area to consciously come in contact with
a hostile organization while staying outside the area."34 The penalty fop ffiaking
such a contact, according to Military Order 284, was a ten-year imprisonment or
5,000 pounds fine or both. It is interesting to note that the Order did not call for
exile or deportation as the Israelis decided to do in this case. This leads us to
conclude that Israel's primary aim in this instance was simply to deprive the
Palestinian community in the West Bank of its nationalistic leadership and to
inhibit future leaders from following the same path.
Continued Israeli attempts to tighten its grip on the occupied areas elicited
further resistance from the Palestinians on all fronts including the political one.
On August 15, 1973, the Palestine National Front (PNF) was established in
response to Israeli activities on the West Bank and Gaza. This was an
amalgamation of several nationalistic and progressive groups which previously
operated separately under the Front for Popular Resistance in the West Bank and
the United National Front in Gaza.3* The Front utilized several non-violent
33Metzger, Orth, Sterzing, p. 159.
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means to counter Israeli attempts to consolidate their hold on the occupied areas.
The means ranged from organizing rallies and petitions to working on behalf of
the victims of Israeli expropriations and the boycotting of municipal elections in
Jerusalem which were designed to legitimize the annexation of the eastern sector
of the city.-30 A primary goal of this organization was to provide a broadly-
based, grass-roots leadership that could supplant the narrowly-based traditional
leadership on the West Bank.37 The PNF's strength grew considerably following
the October War of 1973 and was reflected in the success of its campaign to boy
cott the city council elections in Jerusalem. As a result of its efforts, only eight
percent of the people of East Jerusalem went to the polls.3*5 The continued
growth of the PNF caused the Jordanians as well as the Israelis to react harshly
to this organization. In an attempt to undermine the influence of the PNF and
simultaneously prop up the traditional leadership, Jordan sent millions of dinars
to finance its supporters on the West Bank. For its part, the military government
used deportation and administrative detention to achieve the same goal. Jiryis
Qawwas and Arabi Awwad, two prominent leaders of the PNF, were deported in
December of 1973. By April of 1974, six other leaders were deported as well,
including Suleyman Najjab, Chairman of the West Bank's Communist Party. In
addition to these deportations, 150 PNF activists were put into administrative







The detainees included all active leaders of Jordan's illegal
Communist Party They organized themselves as the
'Palestinian National Front' and began activities .... They
are chiefly representatives of the class of young, educated
Arabs—teachers, engineers and those active in underground
professional associations.40
Israel's objective was abundantly clear-to nip in the bud any organization which
could serve as a vehicle for the political aspirations of the Palestinians on the
West Bank and Gaza.
Recognition of the PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the
Palestinian people" at the Arab summit in Rabat, Morocco, in 1974 and by the
United Nations later in the same year complicated matters considerably for
Israel in the occupied areas. While the triumphs of the PLO in the international
arena gave a big boost to the nationalist forces on the West Bank, they had an
opposite effect on the traditional and pro-Jordanian elements. In light of the
newly found successes of the PLO on the outside and PNF on the inside, Israel
began to debate the possibility of an "administrative autonomy" for the West
Bank under the traditional leadership but within the occupation framework.41 It
was against this backdrop of developments that the 1976 municipal elections
were held. Israel's primary objective was to have pro-Jordanian and traditional
leaders maintain their control of the municipalities in a purportedly democratic
election, thus negating the PLO's claim of being the sole representative of the





tdbrael's wishes, and obviously unlike their stand in the 1972 elections, the
nationalists decided to plunge into the electoral battle for the municipalities.
When it became apparent that the PNF candidates met the registration deadline
for the elections while significant number of the traditionalists did not, the
military governor was prompted tQ extend ^ registration ^.^ ^ ^.^
reasons. The chief reason for the traditionalists' lukewarm interest in the
elections was the rapid decline of their political stature at a time when the PLO
enjoyed widespread popularity^ The Jerusalem Pn. commented on the
extension as follows:
Officially this has been attributed to the 'pressure of numbers'
but the deadline is believed to have been extended to enable
more moderates to put forward their candidacy, with the
aim of counter-balancing the radical tide which had swept
the registration lists by the first deadline.44
Despite Israel's interference, the 1976 municipal elections were a stunning
victory for the nationalist forces on the West Bank. In practically all of the large
towns, with the exception of Bethlehem, the PNF won a decisive majority of the
council seats as well as the mayor's position. In terms of numbers, the nationalist
bloc won 148 out of the 191 total number of seats. 45 The results of ^ im
elections were an unequivocal testimony to the strength of Palestinian
nationalism on the West Bank, and of which the elected municipal officials
became the undisputed symbol. Newsweek commented on the meaning of the





Palestinian nationalism was no longer just a fig leaf for political terrorists but a
rallying cry for most of the West Bank."4* This of course, was the last thing
Israel wished to see. The question for Israel was not what to do about the newly-
elected leadership but rather how to go about undermining it.
Israel's Search for A1wna+- Palestinian T.Qa^,^r
Israel's approach to destroying the Palestinian leadership at the
municipality level was twofold: to render the municipalities useless in terms of
their usual functions and to build up certain elements outside the nationalistic
municipalities that were more amenable to its policies. In the summer of 1976,
Dr. Menachem Milson was appointed as the new advisor on Arab affairs to the '
military governor of the West Bank.*? It soon became clear that Milson's
primary goal was to undermine the political base of the nationalistic mayors.
This was done using subtle and sometimes not so subtle means. To begin with,
the procedure of communication between the mayors and the military governor
was altered to become a channel for humiliation. Instead of the the military
governor going to the mayors when the need arose, as was previously done, the
reverse became the norm. Moreover, with the exception of signing Israeli loans,
written confirmation of agreements ceased to emerge from the military
governor's office. Even the loan agreements were tenuous at best, since the
binding version was always written in the Hebrew language which most West
Bankers could not read, and which
were arbitrarily cancelled by the Israelis any
46"West Bank Land Slide," Newsweek. April 26, 1976, p. 37.
47Metzger, p. 179.
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time they wished.48 Mr. Ibrahim Al-Tawil, former mayor of Al-Bireh, made the
following comments on the Israeli methods of dealing with the West Bank
municipalities:
Most of the communication between the military governor
and the mayors took place over the telephone. But even
when we met with him, we never got anything in writing even
when we requested it. By doing this, it was easy for him to
change any verbal agreements reached in a previous meeting.
This happened often enough but we could not prove it to the
media or anyone else. Moreover, we were generally kept
in the dark about the latest military orders and changes in
Israeli policies in the occupied areas.49
The political impotence of the mayors was exposed further by "the military
government's interventions in the mayors' attempt to provide the cities with vital
infrastructure and projects for city development."50 Termination of the
Ramallah sewage system project after millions of Israeli pounds were spent, and
the stoppage of a school construction in Nablus shortly before completion were
two glaring examples of the military government's efforts to impair the mayors'
political clout. Similarly, the military government prevented the improvements
of water systems for many towns even though the funds were made available by
the localities.5 Furthermore, financial constraints were imposed by the military
government on the municipalities not merely to limit their services and growth
but also to effectively erode the power of mayors and city councils. Among the
48ibid.





many fiscal restrictions that they continued to live under were the following:
"They cannot levy any taxes without prior approval by the occupation authorities.
They are also restricted in collecting grants and financial aid from the Arab
world, and if they did receive aid, they had to expend it according to a plan
approved by the military government."52 Karim Khalaf, mayor of Ramallah,
clearly understood the goal of the occupation authorities when he succinctly
commented:
In this way, the Israeli authorities are trying to stop the city
councils from involving themselves with the people's problems.
They want to show the people, 'What kind of mayors and city
councils are they anyway? They don't do anything for you at all.'53
Another method employed by the military government to undermine the
popularly elected officials was to prop up the traditional and so-called moderate
elements among the Palestinians of the occupied territories. Some of these
individuals gained notoriety, at the municipalities' expense, because they were
able to assist-others in routine problems connected with the military government.
The Israeli newspaper Haaretz summed up the Israeli strategy towards the newly
elected West Bank municipalities as follows:
Dr. Milson, with the approval of the commander of the territory,
General David Hagoel, and the coordinator of activities in the
(occupied) territories, General Abraham Orly, attempted to
enlarge the power of ether representative bodies in the West
Bank, for example, of the chambers of commerce, thereby
52Emile A. Nakhleh, The West Bank and Gaza, Toward the Making of a
Palestinian State (Washington, D. C: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Research, 1979), p. 18.
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limiting the influence of the elected city councils as the only
representatives of the people.54 y
A similar appraisal .as made by Zavi Barael, an Israeli j
July 24, 1977:
journalist, in Davar on
It seems clear that it is the policy of the military government
to reduce the powers of the mayors by redefining their status
. . . .encouraging the rise of a new leadership, consisting of
members of the Chambers of Commerce, certain aotaSL
and persons promment in the field of education, to compete
The ascendency to power of Menachem Begin and the Likud party in Israeli
politics brought about radical efforts to find, or create if necessary, a submissive
Palestinian leadership which was willing to accept their programs and designs.
This Israeli search for an acceptable political leadership in the occupied
territories led to the creation of the so-called Village Leagues in 1978. The
Village Leagues' primary purpose was to "echo and help facilitate" Israel's
occupational policies.** It was widely believed that Begin founded the Village
Leagues as an answer to the nationalist voices and pro-PLO sentiment which
continued to permeate all levels of the Palestinian community. To strengthen
the hand of the Village Leagues, the Israeli military authorities gave them
extensive licensing powers." Under the Israeli occupation, nearly everything
that an individual wanted to do required obtaining a license or a permit from the
54lbid.
Vol.
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57ibid.
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military authorities or their agents. Among other things, permits were needed to
rent a tractor, or even plant an olive tree, the intended Israeli message to the
Palestinians of the occupied territories was loud and clear: "Cooperate with the
Leagues or else."^
The Israeli military government found few collaborators to activate its
Village Leagues' scheme. The most outspoken head of the Village Leagues was
Mustafa Dudin, a former Jordanian minister from the Hebron district. In an
interview with France-Soir. Dudin reportedly said: "Let's be frank. The Israelis
are on the West Bank to stay. Everybody knows they have no intention of leaving
and we do not have the power to remove them. So let's be realistic: Let's
cooperate with them."5^ On a different occasion, he was quoted in Haaretz
(September 9, 1977) making a veiled anti-PLO statement by saying that '"only the
inhabitants of the West Bank, Hebron and Nablus can speak on behalf of the
Palestinians living in these places, and not persons who do not even have any
relations there."60 Outside the Village Leagues but still within the scheme of
building an alternate leadership to the PLO in the occupied areas, the Israeli
government and press gave disproportionate attention to two obscure West Bank
lawyers, Aziz Shihadeh and Hussein al-Shoyoukhi, for their efforts to undermine
the PLO's popularity. While both men were pro-Jordanian in their political
leaning, al-Shuyoukhi rejected the use of military action as a liberation tool and
58Hirschfield, p. 302.
59ibid. p. 303.
60"The Search For Alternatives to the PLO," p. 134.
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had hoped to hold a conference of PLO opponent, in an Arab capital." No 5uch
conference was ever held.
Although neither man developed any considerable following, these men and
others like them continued to sow divisions among the Palestinian masses at the
behest of the Israeli occupiers. The Israeli position on this subject was clearly
enunciated by Ezer Weizman, Defense Minister at the time, in YedipiAha^not
(September 5, 1977): "Wei is glad to encourage any Palestinian quarter that
expresses opposition to the course pursued and the methods employed by the
sabotage organization."** Without doubt, Weizman was referring to the PLO
when he said "sabotage organization." Regarding the extent of Israel's
involvement in nurturing an anti-PLO block, the Israeli journalist, Y. Ben Haim,
of Davar wrote the following:
I naive hamS the gr°Wth °f anti"PL° trend' but th* ^estion* naive, because everyone active in this field realizes that the
military government and security leaders who representIsrael
the' $££££*?T^^^ °f the new ^ia^velthe West Bank and not only encourage but help them ... the anti-
PLO unlive in the West Bank indicates an attempt-which at
th^ stage „ being presented as independent-to sabotage PLO^s
efforts to represent all the Palestinians.63 g S
Despite the Israeli backing, the Village Leagues which numbered seven in 1983
remained little more than an empty shell. Almost immediately, Palestinians
resisted the imposition of such a body among their ranks. The leaders of the
Village Leagues were branded as collaborators and traitors and treated as such.
6llbid, pp. 132-133.
62"The Search For Alternatives to the PLO" p. 134.
63lbid., pp. 135-136.
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Several heads of the Village Leagues were assassinated and those who survived
commanded no respect at all among the Palestinians in the occupied areas.^
In the meantime, Palestinians in the occupied territories looked to the
National Guidance Committee (NGC) for leadership on national issues. The NGC
became quite active following the 1976 elections. Its effectiveness was reflected
in the numerous strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations it was able to organize and
coordinate which concerned the military government on the West Bank, the
NGC's active support of the PLO made it an obvious target for the occupation
authorities."^ On November 8, 1981, the military government issued Order
No. 947, which in addition to elevating the status of a vast number of military
orders to that of permanent laws, had the effect of "formally establishing a
new structure of civilian government of the West Bank which is empowered to
function within the limits determined by the Order."^ The head of the Civilian
Administration was empowered by Order 947 to administer a large body of laws
and military orders covering appointments,issuing of permits and licenses, and a
host of regulations affecting many facets of economic life. Article 5 of this
Order authorized the head of the Civilian Administration to "delegate to others
the authority to create secondary legislation based on the law and the military
orders he is charged with administering."°' The requirement imposed on the local
64Hirschfield, p. 303.
65"After the National Guidance Committee," Journal of Palestine Studies.
Vol. XIV, No. 3 (Spring 1985), pp. 175-176.
66Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 14.
67ibid, pp. 16-17.
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population by officers of the Civilian Administration to get endorsements from
Village Leagues before having their requests considered was a case in point. In
short, Order 947 was a serious blow to the nationalist leadership on the West
Bank. Military Orders 993 and 994, which revised Order 970 and 971
respectively, empowered the head of the Civilian Administration to assume the
powers of the city councils or any of its members in the cities of Nablus and
Ramallah if the former felt that the latter was not carrying its responsibilities
according to law or if it failed to cooperate with it.**8 These Orders set the
stage for evicting the nationalist mayors out of office and for destroying the
cohesion of the NGC.
Early in 1982, Jewish terrorists were suspected of planting bombs in the
cars of the mayors of Nablus, Ramallah, and Al-Bireh. The mayors of the first
two cities, Bassam Shakaa and Karim Khalaf, were maimed by the explosions
while Ibrahim Al-Tawil escaped injury.69 In resolution 471 of 1980, the Security
Council of the united Nations condemned the attack on the mayors and held that
Israel was indirectly responsible since it had "failed to provide adequate
protection to the civilian population in the occupied territories in conformity
with the provision of the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War."70 Even Mayors Fahd Al-
68Military Orders, 1982, Vol. VIH, No. 55 (Ramallah: Law in the Service
of Man, 1983), pp. 123-125.
69David Shipler, Arab and Jew, Wounded Spirits in a Promised Land (New
York: Times Books, 1986), pp. 105-106.
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Qawasmeh of Hebron and Muhammad Milhem of Halhoul, noted for their ability
to express the Palestinian cause in non-inflammatory language, were deported to
Jordan a few months earlier.71 The Israeli government had flatly refused to
comply with U.N. resolutions 468 and 469 of May 1980 which called on Israel to
rescind its deportation decision.^ in an interview in Washington, D.C., Mayor
Milhem commented on the possible reasons for his and Qawasmeh's deportation
by saying: "We were so successful in talking to Israelis that it was one reason the
military governor expelled us: we showed we could maintain bridges with
Israelis,"0 Milhem was referring to contacts with the Israeli public and not the
Israeli government. By March of 1982, dismissal of West Bank mayors who were
not cooperative with the military authorities was well under way. Within a few
months, at least seven elected West Bank mayors were ousted and replaced by
Israeli officials. The refusal of the municipal council of Dura to cooperate
with the authorities as a protest against the establishment of the "Civilian
71Shmuel Sandier and Hillel Frisch, Israel, the Palestinians, and the West
Bank: A Study in Intercommunal Conflict (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books,
1984), p. 154.
72"Israel Told to Permit Return of Expelled Palestinian Leaders, "U. N.
Monthly Chroncle, Vol. XVIII, No. 6 (New York: United Nations Department of
Public Information, July 1980), p.5.
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of View, held on May 5, 1981, at the American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research (Washington, D. C, 1981), p.5.
^Sandier, p. 154.
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Administration"resulted in the collective dismissal of the whole council.^ Why
did Israel launch a massive, punitive campaign against the Palestinian leadership
on the West Bank at that time? I put this very question to Mr. Bassam Al-Shakaa,
former mayor of Nablus and a victim of the Israeli assault, in August of 1986. In
part, Mr. Shakaa said:
The military authorities were very frustrated over the failure of
the Village League idea. They were equally frustrated in not
finding other quislings to sing their tune. The Israeli authorities
became very hostile towards the National Guidance Committee
simply because it appeared to be effective in articulating and
crystalizing the Palestinians1 political sentiments. And since
these sentiments reflected their wishes to end the occupation
and to have the right to self-determination, the Israeli military
government used restrictions and deportations against the mayors
to undermine the goals as well as the structure of the National
Guidance Committee.?6
All of the Israeli measures to weaken and destroy the NGC were quite consistent
with Israel's policy to prevent the development of any organization that could
serve as a building block in the structure of Palestinian nationhood. In fact, when
Israel realized that truly democratic elections on the West Bank could only pave
the way for such organizations and nationalist forces in general to come to the
fore, Israel simply moved to prevent such a process from occurring. According to
Jordanian law, which Israel claims to uphold on the West Bank, municipal
75"Israel: No Municipal Elections On the West Bank" Palestine
Perspective (Washington, D. C.,: Palestine Research and Education Center,
May, 1984), p.7.




elections should take place every four years. Since 1976, however, Israel had
refused to allow democratic elections anywhere in the occupied territories. The
refusal appeared to have been motivated by political rather than military or
security considerations. This point was illustrated when members of the
Municipal Council of Dura, a Palestinian town in the Hebron district, requested
from the High Court of Justice a permission to hold open elections. The
occupation authorities countered the Palestinian appeal with an affidavit
submitted by Brigadier General Binyamin Ben Eliezer which demanded that the
Palestinians' request be denied on the basis that elections would be "exploited by
terrorist organizations and their lackeys in the region." A senior assistant to
the State Attorney's office echoed the same sentiment by warning that
democratic elections in the West Bank and Gaza are "in the interest of the PLO
and its supporters . . . and this is sufficient cause for Israel to prevent that. °
Needless to say, the occupation authorities had their way and no elections were
held in Dura or anywhere else in the occupied areas since 1976.
The successful repression of the nationalist leadership in the occupied
territories did not put an end to Israel's search for an alternate one. According to
Yehuda Litani, an Israeli journalist, the political void left by the NGC was not





locally filled by either the Village Leaguers or the pro-Jordanians. In the mid
1980's, however, and with Israel's sanction, Jordan renewed its efforts to bypass
the PLO's representation of the Palestinians on the West Bank. This was done by
buttressing its supporters with money and by withdrawing its recognition of the
nationalist elements on the West Bank. Jordan, for example, expanded the role
of the Islamic Waqf (Islamic Trust) a Jordanian ministry, to encompass
everydayconcerns such as handling of applications for Jordanian passports and the
like on the West Bank. Financial assistance, including $4.5 million from the U.S.,
was channeled to the occupied areas through Jordanian agents. Taher Kanann,
Jordan's minister of planning, described his government's five-year plan of
spending $1.3 billion in the West Bank through mayors appointed by Israel as an
urgent humanitarian step. The minister denied that the development plan was an
attempt to strengthen pro-Jordanian elements or that it had any political
implications. The minister's denials seemed unconvincing in light of the fact
that in early August of 1986, Jordan withdrew its recognition of the elected
mayors.00 This was nothing more than a belated approval of what Israel had
80"After the National Guidance Committee, "Journal of Palestine
Studies, Vol. XIV, No. 3 (Spring 1985), pp. 175-176.
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August
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83"Jordanian Cancels Its Recognition of Elected Mayors in the West
Bank," Al-Fajr (Jerusalem: The West Bank, August 11, 1986), p.2.
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already done. These Jordanian moves, Al-Quds newspaper argued, were part and
parcel of an Israeli scheme to return parts of the occupied territories to Jordan
while retaining sovereignty over the rest. It is interesting to note that the
scheme, occasionally called the Jordanian option, did not include the PLO or self-
determination for the Palestinians.**4 In the end, the net result of this scheme
did not differ from any previous Israeli plan. In fact, no matter how these plans
were packaged the Israeli goal remained the same: No self-determination for the
Palestinians in the occupied territories.
84"The Magical Paper!," Al-Quds (Jerusalem: The West Bank, August
25, 1986), p.l. (Arabic)
CHAPTER FOUR
THE ECONOMICS OF ISRAELI OCCUPATION
COLONIAL PATTERN
Historically, the economy of occupied territories is generally shaped by the
constraints and limitations of the occupying power. In this respect, the Israeli
occupation of the West Bank and Gaza most certainly fits this classic colonial
pattern. Since 1967, the occupied territories had been a protected domain for
Israeli manufactured goods and a source of cheap, unskilled labor.1 It is within
these parameters that one can come to grips with the political-economic
configuration and consequences of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank.
Long before the 1967 War, some Israeli leaders had given serious thought to
the type of economic relationship Israel should have with its Arab neighbors.
Abba Eban, a former foreign minister, articulated this thinking when he described
the envisioned relationship as "not the relationship which exists between Lebanon
and Syria; it is far more akin to the relations between the United States and the
Latin American Continent. In other words, Eban was basically advocating the
core-periphery model as the framework for Israel-Arab relations, in which the
former acts as the core and latter serves as the periphery. Israel had its golden
opportunity to implement such a system following the occupation of the West
iMeron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project. A Survey of Israel's
Policies (Washington and London: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1984), p. 8.
2Abba Eban, Voice of Israel (New York, 1957), p. 63.
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Bank and Gaza in 1967. Through the use of military orders and other practices as
instruments of domination, Israel managed to regulate and restrict the economy
of the occupied territories, and thus maintained the core-periphery relationship
which ultimately served its interests.
From the very outset of the occupation, the Israelis had been integrating
the economies of the West Bank and Gaza into their own economy without taking
the crucial step of formal integration.-' For some, the reason for doing so was
political, since formal integration was tantamount to annexation.4 For others,
Meron Benvenisti among them, the reason Israel had stopped short of formal
integration was chiefly economic. Formal and total integration, it was argued,
meant the extension of the "social welfare system that dominates the economic
scene in Israel." This meant "selective taxation and massive subsidies, direct
involvement in refinancing, infrastructure development, massive aid in recession
periods, differential tariffs, and foreign currency manipulations."^ Naturally,
Israel did not want to extend these "privileges" to the occupied areas because it
would have had the effect of keeping the Palestinians on the land. In short, Israel
wanted the benefits of the occupation without the burdens. Both explanations,
however, appeared to emanate from the Israelis' general view of the West Bank
3john P. Richardson, The West Bank: A Portrait (Washington, D. C: The
Middle East Institute, 1984), p. 133.
4jan Metzger, Martin Orth, and Christian Sterzing, This Land Is Our Land.
The West Bank Under Israeli Occupation (United Kingdom: World University
Service, 1984), p. 86.
^Benvenisti, p. 9.
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and its people. In this regard Benvenisti affirmed:
Israelis perceive themselves as the only legitimate collective
in the land of Israel, and therefore all Palestinian claims to
communal (economic and political) rights are illegitimate
and, by definition, subversive. This view, though diffused and
controversial among Israelis ideologically, served as an
unwritten guideline for economic decision makers.6
While the aforementioned policies and perceptions pointed to a purposeful
underdevelopment of the West Bank's economy by the occupying power, they did
not reveal the extent of that underdevelopment. It is the object of this chapter
to examine the effects of the said policies, induced by perceptions or otherwise,
on various aspects of the West Bank's economy.
Agriculture
Agriculture had always been the most significant and productive branch of
the West Bank economy.' Under occupation, however, Israeli policies had placed
a number of restraints which led to stagnation in this sector. Some of the
restraints came in the form of military orders which regulated and constricted
various aspects of farming, ranging from planting to marketing. Other restraints
took the form of practices which deprived the agricultural sector of some
valuable land and water resources. Collectively, these Israeli measures brought
about changes in the agricultural domain that were designed to serve Israel's
needs rather than those of the West Bank. The restraints became starkly clear
when shipments of vegetables, plums, and grapes from the West Bank to Israel





winter tomatoes and cucumbers precipitated a decline in the profits of Israeli
farmers, restrictions and quotas were imposed on the Palestinian farmers through
Order 1039." The underlying theme of Israel's policy in this regard had been that
the agricultural products of the occupied areas should complement instead of
compete with Israeli products. Hence, a number of Israeli agronomists were
assigned to the West Bank to guarantee the goal of non-competitiveness with
Israeli agricultural products.^
One of the earliest measures imposed by the Israelis on Palestinian farmers
was Order 47 of 1967 which prohibited the import and export by the West Bank of
all agricultural products, plants and animals, without a permit from the
occupation authorities.11 By controlling the valves of trade, Israel placed itself
in the commanding position of regulating, to a large extent, the growth, or lack
of, of the West Bank's agricultural sector. Within the West Bank, even the
seemingly mundane matters relative to agriculture were made complex by the
Israeli regulations and military orders. An illustration of this was the issuance of
Order 134 in 1967, which prohibited the transfer or operation of a tractor or any
piece of agricultural machinery in the West Bank without a permit from the




UKuttab and Shehadeh, p. 31.
id., P- 36.
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which pertained to monitoring the planting of fruit-bearing trees also hampered
agricultural development on the West Bank. The second provision of this order
prohibited West Bankers from planting any fruit-bearing tree without first
obtaining a written permission from the appropriate authorities and meeting their
"conditions."13 The third provision denied West Bankers the right even to replace
old trees with new ones without a permit. To add insult to injury, Palestinians
had to pay a fee to secure the permit if the authorities chose to set a fee.
Provision 10(A) of the same order dictated that individuals who failed to follow
its directions may be imprisoned for one year, or pay a fine of 1,500 sheckles or
both. Moreover, once an individual was found guilty of violating this order his or
her trees were uprooted at the "offender's expense".14 To get their point across,
Israeli soldiers uprooted 1,500 olive trees which they claimed were planted
illegally in Obeidiyya village in the West Bank.15 Decree 1039 extended decree
1015 to include restrictions on the planting of vegetables and the need of "non-
Jewish" farmers to acquire a permit beforehand. Rafael Eatan, a Knesset
member, described the objective of the decree as a means '"to pressure hostile
elements and to benefit positive elements.'"1" But the underlying purpose of the
decree, as Avigodar Feldman put it, was far more reaching than simply using it as
13Militarv Orders - 1983. Vol. 8, No. 56 (Ramallah, West Bank: Law in the
Service of Man), pp.71-73.
14lbid.
15"Israelis Uproot Trees," Palestine Perspectives. No. 17
(June/July 1985), p. 8.
l6"Economic Conditions Under Occupation," Palestine Congress of North
America Monthly. Vol.6, No. 2 (April, 1986), p.7.
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leverage. He said '"in order to receive a permit to grow tomatoes on one's own
land, one must prove ownership to it. Not every arab (sic) has such official
ownership documents and so it often happens that the land over which ownership
cannot be proven, falls into the hands of the state of Israel."!? Needless to say,
these decrees and military orders left many West Bankers in a quandry regarding
their very viability as farmers. Not only did the West Bank farmers have to cope
" with a complex web of decrees and their debilitating effects, but had to stand
helplessly as the occupying authorities deprived them of some of the best farm
land and a substantial part of their water resources.
Early in the occupation period, the Israeli military government issued a
number of military orders declaring large tracts of land "closed areas" under the
pretext of security considerations. Several former Jordanian military camps,for
instance, were designated as closed areas although many of those were located on
arable land and could have easily been used by the local Palestinian inhabitants.
The takeover of four camps by Orders 201 through 204*8 m January of 1968 was
a direct result of the "closed area" policy which was employed by the occupation
authorities to justify their control of the land. Practically each one of these
military orders imposed severe punishments and fines on those who violated the
restrictions by entering the said areas without permission.1? The "closed area-
policy was not by any means limited to former army camps, but extended to
17lbid
o . 18Mil^ary Orders, 1967-1968, Vol. 1 (Ramallah, West Bank: Law in the
Service of Man), pp. 395, 397, 399, 401.
19lbid.
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private, arable land as well. Palestinian farmers protested the closing of these
areas and called for their reopening. Among those who made their feelings
known to the military governor was Tahseen Al-Faris, chairman of the executive
committee of the Agricultural Marketing Cooperative in the Nablus District. In
a speech on January 5, 1982, Al-Faris requested " the opening of the closed areas
to the farmer whether it is for cultivation, grazing, or erecting structures, as
well as terminating all acts of confiscation and takeover of lands in all
provinces so that our farmers can put the land into good use."20
Any pretense that the Israelis may have used to exploit the West Bank's
natural resources during the first three years of occupation was dropped on June
5, 1970. On that date, the military government issued Order 389 which gave the
military governor the power to control all natural resources in the occupied
territories. 1 In essence, this order merely provided a stamp of authority to
practices that were already underway. For example, at the outset of the
occupation, Israel destroyed 140 irrigation pumps just west of the Jordan River.
Some felt that this was done to deprive the local population of its livelihood and
facilitate its emigration.22 Moreover, it confiscated scores of wells which led to
the shrinking of irrigated land from 100,000 dunums in 1966 to 98,000 dunums (a
20Arab Society Documents. No. 50 (Jerusalem: Center of Statistical
Studies, Organization of Arab Studies, n.d.). (Arabic)
^Military Orders. 1968-1971. Vol. 2 (Ramallah, West Bank: Law in the
Service of Man), pp. 810-811.
22"The Occupation Loots the Water Resources of the West Bank and Gaza
But Remains Thirsty,1 Al-Hourriah. No. 176 (August 17, 1986), pp. 18-19.
(Arabic)
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dunum is about iof an acre) in 1*1.23 Furthermore> Wl^ dug u ^
artesian wells in the Ghor region with a capacity of producing more than half the
volume pumped by the 314 Arab wells combined^ Meanwhile, the use of water
resources by West Bankers for agricultural purposes had been subjected to Israeli
constraints which in effect had frozen the level of consumption to twenty per
cent higher than that of 1967.25 other measures included appropriation of all
farm land in the Jordan Valley which was suitable for cash-crops but required




Bank was clearly described by Paul Quiring, Programme Director
Mennonite Central Committee in Jerusalem. On September 12, 1977, Quiring
said:
The development of such wells for the Israeli settlements must
sector0 ifrT brkdoP °f Wat6r devel°P—t in the Palestinian
West Bank laWnT T Palestinian vUlages <* individuals on the
West Bank which have been permitted to drill new irrigation wells
since 1967. Mekorot (Israeli National Water Authorityfte^towLr
allowed six wells to be drilled for domestic purposes. This ack oT
water resource development and the confiscation of wells on "ateentee
property means that there are fewer wells providing less water
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The Israeli assault on the West Bank's land and water resources continued
unabated well into tne 1,80's. Accordmg ,o Hashim Saleh, mayor of Tobas, Israel
had caused great destruction to agriculture in his area. He said:
The Israeli occupation authorities destroyed over two thous™,.
housMg units that were specially se, aside forTte farmersTL
were
land and built settlements on it, dug up a number of
In addition to the general restrictions imposed on agriculture in the West
Bank, Palestinian farmers were periodically subjected to methods of
intimidations employed by government officials and settlers alike. A common
practice was to intercept the farmers' trucks during the harvest season as they
attempted to sell their produce in different parts of the occupied areas. On
September H, 1986, to cite a recent example, customs agents and policemen set
up roadblocks at the entrances to Jerusalem and prevented the farmers from
transporting their products to the northern or southern areas of the West Bank,
confiscated part of the produce and destroyed other parts, on the pretext that'
they had failed to secure a permit.** Just two days after this incident, Israeli
settlers uprooted 120 olive and almond trees in the Palestinian village of Kariut
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near Nab.us.30 since the owner of tne trees did no, vio.a,e any .aws and his ,i,le
«o the .and was no, in question, the uprooting ac, can only he seen as another
■ntimidating method to discourage other Palestinians from pursuing farming as a
career or quite possibly ,o deprive them of their livelihood.
As a result of the Israeli policies, the grea.es, change in West Bank
agriculture had been the reduction in the amount of land under cu.tiva.ion as we.,
as the number of people employed in this sector. 31
the
control over the ,and and water resources had led to a substantial reduction in
the size of cultivated land on the West Bank. Since 1967, the cultivated land
area had declined by 100,000 acres, about one-fifth of the ,o,al area under
cultivation^ a. number of peop]e ^^ fa^^^^^^
decreased from 42.5 «o 28.5 percen. in .he Wes. Bank and from 31.6 .o 16.5
percent in ,he Gaza S.rip.33 mSe^ of^^^^^^^
improvement in technology which reduced the need for manual labor, i« was a!so
a reflection of the loss of arable land to Israeli expropriations a^ the
of the agricultural sector on the West Bank.
Quds
32Said> A Profile nf the PiWM.. P-~rl i p. 23.
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Agricultural production on the Was, Bank had a modes, growth in some
areas during the occupation period due ,o greater mechanization and better seed
-lection as the figures in Tab!e 1 (p. 87) show.A close look a. these figures would
mdicate that inconsistency rather than consistency was the norm in growth
Pattern, and that when seen over a seventeen-year period the growth becomes
modes, mdeed. Given the f.uct«a,ions in the increases in production, one tends
«o be hesitan, about reaching a conclusion tha, a substantial development had
taken place in West Bank's agriculture during the Israeli occupation. Even if we
were to accept the notion tha, moderate growth had taken p!ace in this sector,
one cannot help bu, wonder about the extent of growth that could have occurred
had the 100,000 dunums lost to agriculture been in use, or drilling of wells for
irrigation had teen allowed, or if the numerous restrictions on planting and
marketing had not been imposed.. Therefore, 1, is the conclusion of this writer
that the agricultural sector of the West Bank had been underdeveloped during the
occupation period simply because Israeli policies had kept i, from reaching its
potential.
Industry
The underdevelopment of the industrial sector was more profound than that
of the agricultural sector in terms of growth, or more appropriately, lack of it.
Israel's policy toward Palestinian industry, whether on the West Bank or Gaza,
was clearly aimed at bringing about stagnation and even decline in production!
Regarding the Palestinian industry, Israel's industrialization plan recommended a
policy of "no participation, financing and investment.'^ The plan appeared to
34Benvenisti, p. 18.
TABLE I
VOLUME OF PRODUCTION OF VARIOUS AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS OF THE WEST BANK35
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have demographic as well as economic goals since it called for "restricting
industrial development" in all of the urban centers of the West Bank.36
Small as it was, the industrial sector of the West Bank had steadily declined
under the constraints of Israel's occupational policies. Despite the shortage of
data in this area, a comparison of Awartanfs survey of industries in the West
Bank in 1979 with that of Mohammad Masrouji in 1984 was adequate to provide
evidence of the general decline that occurred in the industrial sector. Based on
those two surveys, Table 2 shows the distribution of industries in the West Bank
by areas and number of workers employed for the years 1978 and 1981. (Table 2
is on page 95 ). Table 2 shows a significant decrease in the total number of
industrial sites in the West Bank between 1978 and 1981 -459 to be exact. 37
This decrease did not merely indicate stagnation but negative growth as well. In
the category of small workshops (1 to 9 workers), there was a decrease in all
areas except Jerusalem, m workshops hiring between 10 and 19 employees, five
out of the eight areas witnessed a decrease. In the category of 20 to 49 workers,
there was a decrease in three areas, increase in two, and three areas remained
unchanged. In the industries of 50 workers or more, the number of factories in
all areas either remained the same or declined except for Toulkarm, which had
opened one factory of that size. The reduction in the number of factories was
clearly reflected in the industrial sector's share of the gross domestic product,
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What caused this decline in the West Bank's industrial sector? More specifically,
were Israeli regulations and practices largely responsible for the retardation in
this area? Military Order 219 of 1967 forbade the use of any engineering or
construction equipment without first registering it and having it pass
inspection.™ A construction contractor explained the impact of the order as
follows:
This regulation put several small contractors out of business
because they were not able to replace the equipment which the
Israeli inspectors rejected. As a result of this, there was a
slowdown in the Arab construction sector, which is probably what the Jews
aimed to do in the first place.40
Moreover, while Military Order 470 of 1972 empowered the "Person Responsible"
to issue and cancel licenses for crafts and industries, Order 471 extended his
power to exempt others from obtaining such licenses if he so desired.^* Although
some of the regulations imposed by the orders appeared innocent and routine,
their application was done in a most capricious manner. Mayor Shakaa of Nablus
explained their implementation this way:
Israeli orders and regulations dealing with Palestinian industry and
trade in general have been used for a dual purpose: first, to suppress
industrial expansion and ensure non-competition with Israeli products;
38Benvenistoi p. 15.
39Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 39.
40 Personal interview in Jerusalem in August, 1986.
4lKuttab and Shehadeh, p. 49.
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and second, to use them as an instrument to punish
political dissenters and to reward collaborators.42
If there were any doubts about the restrictive nature of the early military orders
in this domain, they were laid to rest by Military Order 653 of 1976. This Order
prohibited people in the occupied territories from producing, importing or
exporting certain products without a license from the "Person Responsible"43
This in effect led to the constriction, or even suffocation, of industrial growth in
both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Hanna Nasser, owner of a towel factory
in Bethlehem, attributed the lack of growth in the West Bank's industrial sector
to two pestering problems resulting from Israeli regulations. He said, "'In the
West Bank we have had no banks since 1967 and we are unable to buy any new
machines to improve the efficiency of our work."44 This feeling of being
suffocated in the industrial sector was also enunciated by Anwar Nusseibeh,
director of the East Jerusalem Electricity Corporation. Nusseibeh observed that:
The Jerusalem Electricity Company is continually being harassed
by the occupation authorities in an attempt to squeeze it out of
business. They are doing this for political reasons as much as for
economic ones. They don't want a major Palestinian company to
stay on its feet. The regulations they passed, especially the one
setting a ceiling on our prices of electricity but not on the goods
they sell us, are designed to prevent any further expansion of our
services and ultimately to devour our company.45
42personal interview with Mayor Bassam al-Shakaa of Nablus in
August of 1986.
43Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 54.
44Daoud Kuttab, "See No Evil, Speak No Evil," Al-Fair
(August 8, 1986), p. 16.
45Personal interview with Anwar Nusseibeh in Jerusalem in July of 1986.
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It is worth noting that early on, through Order 159, the military governor had
assumed the power which was given to the Council of Electrical Authority in the
West Bank by the Jordanian government in 1967.4^
To preclude Palestinian industry from competing with Israeli products,
Israel employed a number of measures to shut down such industries and to
prohibit potential competitors from being established. A tomato paste factory,
the only one of its kind at the time in both the East and West Bank, was forced to
close in the 1970's. One-way trade from Israel and heavy taxation were the
main reasons cited for this closing. In yet another case, a request of some
Palestinian entrepreneurs to open a cement factory in Hebron in the early 1980's
was blocked by the Israelis for the simple reason that Israel already had such an
industry. In 1985, the occupation authorities imposed several new restrictions
on the West Bank's industry that insured its underdevelopment. Among other
things, the Israeli authorities decreed that no new Arab industrial locations would
be permitted or established, nor would any existing ones be allowed to expand.^
In addition to all of the preceding restrictions, the West Bank's industrial
sector had to compete in an unfair contest with Jewish industries being built on
46Militarv Orders. 1967. Vol. 1 (Ramallah, West Bank: Law in the Service
of Man), pp. 328-329.
47personal interview with a member of the Jerusalem Chamber of
Commerce in July of 1986.
49"Economic Conditions Under Occupation," Palestine Congress of North
America. Vol. 6, No.2 (April 1986), p. 7.
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the West Bank itself. By 1983, six Jewish industrial parks had been built on the
West Bank, occupying 1,260 dunums and employing 2,500 workers.50 These
Jewish industries were entitled to receive massive support from the Israeli
government in terms of investments, selective taxation, and subsidies. For being
in the occupied territories, these industries were "eligible for grants of 30
percent and loans of 40 percent of their investment at a real interest rate of 0.5
percent or, linked to the dollar of 6 percent. Plants are entitled to free physical
infrastructure and to short-term credit facilities."51 Since the Palestinian
industry on the West Bank was neither eligible for any of the preceding
facilitators of business nor was it allowed to receive assistance freely from Arab
countries, it was literally impossible for it to experience any significant growth
under these conditions. If any development in the industrial sector was taking
place, it was a Jewish development. Furthermore, the Israeli government had
planned to construct 14 more Jewish industrial parks in the West Bank by year
2010.52 Therefore, the future of the Palestinian industry on the West Bank
appeared to be bleak indeed if the Israeli plans were to proceed uninterrupted.
Tourism
Agriculture and industry were not by any means the only sectors of the





the West Bank economy had suffered more from Israeli policies than tourism. As
indicated in Chapter Two, tourism was a healthy and vibrant sector of the
economy under Jordanian rule. Within a short time after the occupation began,
the tourist trade in the West Bank started to descend. This decline became
evident over the years in terms of the number of hotels in operation, the number
of beds available,and the number of annual guests received at these hotels.
In East Jerusalem, the number of hotels remained constant at 40 from 1964
to 1984.53 In the rest of the West Bank, the number of hotels decreased from 29
in 1970 to 16 in 1984.54 The number of available beds in West Bank hotels also
decreased from 868 to 645 during the same period. Moreover, a sharp decrease
occurred in the number of guests registering at these hotels. Based on Israeli
statistics, the number of guests at West Bank hotels, not counting Jerusalem,
plummeted from 20,483 in 1968 to 10,511 in 1984.55 The underlying causes
behind this slide in the tourist trade can be traced to Military Orders 87 and 173
of 1967. In effect, Order 87 transferred all the power given to the Jordanian
government under the Temporary Jordanian Tourism Law to the "Person
Responsible" under the Israeli occupation.5" The Order cancelled all licenses and




56Ruttab and Shehadeh, pp. 33-34.
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conditional «o the approval of the "Person Responsible.^ Orier m
'.ravel agents and tour grides from offering any services in the West Bank except
as par, of a too, originate ta faael ^ |icensed by ^ ^^^^.^^
fulfilling the terms and conditions of such license."** ^ effect of this Order on
•he West Bank's tourist industry was clearly devastating. Since the Order linked
their work to tours originating in Israel, Palestinian travel agents found
themselves a. the mercy of their Israeli counterparts. The situation for
Palestinian tOuris, agencies deteriorated further when the occupation authorities
added new regulations on March 28, 1,84. The latest regulation stipulated tha,
those who wish to run a travel or tourist agency must firs, secure a five-thousand
dinar promissory note from a Ucensed bank to ge, a permit to operate.
Furthermore, the bank note must be renewed annually according to
regulation." x^ regulatioM m ^
the
a mMt ^carious
expensive to establish a tourist agency, bu, also made i,
business adventure. In short, the continued existence of a Palestinian travel
agency depended on the goodwil. of the Israeli tourist industry and the whims of
Israeli banks.
In addition to the governmental constraints, the West Bank's tourist industry
was subjected to some practices which had eroded its position even further.





Israelis did their utmost to dissuade Americans and Europeans from staying in the
Arab sector of Jerusalem and the West Bank in general. An Arab hotel owner
asserted that he heard Israeli guides, on more than one occasion, telling English-
speaking tourists that they should be wary of Arabs because they "cheat and
steal", and that their safety could not be guaranteed if they slept in the Arab
section.60 On the official level, the Israeli Tourist Ministry, through its offices
overseas, promoted only Israeli hotels thus diverting most of the tourist business
in their direction.61 Further, Arab hotels, like other West Bank businesses,
suffered from the heavy taxation they were subjected to by the Israeli tax
collectors. Not only was this practice prohibited by international law, but it was
also done in a most arbitrary manner. A member of the Jerusalem Chamber of
Commerce echoed the sentiment of many Palestinian businessmen when he
described the tax-collectors1 methods of operation this way:
They (Israeli tax-collectors) always seem to assume that Arab businessmen
cheat on their taxes by concealing their true incomes. Therefore, instead
of using the business records to determine the correct amount of taxes, tax-
collectors resort to estimating the Arabs' income which invariably turns out
to be greater than the real income. To lend this unfair practice some
credence and justify their robbery, the Jewish tax-agents would pounce on
Arab businesses at their busiest times and then use that hour of work or day
as a yardstick to estimate the establishment's income for the rest of the
year.62
60personal interviews with Palestinian hotel-owners in the Jerusalem-Bethehem
area in July of 1986.
6lAttiah, p. 270.
62personal interview with a member of the Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce in
July 1986. .
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The Palestinian Refugee Camp of Kalandia, just north of Jerusalem, was
subjected to such a practice in June of 1985. As the Border police and the
regular police encircled the camp, tax officials ordered all the stores within the
Camp to close for business as they went inside each one to assess them for tax
purposes. According to the Israelis, the Palestinians were not paying the
"appropriate" taxes and therefore were fined 10,000 dollars.^3
The Israeli restrictions and practices that were imposed on practically all
aspects of the West Bank's economy did not merely underdevelop the affected
sectors, but, as expected, had a devastating impact on both trade and labor.
Trade
Prior to the 1967 war, both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip ran a deficit
in their trading with the outside world. The exports from both areas were
basically agricultural products and their imports were mostly industrial products
and some foodstuffs."4 Once the occupation set in, the direction of the flow of
trade shifted, but the deficit continued. Since the occupied areas had very little
choice in the matter, as is the case in practically all other occupied territories,
Israel became their greatest trading partner. Table 3 and 4 not only confirmed
this fact, but signified the high degree of dependency of the occupied on the
occupier. The dependence of the West Bank on Israeli imports appeared
to be on the increase as evidenced by the statistics in Table 3.
63personal interview with several merchants in the Kalandia Camp in
July 1986.
64Van Arkadie, p. 77.
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TABLE 3
WEST BANK IMPORTS ACCORDING TO COUNTRIES IMPORTED FROM
AND TYPE OF PRODUCTS FOR THE YEARS 1981, 1982, 1983**
(IN JORDANIAN DINARS)
Countries
















































The total of imports from Israel increased from over 133 million dinars in 1981 to
over 142 million in 1982 and to nearly 156 million in 1983. As for exports, it
65Attiah, p. 244.
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should be noted that most of the manufactured goods "exported" to Israel from
the West Bank and Gaza were largely the result of "subcontracting arrangements
with Israeli firms producing food, textiles, leather, and building material The sale
of agricultural products has been restricted to prevent competition with Israeli
farmers.66"
TABLE 4
WEST BANK EXPORTS ACCORDING TO COUNTRIES EXPORTED TO

















































The cumulative picture of exports versus imports was not an encouraging one for
the West Bank's economy. In 1981, for example, imports exceeded exports by 100
per cent. The situation worsened in 1982 and by 1983 imports surpassed exports




Israel were merely $26.8 million in 1968, but grew to $263.2 million in 1984.68
Similarly, trade deficit between Gaza and Israel mushroomed from $11.4 to $161
million during the same period.** This was simply further ^.^ ^^^
degree of dependency that the occupied territories had reached on their occupier.
Lack of any substantive economic development in the West Bank and Gaza
caused Palestinian workers to flock in large numbers to Israel or to Israeli
settlements in search of employment. Israeli law required Arab workers from the
occupied territories who wanted to work in Israel to register at one of thirty
employment offices scattered in the West Bank and Gaza.™ According to the
decree, registered workers would be assigned work based on the needs of the
Israeli economy.™ By 1985, the number of workers from the occupied territories
who were employed in Israel and on the settlements reached 72,000 and 24,624
respectively. The vast majority of this labor force was engaged in construction
and service jobs, and less than 16 percent worked in industrial jobs.™ In other





most Jews refused to do.
All workers from the West Bank and Gaza were classified by Israeli
economic legislation as "'non-resident workers'". As such, these Palestinian
workers were not eligible for the social benefits accorded to their Israeli equals
under the Social Security Law. 73 It is worth noting that Palestinian laborers
who were employed by Israelis were required to contribute to Israel's Social
Security System like their Jewish counterparts. Using this practice, the Israeli
government amassed huge but undetermined sums of money during the first
nineteen years of occupation and did not spend one shekel of it on these workers
for retirement, disability or unemployment benefits.74 Moreover, since
Palestinians were not allowed to join the Histadrut, the Israeli Labor Union,
Palestinian workers in Israel had no union protection against layoffs and arbitrary
dismissals. D For this reason, recessions in the Israeli economy affected the
Palestinian worker more immensely than the Israeli worker. This may have
seemed as a positive development for the occupied territories since that meant
increasing their labor force. This was irrelevant, however, because Israeli
restrictions had already caused a shrinkage in some sectors of the occupied areas'
economy and stagnation in others. Hence, Palestinian workers who lost their jobs
in Israel generally became unemployed or emigrated in search of work.
73ibid.
74Schwartz, p.2.
75"The Changing Society of the West Bank," Journal of Palestine Studies,
Vol. Vm, No. 4 (Summer 1979), p. 149.
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Having one third of the occupied areas1 labor force employed in Israel and in
the settlements had an adverse effect on the economic development of the West
Bank in general, and the agricultural sector in particular. According to a number
of farmers, the increased Arab labor in Israel and the Jewish settlements had not
merely driven up the cost of labor on the West Bank, but also deprived it of badly
needed "working hands" for the development of the area.7^ Generally speaking,
Palestinian laborers in Israel earned between 60 to 90 percent more than their
counterparts in the occupied areas. It is worth noting, though, that these same
laborers received less than half the average Israeli wage for similar work.77 The
conditions and wages for other Arab workers in Israel, especially the illegal
laborers, were far worse. A large number of Arab workers, mostly children, were
exploited by Israeli employers, particularly in the agricultural sector. The
process used in selecting these workers, their treatment at work, and the wages
they received had all the earmarks of a slave market. Writing in Davar, Nahum
Barnea said:
The fate of the little Beduin children, the Kunte-Kintas of the state of
Israelis really touching. They get up at dawn for their long march to their
Jewish boss who exploits them mercilessly. The work in the sun and the
money they getcannot buy them 5 falafel (an inexpensive vegetable patty)
portions in Jeruselem.78
76personal interview with farmers in the Jenin-Toulkarm region in
August 1986.
77Sai'd, p. 24.
?8"The Market of Arab Children In Israel," in a Collection prepared by the
Israel League for Human and Civil Rights, Document No. 1479 (Jerusalem:
Arab Studies Society, n.d.), p. 9.
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Being largely integrated into the Israeli economy, the labor market of the
occupied territories vas naturally affected by the major currents impacting the
occupier's economy. To prop up its ailing economy and to reduce the deficit,
estimated at more than four billion dollars, Israel adopted a number of measures
in 1985 which had a detrimental effect on the economy of the occupied
territories, and naturally, their labor force.79 Among the measures affecting
Arab workers were the imposition of a production tax of thirty-eight percent and
a property tax of six percent. For Jewish workers, the rates were one percent
and about two and a half percent respectively.80 Furthermore, with Arab
workers earning less than fifty-nine percent of their Jewish counterparts, the
increase in prices of consumer products by ten to twenty percent was devastating
for Arab employees.81 The extent of the devastation was clearly reflected in a
comparison of the loss of income to inflation between Arab and Jewish workers.
It was estimated that the loss of income due to inflation was thirty-eight percent
for Arab workers and a mere one percent for Jewish workers.8^ The chief reason
for the discrepancy was that Palestinian wages, unlike Israeli wages, were not
79"Economic Conditions Under Occupation," Palestine Congress of North
America Monthly. Vol, 6, No. 2 (April 1986), p. 7.
80ibid.
81lbid.
82"Economic Conditions Under Occupation," Palestine Congress of North
America Monthly. Vol, 6, No. 2 (April 1986), p. 7.
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linked to the inflation index.®-* According to this formula, Israeli laborers were
protected from the ravages of inflation by linking their wages to the ever
increasing cost of living index. In other words, any increase in the cost of living
was automatically matched by an increase in the Israeli worker's income. This
formula, however, did not apply to Arab workers.
Standard of Living
The relative improvement in the standard of living in the West Bank and
Gaza was generally presented by Israel as an indication of economic development
in the occupied territories, to support this contention, Israeli statistics were
offered to show a marked increase in consumption, especially of durable
household goods, among the Palestinian population as shown in Table 5. Other
Israeli sources pointed to the fact that West Bank residents had only 6,300
telephones in 1967 and 7,500 cars in 1968. By 1980, the number of cars had risen
to 33,000 and the number of telephones climbed to 19,000.**4 While Israeli
propagandists were quick to claim credit for this obvious increase in consumption
of durable goods in the West Bank and Gaza, they conveniently failed to mention
that most of these commodities were far beyond the reach of the average
Palestinian worker.
83Alan Andresd, "Not So Eyeless In Gaza: Observations on a Visit,
"Palestine Congress of North America Monthly. Vol, 4, No. 8 (August 1984),
pp. 10-11.
84coordinator of Government Operations in Judea and Samaria, Gaza
District, Sinai, Golan Height, A Thirteen-Year Survey (1967-1980) (Jerusalem:
Ministry of Defense, January 1981), pp. 3-4.
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TABLE 5
WEST BANK AND GAZA HOUSEHOLDS POSSESSING DURABLE GOODS
FOR SELECTED YEARS 85
(PERCENT OF ALL HOUSEHOLDS)
Commodity
Electrical or Gas Stove












































The Israelis also pointed to the "active" housing industry as another indication of
improvement in the standard of living on the West Bank. Claims of progress in
this area, however, were somewhat inconsistent as shown by the figures in
Table 6.
85Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel. 1983, No. 34
(Jerusalem: Hed Press, Ltd., 1983), p. 771.
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TABLE 6
AREA OF BUILDINGS THAT WERE CONSTRUCTED IN THE WEST









































As clearly seen in Table 6, the bulk of investment in construction had been
carried out in the private sector. Construction in the public sector, on the other
hand, generally declined throughout the occupation period and finally came to a
standstill in 1982 and remained that way through 1984. This decrease was largely
attributed to the reduction in the construction of schools and other public
facilities due to Israeli impediments.
By using consumption and to a lesser degree construction as the only
criteria to measure the standard of living on the West Bank, one may conclude




however, that there was any serious linkage between the improvement in the
standard of living and the underdevelopment of practically all sectors of the
economy on the West Bank as explained earlier in this chapter. Then, to what do
we attribute the considerable increase of purchasing durable goods in the
occupied territories? There were a number of factors which accounted for this
increase in consumption. First, as indicated earlier, many of the Palestinians
who lost their land to Israeli expropriation or were forced out of the market by
restrictive measures joined the ranks of wage-earners and thus had more cash at
their disposal. Second, substantial amount of remittances were sent on regular
basis from relatives working outside the occupied areas.88 This money
augmented their income and made it possible for them to buy some of the durable
goods and thus improved their standard of living. Third, the funds funnelled by
the Jordanian-Palestinian Coordination Committee to various institutions and
municipalities to stem the tide of emigration had undoubtedly increased the cash
flow in the West Bank and contributed somewhat to the superficial appearance of
improvement in the standard of living. Israel prohibited the entry of such funds
in August of 1981.89 Last but not least, while it was true that some Palestinian
families had more capital at their disposal, their options of what to do with it
were very limited. Israeli economic constraints precluded most Palestinians from
88Antoine S. Mansour, "Monetary Dualism: The Case of the West Bank
Under Occupation," Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XI, No. 3 (Spring 1982),
p. 114. Also in Gharaibeh, pp. 19—21.
89Mansour, pp. 19-21.
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making any serious investment in agriculture or industry.90 Hence, the increase
in their purchasing power of Israeli durable goods.
The underlying causes for the moderate level of activity in the construction
sector, chiefly housing, were largely the same as those for purchasing durable
goods. The only major difference between the two was that the housing industry,
limited as it was, had been motivated by social and political factors as well as
Q1
necessity.71 Nevertheless, according to several Palestinian contractors, the
construction industry in the Palestinian sector had been operating on a relatively
low level due to Israeli obstacles. Three contractors independently stated that
for every building permit issued to the Arabs, four or five requests were
denied."^ At any rate, while the building of private homes and the purchasing of
durable goods gave the appearance of prosperity, they did not contribute in any
significant way to long-term economic development.
90Qharaibeh, p. 115.
9lMansour, pp. 19—21.
92personai interviews with construction contractors on the West Bank in
July/August of 1986.
CHAPTER FIVE
EDUCATION UNDER ISRAELI OCCUPATION
Education is considered a fundamental pillar to the growth and development
of any modern society. The disruptions and dislocations caused by the 1948 War
accentuated the value of education for the Palestinians as an asset that could not
be taken away from them as other worldly possessions. Hence, once the
Jordanian government "committed itself in the 1950's to a national educational
system, the Palestinians, including the poorest refugees living in UNRWA camps,
took advantage of the opportunity."1 The advent of the Israeli occupation in
June of 1967 caused many Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza to search for
ways to salvage what they had and improve on it if feasible. In this regard, while
Palestinian progress on the elementary and secondary level was rather negligible,
their achievements on the university level, at least in terms of numbers, was
somewhat impressive.
These achievements caused the Israeli authorities to employ numerous
tactics and measures to impede the growth and development of higher education
in the occupied territories and to reduce the quality of education for those who
persisted in seeking it. This chapter will attempt to focus on the methods and
military orders utilized by the occupation authorities as well as their effects on
the realm of academics in the following areas: student and faculty harassment,
closure of universities, censorship, and restrictions on physical expansion.
iRichardson, The West Bank: A Portrait, p. 57.
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DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA
Before delving into the various aspects of educational underdevelopment, it
is only fitting that this discourse provides a reasonable explanation of why was
there a sudden growth of colleges and universities in the first twelve years of the
occupation period. In 1967, only eight institutions of higher education (those
beyond secondary school) were in existence on the West Bank. Most of these
institutions, as shown in Table 7, served as teacher-training and vocational
centers, had relatively small enrollments, and offered a period of study of no
more than two years. Students who wished to pursue a university education had
to seek it in neighboring Arab countries or outside the Arab world.^
Following the 1967 War, the difficulty for West Bankers to enroll in the
universities of Jordan was further complicated by the Israeli restrictions on
travel. Among the restrictions were that young males under the ages of twenty-
six were prohibited to depart the West Bank for less than six months at a time.
This measure greatly increased the cost of education outside the West 'Bank and
consequently discouraged some students from studying abroad.^ Further
restrictions against students of the Gaza Strip from entering Egyptian
universities following the camp David Accords in 1978 prompted many Gazans to
lil Mahshi and Ramzi Rihan, 'Education: Elementary and Secondary,
in Emile A. Nakhleh, A Palestinian Agenda for the West Bank and Gaza.
(Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research,
1979), pp. 46-47.
3Sarah Graham-Brown, Education, Repression and Liberation: Palestinians
(United Kingdom: World University Press, 1984), p. 87.
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see the necessity of establishing their own university.4 The Palestinians' response
to their much reduced access to higher education was to turn inward and build
their own universities. Another equally important factor was the fact that some
TABLE 7
INSTITUTES OF HIGHER EDUCATION ON THE WEST BANK BY LOCATION




































5Mahshi and Rihan, pp. 46-47.
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politically-conscious Palestinians viewed the supporting of local universities as a
means of maintaining their national identity and subsequently resisting the
occupation.6 As a result of these two contributing factors, both of which were a
by-product of the Israeli occupation, there was a dramatic increase in the number
of colleges and universities on the West Bank as evidenced in Table 8. In addition
to the institutions listed in Table 8, several community colleges were established
on the West Bank offering a period of study of two to three years. Among these
were Khaddouri Agricultural Institute, Al-Tira Community College, Vocational
Training Center, College of Al-Umma, Al-Ibrahimia College, and Al-Rawda
College. Israel did not initially interfere in the establishment of the West Bank
universities basically for two reasons: to project the image of managing a benign
occupation and because it did not expect them to succeed.8 Some argued,
however, that the establishment of Arab universities on the West Bank was
viewed by the Israeli leadership as a step towards "stabilizing" the area by
nurturing "a moderate Palestinian leadership that could serve as an alternative to
the radical Arab guerilla organizations."9 Therefore, regardless of the motive, it
6Ali al-Jirbawi, Palestinian Universities: Between Reality and
Expectation (Jerusalem: Organization of Arab Studies, 1986), pp. 28-29
(Arabic).
7Attiah, pp. 156- 157.
8A1-Jirbawi, pp. 28-29.
9James Feron, "Israel Helps Plan Arab University," New York Times
(October 7, 1970), p. 11.
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is fair to conclude that the Israeli occupation was largely responsible for the
sprouting of institutions of higher education on the West Bank and Gaza.
To both Palestinians and Israelis, universities in the occupied territories
became a symbol of Palestinian cultural and national identity, a matter of great
pride to the former and a source of serious concern to the latter. Some of these
TABLE 8
WEST BANK AND GAZA'S INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION,










College of Sciences - Abu Dis
Beit Haninah, Jerusalem Districe
Hebron Polytechnic Institute
Maahad al-Sharie - Jerusalem
Maahad al-Sharie - Qalqiliah











































universities did not merely serve their communities by producing well-educated
graduates who made their contribution to society after graduation, but provided
lOAttiah, p. 152.
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programs which strengthened the student-community relationship long before
graduation. Students at Bir Zeit University, for example, were required to
complete 120 hours of community service during their four-year terms. ** This
community service included "work in public institutions, physical work such as
paving village roads, helping farmers during the busy harvesting seasons, teaching
in the university's literacy programme, and occasionally helping the staff do
social surveys."12 This phenomenon, however, did not go unnoticed by the
occupation authorities. Once the universities began to play an active role in
Palestinian society, Israel spared no time or effort to restrict their functions and
obstruct their growth. As far as the Israelis were concerned, allowing the
Palestinians to build up their universities was a serious miscalculation.
Student Harassment
Working on the premise that it is far easier to control and manage
uneducated individuals than educated ones, the occupation authorities focused a
great deal of attention on restricting and disrupting normal life for students and
faculties of universities/colleges in the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, the
Israelis' view of the West Bank universities as centers for "terrorism" rather than
beacons of learning may very well explain their "pattern of raids, closures,
detentions, arrests, interrogations - about which any student on campus may tell
you in great detail."1^ Pursuant of this line of reasoning, the Israeli occupation
11Graham-Brown, pp.83-84.
13Rushworth, M. Kidder, "Terrorism, Idealism, and the West Bank
Universities," The Christian Science Monitor (March 24, 1986), p.27.
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authorities adopted a systematic policy of harassment which was designed to
forestall or even preempt most, if not all, situations which could lead to
organized students' protests.
The most common form of harassment that students and teachers alike
found themselves subjected to was the uncertainty of whether they would make it
to class on time, or even have any classes to attend once they arrived on campus.
A student at al-Najah University described the problem this way:
Hardly a week of school passes by without one form of interruption
or another by the occupation forces. They (the Israelis) try to keep us off
balance by their random but frequent assaults on the universities. It is very
irritating and frustrating. But we know their goal behind
these tactics and we are not about to give in to them. 14
The occupation soldiers effectuated and perpetuated this uncertainty by the
frequent roadblocks they erected on roads leading to the universities. The
problem became immensely worse when the soldiers confiscated the students'
identification cards, which they were required to carry on the their person
whenever they traveled in the occupied territories. 15 To illustrate the extent of
complications posed by such seizures, Dr. Robert Ashmore of Marquette
University cited in his booklet, Palestinian Universities Under Israeli Occupation,
the case of three Bir Zeit University students whose identity cards were
confiscated in October of 1983 and were unable to replace them until March of
1984.16 In a variation of this practice, but for similar purpose, the Israeli
14personal interview with a student from al-Najah University in Nablus,
August, 1986.
!5Robert B. Ashmore, Palestinian Universities Under Israeli Occupation;
A Human Rights Analysis. Occasional Paper No. 2 (Chicago: North American
Academics in Solidarity with Palestinian Universities, 1986, pp. 9-10.
l6Ashmore, pp. 9-10.
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authorities on the West Bank demanded that commuting students of Bir Zeit
University obtain a special travel permit to get to campus. When the university
refused to comply with this regulation, Israeli forces prevented the students from
taking their examinations.17 The impact of these practices went far beyond
disrupting the students' educational development to literally throwing their daily
lives into turmoil. The uncertainty over whether one can take examinations on
time was particularly acute for high school seniors who had to take the Tawjihi
exam. This examination was not only significant in terms of graduation from
high school, but also in determining whether or not a student would be accepted
in a university. Al-Haq,a newsletter published by Law in the Service of Man
(LSM) in the West Bank, reported in its July/August 1986 issue that it was able to
verify the arrest of at least eight students just before or during the Tawjihi
examination. The newsletter pointed out that since the arrested students were
not charged with any offenses and were not even interrogated, one can only
conclude that the occupation authorities were simply aiming at disrupting the
students' educational development.1** In an earlier survey conducted by LSM, it
was established that the Israeli military authorities arrested thirty-four students
between June 16 and June 22 of 1983 for no apparent reason other than keeping
them from taking the Tawjihi exam. LSM arrived at that conclusion in view of
the fact that no charges were brought against the students, and that they were
17"Iron Fist on the West Bank," Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XI, No. 1
(Autumn 1981), p.226.
18"Arrests During Tawjihi Exams," Al-Haq. No. 14 (July/August 1986), p.5.
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released four or five days after the examination was over. ^
Detention and deportation were mechanisms generally utilized by the
occupation forces against the student leadership to paralyze students'
organizations. Just one week following the revival of the 1945 British Mandate
Emergency Regulations in 1985, four students from al-Najah University were
placed under administrative detention for six months.^ Later on, in September
of 1986, practically the entire student leadership at al-Najah University was
either imprisoned or placed under town arrest. This wave of arrests encompassed
the president of the Student Council, the deputy president, the director ofstudent
affairs, and the financial secretary. * Using a slightly different tactic, the
Israeli authorities simply banned the president of the Student Council of Bir Zeit
University from attending classes for six months, without levelling any charges
against him. Bir Zeit University commented on this policy in a press release on
June 3, 1985, which stated in part: "If the army commands veto power over
student attendance at universities then any notion of academic freedom for
Palestinian universities is seriously undermined. ^ Similarly, the implications of
19Graham-Brown, pp.74-75.
20Ashmore, p. 10.
21"Al-Najah University President Exiled, "Education Under Occupation.
Vol. 1, No.3 (Chicago: North American Academics in Solidarity with
Palestinian Universities, Fall 1986), p.7.
22Ashmore, p. 12.
23Bir Zeit University, Press Release, June 3, 1985.
124
deportations had not been lost on the Palestinians of the occupied territories.
After the occupation authorities deported three students from the West Bank on
October 2, 1985, al-Najah University issued the following statement:
On 2 October 1985, the Israeli government deported three Palestinians
from the occupied territories, Amin Magboul, Bahjat Jayyousi and
Walid Nazzal . . .There is another more ominous, dimension to the
problem of these three young men's deportation: it sets the political
and legal stage for the possible resumption of large-scale arbitrary
expulsions of Palestinians from their homeland.24
The ultimate form of harassment employed by the Israelis against
Palestinians in the occupied areas was the use of physical force. West Bank
universities were not immune from wanton physical attacks by either the Israeli
security forces or the Israeli settlers. Throughout the occupation period, the
Israeli army did not show any restraint or hesitation in using excessive force,
including the shooting of defenseless students, in the name of keeping order.^
The firing on demonstrators at Bir Zeit University on November 21, 1985,
was one of dozens of occasions in which the Israeli army resorted to deliberate
killings. ° The Israeli soldiers manning the roadblock outside of Bir Zeit
University detained the car that was transporting one of the wounded students
for half an hour before allowing it to proceed to the hospital. As a result of the
24A1-Najah National University, Press Release: Two Al-Naiah Students
Deported (October 5, 1985), in Arab Studies Society Documents, No. 1655.
25Graham-Brown, p. 96.
26»Two Palestinians Killed," Palestine Perspectives. No. 12 (December
1984 - January 1985), p.8.
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delay, Sharaf al-Tibi, an engmeering student hied to death." SettIers,^^
was jus, as savage. Between 1,80 and .,84, for example, Israeli settlers carried
ou. no less than thirty attacks against educational institutions in the occupied
territories, the attacks ranged from assaults on kindergartens and elementary
schools to homhings and firings on secondary schools and universities.^ Until
1986, the most serious assault on educational institutions was against the Mamie
wounded. among other things, these attacks highlighted the irony of Military
Order 817 of 1,80. Supposedly, the order called for the stationing of "guards-
near educational institutions tha, enroUed students who were 16 years of age or
older for the purpose of protecting Jewish settlers* ^ attitudes Qf ^ ^
students and professors tha, this writer had ,a,ked to regarding .his order were
best summed up hy Khali, Tufkgi, a former teacher in the West Bank. He said-
29lbid.
3°Kuttab and Shehadeh, p. 57.
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Moreover, the order had subjected the whole educational system to political
manipulation by the Israeli authorities. To discourage educated Palestinians from
teaching in the West Bank and Gaza, the occupation authorities decreed in 1983
that Palestinian teachers were prohibited from holding a second job to
supplement their already meager incomes.34 Futhermore, the restrictions
imposed on employment in the educational field coupled with the restrictions in
the field of economics had left most college graduates with little choice but to
emigrate.35 This "brain-drain" had in turn deprived the West Bank of skilled
workers and impeded the growth of colleges and universities.
In an effort to restrict the influx of foreign professors on the West Bank,
Israel demanded that all foreign instructors sign a statement condemning the
Palestine Liberation Organization as a prerequisite to getting a work permit.
The crux of the statement was the following:
I hereby declare that I am committed not do any kind of work
and not to give any services directly which will help or support
the so called PLO organization or any other hostile organization
which is considered hostile as indicated in the order concerning
banning of instigatory actions and hostile publicity (modification 1)
(Judea & Samaria) (No. 938) 5742 (1982).36
When all of the twenty-eight foreign professors at al-Najah University refused to
sign the pledge, the occupation authorities deported the first three objectors to
make an example of them for the others. One of the deportees was Tayseer Al-
34Graham-Brown, p. 76.
35Kuttab, pp.8 - 9.
36Graham-Brown, p. 94.
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Kelani, dean of education a. the uni.ersity.37 At Bethlehem
foreign professors, four of them Americans, were "barred- from teaching when
they refused to sign ,he an,i-P«, statement. Official, of BetMehen, University
were particularly concerned ,ha, their English department would be seriously
affected by the Israeli actions since one-fourth of them happened to be
foreigners^ Others perceived the problem ,o be of greater depth and
magnitude. Among those was Pe,e, Heath, an American professor a, Sir Zei,
University, who remaked tha, the anti-PLO statement "'seems to be the
beginning of a concerted effort to gain control of Palestinian institution on the
West Bank.1"39
The purported withdrawal of the pledge as a requirement for obtaining a
teaching permit in November of 1982 turned ou, to he Jus, a play on semantics.




(September 22, 1982), p. 17. Vol. XXV, No. 4
pp. 25-26.
39
U- " »•£»,vdTxJNol m°m BetUehemon, vol. XXV, No. 16 (December 15, 1982),
(December 1, 1982), pTl?
orce 3 Professors to Leave West Bank," The
. XXV, No. 4 (September 22, 1982), p. 20~
"cation, Vol. XXV, No. 14
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Therefore, the change was in the form and not in the substance of the policy.
The essence of the pledge, however, was nothing short of harassment of faculty
members and an outright abridgement of academic freedom.
The Israeli authorities were equally innovative in finding ways and means of
making life more difficult for local teachers in the occupied territories. Before
the 1983-84 academic year began, the Israelis required the entire faculty of Gaza
Islamic University to obtain permits from the military governor. The occupation
authorities invoked Egyptian Order 380 as basis for their requirement.^* The
university's protestation that the order applied only to the al-Azhar University of
Egypt and not to the Islamic University of Gaza went unheeded, and six teachers
were arbitrarily denied such permits. Town arrest was another weapon in the
occupiers' arsenal which was also used against some teachers. Faculty members
who were suspected of being politically active, even non-violently, were
commonly placed under severe restrictions by the military authorities to curtail
their activities. Zahera Kamal, a physics teacher and an active member in a
number of cultural and social organizations on the West Bank, was among those
targeted by the occupation authorities. While Zahera was allowed to travel to
Ramallah to teach at the Women's Training Center, she was required to appear at
the Moscobiya police station in Jerusalem at 2:30 p.m. on a daily basis.
Moreover, Zahera had to spend all her evenings at home, and this requirement
4lGraham-Brown, p. 95.
42lbid.
43"West Bank Teacher: Prisoner of Conscience," Palestine Perspectives
(March 1984), p. 10.
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was monitored by frequent police calls to her house. Zahera's case was not
unique, however, for at least sixty-one other Palestinians suffered a similar fate
in 1983 alone. M
Unlike Israeli educators, Palestinian teachers who sought to improve their
conditions by organizing members of their own profession were viewed with
suspicion and treated as if they were political saboteurs. Once teachers formed
committees in various districts to represent them, the occupied authorities
responded by firing some, transferring others to remote locations, and coercing
about 100 teachers to take early retirement.4^ Other forms of pressure included
assaulting their homes and confiscating their books.4^
Israel also took steps to obstruct the return of Palestinian teachers living
abroad as part of its wide-ranging policy of restrictions against Palestinian
educational institutions in the occupied territories. According to Hikmet al-
Masri, chairman of the Board of Trustees at al-Najah University, it was
extremely difficult for Palestinian professors who were living abroad to obtain
"family reunion" - an approval from the Israeli authorities which in turn gives
them permanent resident status in the West Bank. In fact, Masri pointed out, as
of September 1979, only the president of al-Najah, Dr. Kayed Abdul-Haq, was
44lbid.
45General Committe of "Teachers for Public Schools, Press RElease
Regarding the Occupational and Financial Conditions of Teachers in West Bank's




able to secure such a reunion successfully.47 Denying Palestinian professors
reunion with their families had the effect of keeping them in permanent exile
from teaching on the West Bank and Gaza. Restrictions on the movements of
both faculty and students became more severe after the summer of 1980. Two of
the three unnumbered regulations which accompanied Order 854 (1980) dealt with
prohibiting entry to the West Bank of principals, teachers and students who
intended to work in educational institutions without first securing "a written
personal permit issued by a military commander."4*5 The language of the
regulations was so vague and expansive, Kattab argued, that their restrictions
could apply not only to foreigners and movements of teachers and students
between the "administered" territories, but can also be applied to people within
the various territories." These regulations simply strengthened the hand of the
military commander in controlling the transfers of teachers within the West Bank
and Gaza.
Closure of Educational Institutions
Closure of schools by the military commander or by any of the military
governors of the six districts was a common practice employed by the occupation
authorities to disrupt the educational process on the West Bank. Using the rubric
of "security and order", the occupation authorities viewed students' protest,
"inciting" material on campus, and cultural exhibits as a pretext for the
47"Hikmet al-Masri," Arab Studies Society Documents. No. 34 (1979).




Protested the fluent closing of educational institutions on the West Bank and
-ued a list (Table 9) of the chief closings that were proved by Israeli
interference between February and May 1979. Israel, goal behind these closings
was not merely to cut into class time, but to
over the viability of educational institutions i
cast a dark cloud of uncertainty
in the West Bank as a whole.
TABLE 9
CLOHNG OF EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ON THE WEST BANK BY THE
OCCUPATION AUTHORITIES PROM FEBRUARY TO MAY OF 197,51
Date of
Feb. 12-April 8
March 5 - April 6
March 5 - April 6
March 11 - N.A.
March 12
March 12
March 13 - April 7
March 16-April 1




Bethlehem Secondary Boys School
Hisham Ben Abdel-Malek Secondary
Boys School, Jericho






Halhoul Secondary Boys School
Dura Secondary Boys School
All educational institutions
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Pretexts for the closings ranged from demonstrations
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whole. Por example, since Bir Zei, University had the only .aboratory in the
Wes, Ban, which could "determine the ouality of new drugs for pharmacy sale
and hospital use", its fluent closure placed the health of many Palestinians in
.eopard," Moreover, closure of universities tended to retard a*d even destroy
certain scientific experiments which required controUed conditions or freouen,
monitoring. This insidious practice drew critcism and
of Hebrew University professors who labeled it as a t^Z^^T ""^
punishment. In their ReDort nn tu r- a- •
„ H i on the (.options of TTn,v^,-ties ^ fhe> n^^r(]




ll«y for the events which resulted
Israel's underdevelopmen, of education in the occupied territories was
manifested in yet another form: censorship. This instrument was utilized to
expurgate boo*s, journals, newspapers, and any other published material origi
nating in or reaching the occupied territories. Tie scope of this mechanism was
-er expanded to encompass audio-visual materials as wel, through Orfer 107,
The ".egar basis for JsraeU censorship has rested largely on ,he decreeing
of three MiUtary Orders (No, 50, ,1, and 101,. One of the earliest Military




1967. This Order was general in nature in that it transferred to the "Person
Responsible" all the authorities vested in Jordanian laws and regulations for
determining educational policy on the West Bank.59 Military Orders Nos. 50 and
101, on the other hand, were more specific in that they empowered the
occupation authorities to censor any printed matter in the occupied territories
regardless of its source of publication.^ Moreover, they stipulated that
individuals who are involved in importing, publishing, or distributing such
material must obtain a permit from the military commander to carry out their
functions. 61 Order 1079 basically amended Order 101 by adding to the censored
printed matter audio-visual material such as films, tapes and records.^2
Shortly after the occupation began, the Israeli authorities outlawed the use
of fifty-five textbooks on the West Bank, twenty-two of which were in the field
of Arabic literature and three were purly Islamic religious books.^ In Gaza, the
Israeli censors banned seventy of the seventy-eight textbooks in use at the time.
To ensure adherence to the bannings, the occupied authorities set a penalty of
one year imprisonment or 2500 Israeli shekels or both.^4
p. 5.
59Kuttab and Shehadah, p. 34.
60Ashmore, pp. 6-7.
6 Ibid.
62Militarv Orders. 1983. No. 63 (Ramallah: Law in the Service of Man),
63General Union of Palestinian Students, Education Under Occupation
(Brooklyn, N.Y.: General Union of Palestinian Students, N.D.), p. 2.
64ibid.
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While the number of banned books reached its apex in 1981 with about 3000
titles on the list, this figure was revised downward to slightly more than a
thousand.65 The list was periodically updated by the Israeli censors to
purportedly prevent "politically inciting" material from falling into the hands of
the occupied population. Naturally, the determination of what was considered
politcally inciting was left solely to the Israeli censors. More often than not,
however, the censored lists included works from a variety of subjects that can
hardly be judged politically inciting. A sample from the last eighteen books that
were banned in 1984 was a case in point. Among them were the following:
Panorama of the Modern Novel. Al-Mutanabbi and Children. Lectures in Modern
Arabic Literature. Part n. and Hearts Painted Blue. None of these books can be
deemed politically inciting by any stretch of the imagination.66
Educationally, Arab East Jerusalem underwent the greatest alteration of all
of the occupied territories. Once the annexation of East Jerusalem became
official, Israel replaced the Jordanian curriculum with its own.67 This change
remained in effect until the mid 1970's when the Jordanian curriculum was
restored. However, poor conditions in the public schools prompted many to shift
to private shcools.6° The fate of education in the rest of the West Bank was not
much better. Restrictions on imported textbooks, for example, was a common
65"More Books Banned," Palestine Perspectives. No. 11 (November 1984),
p. 6. Also in Aruri, Occupation: Israel Over Plaestine. p. 33.
66"More Books Banned," Palestine Perspectives. No. 11
(November 1984), p. 6.
67General Union of Palestinian Students, p. 2. Also in Aruri, p. 311.
68Aruri, p. 311.
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occurrence. On the average, Israel has refused import permits to between nine
and fourteen UNRWA textbooks annually between 1979 and 1984.^9
Furhtermore, while Israel allowed the Jordanian curriculum to remain in effect in
the schools of the West Bank, the occupation authorities "changed syllabuses (sic)
and censored and altered textbooks, especially those dealing with history and
social sciences." 'u Books which included references to Palestinian national
aspirations or conveyed Palestinian history with pride were banned without
71
exception. l Meron Benvenisti acknowledged that: "It may be that only 3-4
percent of imported tittles are censored, but the titles censored represent 100
percent of all works which express, instill or foster Palestinian-Arab national
feelings and national heritage."7^ Israeli deletions of "references to Palestinian
nationalist sentiments or to Palestine as a political or geographical entity" made
it very cumbersome to teach literature and social science courses.7^ A
secondary school teacher in Ramallah commented on the impact of Israeli
censorship this way:
In the social science field, the textbooks are not directed to teach the
children about their history, the geography of their county, or the structure
of their society. The curriculum in the West Bank has not changed in the
past twenty years. Due to lack of change and censorship, many of the
69Graham-Brown, p. 66.
"^General Union of Palestinian Students, p.2.
71Richardson, p. 95.
72Meron Benvenisti, Israeli Censorship of Arab Publications: A Survey
(New York: Fund for Free Expression, 1983), p. 117.
"^Graham-Brown, p. 66.
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developments around the world are not known to the students through their
textbooks.74
Isreali censorship, on occasion, was used as a pretext for raids on public
libraries and colleges campuses. Israeli forces, for example, twice raided the
only library in Gaza, the Red Crescent Society Library, once in 1983 and again in
1985, allegedly to confiscate books considered illegal by the occupation
authorities. During the first raid, books were confiscated and the administrators
were fined; on the second raid, wall paintings as well as books and periodicals
were whisked away.75 Similarly, the raid on Bir Zeit University on March 1,
1985, was supposedly carried out for the purpose of confiscating "inciting
material." The "inciting material" in question consisted of books, posters and
tapes that were part of a cultural exhibit. One week following the raid, Gneral
Orr ordered the closing of the university and had roadblocks set up to prevent
students and faculty from reaching three of the four colleges on campus.7^
OnAugust 11, 1986, to cite another example, the spokesman of al-Najah
University ami a lecturer of the same insitution were charged with "possession of
inflammatory printed matter." The charge against the university spokesman was
based on the seizure of innocuous "university public relations bulletins, student
council publications issued at Al-Najah and Bir Zeit Universities, and articles
onAl-Najah from the local and foreign press." The lecturer, Abdel Satter
^Personal interview in Ramallah, West Bank in July of 1986.
75"Life under Occupation," Palestine Perspectives, No. 15
(April 1985), p.9.
76ibid.
77"Arab University Staffers Chared with Incitement," The Jerusalem Post
(August 12, 1986), p. 2.
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Kassem, was charged with writing a book about life in Israeli jails.^8
Censorship of newspapers on the West Bank was strictly enforced by the
occupation authorities. Not only did the Israeli censors scrutinize every issue of
a newspaper, deleting articles in part or as a whole, but also denied editors the
right to inform their readers that their papers were being censored.7^ An official
of Al-Fajr told this writer that his newspaper, like all other Palestinian
newspapers in the occupied territories, must submit a copy of every upcoming
issue to the Israeli censor in the early evening of the day before publication.
The censor, according to the official, returned the articles with the "necessary
deletions" by midnight.80
Officially, the occupation authorities claimed that censorship was employed
solely for "security reasons". This explanation, however, was woefully inadequate
in view of the fact that the bulk of the books on the banned list did not threaten
the security of Israel but merely highlighted the cultural achievements of the
Palestinian people. Therefore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the
underlying objective behind Israeli censorship was chiefly political. In the
process of weakening the Palestinians' cultural and national identity, censorship




SOpersonal interview in Jerusalem in August of 1986.
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Constraints nn Tr-,-rnrni-nn
WhUe mos. universities in the West Bank had expanded somewha. from their
very modes, beginnings, their physical growth was^^.^^ ^^^
occupation. To accomplish this goal, Israel had .argely re,ied on two basic tools:
denial of building permits and pressure on finances.
Early in the 1980's, the occupation authorities applied the "iron fist" policy
in the ducational sphere as they did in the political domain. Using ludicrous
excuses for their actons, .he feraelis prevented al-Najah University from huUding
a new engineering wing for "security- reasons, and blocked expansion at
Bethlehem University for the aHeged purpose of protecting 'archaeological
treasures."" ferae* refusal to allow Bethehem University to incorporate a
program for .raining .ouris. guides as part of its ho.el management curriculum
was an iUustration of how restrictions on educational institutions had a direct
effect on .he economy-in this case tourism. Similar efforts by al-Najah and
Be,h.ehem Universities to estalish agricultural departments were also rejected by
the occupation authorities.** * all of these cases, Wi interference had led to
containmen. of .he educational growth a*i subsequently to constriction of the
West Bank's economy. ProMems with expansion were no. unique ,o al-Najah and
Bethehem Universi.ies,however. Hebron Unviersity, for examp!e, was in dire




but was not able to do so because of Israeli obstacles" ^ the case of Bir
University, Israel had adamantly refused to grant it a permit since 1975 to
construct a fine arts building in an area already designated for that purpose by
the Israeli Planning Department.84
To ensure that all financial assistance coming from the outside to develop
the West Bank was spent according to Israel's specifications, the "Civilian
Government" issued Order 974 on June 9, 1982. The Order stipulated that the
"Civilian Government" appoint seven members to administer the funds, and that
the same government regulate the procedures and methods of how the loans,
grants and investments would be made.85 Since the^q{^^
had not allowed any of the funds to be spent on projects which could serve to
strengthen the West Bank economy on long term basis. This policy effectively
precluded any meaningful assistance to the universities of the West Bank.86
Rashad Shawwa, mayor of Gaza, lamented the imposed restrictions on the
development of higher institutions of learning in the occupied territories in an
interview with News International on May 20, 1985. He said:
Recently, Israeli authorities have allowed Palestinian institutions
August




interview with an administrator of Bir Zeit University
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to receive money, provided a permit is obtained in advance. Such
funds are brought in hard currency and paid in Israeli money. They
are deposited in an Israeli bank at the inflated official price of
the shekel, which is 33 per cent less than the free market
world price. So, $100 immediately shrinks to $67. The other $33
is in effect indirect taxation taken by Israel . . .
The Islamic University, the only institution of higher education
in the Gaza Strip, is not recognized by Israel. It is not permited to
build facilities, even though it has the funds to do so. Most of its
4,500 students are forced to study in temporary sheds. In the
occupied territories, we are not allowed to build schools. We
have been trying to establish a polytechnic institute in Gaza for
the last ten years, but the Israeli authorities refuse to let us build it.87
The Israeli practice of charging exorbitant taxes on imported equipment and
supplies for the universities of the occupied territories had also added to their
financial strain. Occasionally, according to some professors at Bir Zeit and al-
Najah Universities, custom duties equaled or even exceeded the value of the
imported equipment.88 The British Committee of the World University Service
and the International Commission of Jurists observed in their joint report that the
import charges on Bir Zeit University goods for the year 1980 approximated fifty
percent of their actual value.8^ Hence, some of the funds which could have been
spent on numerous vital areas were unwillingly diverted to the Israeli coffers.
On the elementary and secondary levels, the record for expansion and
development was simply dismal. The building of schools and staffing them with
87"Gaza: The Other Soweto," Palestine Perspective, No. 19
(October 1985), pp. 2-3.
88Ashmore, p. 6.
89Adam Roverts, Boel Joergensen, and Frank Newman, Academic
Freedom Under Israeli Military Occupation; Report of WUS/ICJ Mission of
Enquiry in to Higher Education in the West Bank and Gaza (London & Geneva:
World University
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qualified teachers did not keep pace with the increases in student population.
During the first ten years of Israeli occupation, no new schools were built. After
1977, too few schools were constructed to meet the basic needs.^0 Bashir
Barghuti, editor of a weekly newspaper in Ramallah, commented on the general
impact of Israeli policies in the field of education by saying:
Qualified teachers are kept out of the public school if their politics
are not well hidden. There are constant problems of textbook censorship
and curriculum monitoring, which have the effect of depriving
Palestinian students of a knowledge of their own history and culture.91
Even for those who managed to graduate from the colleges and universities of the
West Bank, the employment opportunities were relatively few in an area
characterized by a stagnated economy and the absence of national political
structure. It had been estimated that no more than twenty percent of the
occupied areas' graduates generally found jobs locally which were commensurate
with their qualifications.'
In summation, the harsh restrictions imposed on the universities of the West
Bank and Gaza, plus the frequent military interference with the movements of
faculty and students, had caused major disruptions in their daily functions and
clearly impeded their progress. Further, limitations on books, laboratories,
libraries, and building expansion of univeristies had greatly curtailed their
development and seriously reduced their ability to plan for the future.
90Graham-Brown, p. 65.
91Jonathan B. Gans, "Journal to the Occupied West Bank," Journal of
Palestine Studies. Vol. VEI, No. 4 (Summer 1979), p. 61.
92"Specter of Unemployment Haunts Palestinians," Palestine
Perspectives. No. 25 (September/October 1986), p. 4.
CHAPTER SIX
DEMOGRAPHICAL CHANGES
The demographical changes which Israel had wrought during its first
nineteen years of military occupation constituted the most ostentatious as well as
pernicious form of underdevelopment in the occupied territories. These changes,
particularly in the West Bank, were characterized by two salient features: a
considerable Palestinian emigration and a rapid Israeli colonization.
Essentially, the methods employed by Israel to underdevelop the West Bank
and Gaza following the 1967 War were not much different from those it used
during and after the 1948 War in the coastal, northern and southern regions of
Palestine. The fundamental difference between the two situations was the fact
that the Palestinians were much more determined to remain on their land
following the second Israeli aggression. While this may have necessitated some
improvisation of the Israeli methods, their chief instruments remained basically
the same. The primary instruments which were directly utilized in the
"emigration" feature were expulsion, coercion, and poor health services. The
mechanisms of the settlement feature were annexation, land confiscation, and an
influx of Jewish settlers and settlements. It is important to recognize at this
point that while these instruments and mechanisms were primarily responsible for
the demographic underdevelopment of the West Bank, they were not by any
means the sole contributors. The restrictive conditions created by the Israelis in
the political, economic, and educational fields (Chapters 3,4, and 5), had an
indirect impact on the demographic changes in the occupied territories as a
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whole. This chapter focuses on the primary rather than secondary contributors to
demographic changes in terms of laws and practices.
PALESTINTAM
Expulsions
Esttaa.es made by ,he Jordanian government and the United Nations Relief
and Works Agency placed the figure of Palestinians who fled from the West Bank
to the East Bank just one week after the star, of the 1967 War a, .00,000 1
Jer,cho, which were attacked by Israeli planes on the second day of the war
Based on reports from the refugees themselves, U.N. officials on the scene
concluded that "the Israelis appear to be concentrating on pushing ou, the
inhabitants of such frontier viUages as Qalailya and TuKarn, as weU as the
^habitants of the refugee camps.-* Some of the Palestinians who were expelled
from the frontier villages testified to U. N. official in Jordan tha, -so.diers have
ordered people ou, of their homes to police stations, where they have been picked
up by buses, Wd for a place called Wad. Badan. From there they have been
obliged to waft to the rive,"3 to October o( w?> UNRWA^^^
General Assembly o, the U..N. tha, the 1967 War caused 200,000 new refugees.
^i^i;^,
t, Vol. IV, No 7 (New Yo*
ion July 1967) 8°
nicl
Information, , pp. 0-8°
a




The -OUT refugees ta the 1948
pUced *. number of Palestinians
terror following the 1967 war at 350,000.5
Under coasiderab>e pressure by the Unl.ed Nation, Israel acceded .o
aUowing Paies.^ who left
to -urn .o theip
a»d was probabl, aimed a, defusfcg tbe *oM outcty ,t „,^^
C-ideHng .he cu.berso.e procedure se. by the WHs for «« Palest^
retu. and the breW.,, ot «_ .o do i. in, Red Cross offlcials es.una.ed .Ha, no
-ore than a sn,all fraction of .He .70,000 who wisHed «o re.um would He able .o
*o so. Moreover, !srae. refused .o a.low any o, «ne residen«s of tte refugee
camps near JericHo or .He former resident of Jerusalem .o re.um under i.s
-»gram.a * obviously indict a defini.e Israeli Merest in Jerusalem and
«- border areas, namely .o reduce .Heir Palestinian popula,ion. m l^H. of .His
*ac, wHicH was later confirmed by taael, e^nsIonist designs> „ „^^^




the occupation period. The same conclusion would be reached if one reviews the
Israeli program to reunify Palestinian families which were separated by the 1967
War. The Committee for Reunifying Families stated that although 140,000
Palestinians had requested reunifications with their families on the West Bank
and Gaza, only about 19,000 were accepted by the occupation authorities as of
February 1987.^ This figure of returnees became more negligible in view of the
continued Israeli expulsions and deportations.
Contrary to Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention which prohibits
"deportations of protected persons from occupied territory," Israel chose to apply
the 1945 Emergency Regulations of British-mandated Palestine because they
allowed deportations. ^ Ann M.Lesch, compiled a detailed and well-documented
list of deportees from the West Bank and Gaza for the years 1967 through 1978,
which encompassed the names of 1,151 individuals and two tribes that were
expelled "en masse." Needless to say, many more Palestinians were deported
after 1978. The deportation mechanism was widely used against the dissenting
Palestinian leadership in all walks of life. Among the deported on Lesch's list
were the following: seven councilmen, thirty-seven student leaders, nine lawyers
and judges, forty-two educators, four clergymen, six journalists, twenty-six
professionals such as doctors, dentists and engineers, fifteen businessmen, and
9"Palestinian Families in the West Bank and Gaza Ask Gorbachev to Aid in
Reunifying their Members," Al-Quds (February 26, 1987), p.2.
10Ann M. Lesch "Israeli Deportation of Palestinians from the West Bank
and the Gaza Strip, 1967-1978," Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. VEI, No. 2
(Winter 1979), p. 101.
Hlbid.
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.rade union ieaders a*, o«her acivis. workers."
of depor.ees did not
hy .He, fa-niiies. ^ siaply
generaUy taduced tte emigratica of many others.
Coercion
the various
pop.Ua.ion were suHjeCed .o variousWof coercion whicH
invars inciuded one or nore of .He foUowin* in.i^a.i
and Physical force. With
hunBiation(
coercion served .„ induce_ Pa.es.inians .o We *. Wes. Ban, and Oa,a „,
d1ssuaded others from returning.
in.taida.ion wa. u.m,ed .h^ughou. .he occupation period as a
weapon .o drive .he Paiestinians in.o Mission, i. Bas used as a .ooi .o induce
en.fcra.ion d.in, and tomedia.eiy af.er .He 1967 War. Wi.hin hours folIowtag
*e braeU occupa.ion of Kas. .erusaie., nm.aPy vehlcles^^^^
spiers .cured .he s,ee.s of .he c,y^,.s inHaoi.an.s .o ieave .hroUgH .he
safe road .o^richo and in.ojordan.13 StaiW
Pa.es.inians .o emigra.e were made in .He cities of
see dances .he ioud speakers warned „ P^.^, -,„ have two „_
to leave. After .ha, we c« guaran.ee your safe.y.-U Tem of





Palestinians fled their ho-nes following these warnings apparent* fearing a
-Petition of the Israeli amities coated during the ,948 War. A Palestinian
*- the Jerusalem area who en.igra.ed to Jordan mediately after the 1,67
War articulated the views of many others when he said:
(a site near °Lt *" "*
emigrated about tna,
Son,e of those who refused to be inttaidated into leaving found ft too
-Me* to bear the almost daily hutniliations to which they were being
. When a Palestine wotker in An,n,an, Jordan, was asked why he left
after the 1,67 War, he responded by saying: -No work, m^
expensive. It is for ,nem> too. Buttney have African assistance.
I adn.it ft, fea, No dignity.-* fc
.-users in view of the foreign clients he had in his taxi." shortlv «_^
-ident, tha, taxi driver left the West Ban, for Jordan. This case was no,
exception. A number of Pa.es,inian
an
men recounted to ttis wHter incidents
a,
bitches, and »ade lewd remarks about their .others and sisters in front of the





As if to add insult to injury, Military Order 297 of 1969 required all adults,
sixteen years or older, in the occupied territories to apply for an identity card,
carry it at all times, and present it whenever ordered to do so by an Israeli soldier
or an occupation official. * On a number of occasions, occupation forces made
the routine check for identity cards a most humiliating experience for the
Palestinians. Israeli soldiers had been known to confiscate the identification card
and then force the Palestinians to dance in the street, sometime shirtless or even
without trousers, as the price to regain them. According to reporter David Hirst
of the Guardian, on some occasions, the "Arabs have been invited to bark like
dogs, bray like donkeys and - in one case in Hebron - kiss their donkey's ass.^
While the humilation factor did play a role in forcing some Palestinians to leave
the country, the number of people who emigrated largely because of it was
difficult to determine.
Imprisonment and Physical Force
Imprisonment and physical force were two coercive instruments which had
been used by the Israelis with two purposes in mind: to subdue the dissenting
elements and to encourage mass emigration among the general population of the
18personal interviews with Palestinians men in the Ramallah and Hebron
areas in July and August of 1986.
19Militarv Orders. 1968-71. Vol. 2 (Ramallah, West Bank: Law in the
Service of Man), pp. 609-613.
20"The Face of the Occupation," Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XV,
No. 2 (Winter 1986), p. 187.
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occupied territories. It was estimated that approximately, 500,000 Palestinians
were either arrested or imprisoned for "security reasons" during the first nineteen
years of Israeli occupation.21 This figure amounted to more than one-third of
the combined populations of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The vast majority
affected by these instruments were students, workers, and residents of refugee
camps.22 Furthermore, physical violence appeared to be concomitant with
imprisonment in Israeli jails. Felicia Langer, an Israeli lawyer, stated: "For
years torture was used in interrogations in the territories, and I have seen
personally with my own eyes hundreds of persons with signs of violence on their
bodies. Outside the walls of prisons, physical violence against the Palestinians
by the Israeli army and settlers alike was a common phenomenon. On this facet
of Israeli coercion, Langer said:
It is amazing how easy it is to pull the trigger and fire on
demonstrators in the territories, during searches or in any
confrontation with the inhabitants. Hundreds were killed by
'shots in the air1 that miraculously hit and kill. Only scarcely
can we, who are fed by the official versions of 'shots in the air1 see with our
own eyes the angle of the guns fired directly into the crowd.24
Unlike the regular army, Jewish settlers neither awaited crisis-situations
nor bothered to look for pretexts to launch their attacks against the defenseless
Palestinian populace. West Bank newspapers were replete with accounts dealing
21"Half a Million Palestinians Arrested Since the Occupation Began," Al
Quds (February 26, 1987), p. 1.
23Law in the Service of Man, Collection No. 2: The Work of Felicia
Langer (April 5, 1986), p.3.
24ibid., p. 5.
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with settlers' violence or with assaults that were conveniently attributed to
"unknown assailants." The Karp Report, reportedly an investigation of settlers'
violence, concluded that the military police's negligence was largely responsible
for perpetuating such violence.25 On the other hand, Dani Rubinstein forcefully
argued in Davar (February 10, 1984) that the blame for the settlers' violence
rested with high officials of the Israeli government rather than with the Israeli
police as the Karp Report suggested.2** Regardless of where the blame was laid,
the fact remained that the settlers' violence on the West Bank was rather
commonplace and had far reaching consequences among the Palestinian
population, one of which was to encourage further emigration. What inflamed
the situation even more was that men such as Meir Kahane, a vociferous
advocate of expelling all Arabs from Palestine, by force if necessary, were no
longer characterized as part of the lunatic fringe of Israeli politics. A 1985 study
by Van Leer Institute of Hebrew University indicated that forty percent of
Israel's high school students supported Kahan's philosophy towards the
Palestinians. If anything, the results of this study constituted an ominous sign
for the future of the West Bank and it inhabitants.
25ibid.
26"From the Israeli Press-The Karp Report," Journal of Palestine Studies.
Vol. Xm, No. 4 (Summer 1984), p. 157.
27jOyce R. Starr, "In Israel, A Rise in Animosity," Herald International
Tribune (August 26, 1986), p. 4.
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Health Services
It had been estimated that the population of the West Bank and Gaza at the
start of the 1967 war was 1,300,000. It was also established that the Palestinians
had one of the highest population growth rates in the world at 3.09 percent.^**
Given these two fundamental facts, one would have expected the Palestinian
population in the occupied territories to be well over two million after nineteen
years of occupation. This had not been the case for the aforementioned factors
(expulsions and other forms of coercion), plus the poor quality of health services.
Deterioration of health services was undoubtedly another contributing
factor to the slow growth of the Palestinian population on the West Bank. The
two most obvious indicators of this decline were the inadequacy of facilities and
personnel to meet the basic health needs of the people, and the relatively high
infant mortality rate (IMR) in the occupied territories. Like most other aspects
of life, health services on the West Bank and Gaza fell under Israeli control and
manipulations following the 1967 War. Neglect and suffering were clearly
concomitant with Israeli control of such services. For instance, the Israeli
authorities provided the West Bank with merely ten million dollars or less
annually from 1983 to 1986 for health services, which came to about thirteen
dollars per person. ' This per capita investment in health services on the the
West Bank paled in comparison with the two hundred dollars spent in Israel for
28David D. Henley, Eva Bergholtz, and Gunnar Olofsson, "Health and
Health Care for the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip,1 Journal of
Palestine Studies. Vol. XV, No. 2 (Winter 1986), p. 133.
29Henley, Bergholtz, and Olofsson, p. 135.
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similar purpose.30 This apparent negligence on the part of the occupation
authorities was reflected in the decline of the number of governmental hospitals
on the West Bank from eleven operating and three more about to open in 1967 to
nine in 1987.31 Table II32 clearly indicated the stagnation in the number of
hospitals, the reduction in hospital beds, and the increase in hospitalized patients
and operations performed, which had unquestionably created overcrowding and
the likelihood for poor service.
According to Dr. Samir Katibah, representative of the doctors' union in the
occupied West Bank, normal development of medical services, such as expansion
of hospitals or construction of new ones, was deliberately neglected by the
occupation authorities through omitting it from their budgets. Dr. Katibah
charged that any improvement made in one area of the health services was
usually carried out at the expense of other areas.33 A physician working in Al-
Maqasid Hospital in Jerusalem, reputedly one of the better hospitals on the West
Bank, described the conditions of health care in the occupied territories this way:
Health services on the West Bank are in serious trouble, but the
situation in Gaza is even worse. It is important to note that all
government hospitals on the West Bank were built before 1967, and there
has been no significant expansion or serious renovations since then. A good
deal of the equipment necessary in such hospitals is either defective,
outdated, or simply not available at all to us. Even the equipment we
30Henley,p.l35.
31lbid.
32Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel. 1983. No. 34
(Jerusalem: Hed Press, Lts., 1983), p. 805.
33Arab Journalist Association, "Palestinian Positions from the Heart of
the Occupied Territories - Dr. Samir Katibah," in Arab Society Documents.
No. 34 (Jerusalem: Arab Studies Society, 1979), p. 34. (Arabic)
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Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Abstract of Israel. 1983. No. 34 (Jerusalem: Hed Press, Lts., 1983),
p. 805.
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purchased from abroad two years ago is still sitting in the port of Haifa due
to Israeli hindrance. Therefore, many of our heart patients and others who
require sophisticated equipment for their operations are advised to seek
medical care elsewhere.34
The case of the government hospital in the Hebron district was quite illustrative
of the type of difficulties and challenges which all government hospitals
confronted under the Israeli occupation. This hospital, which was constructed in
1958 to provide services for a population of 60,000 was struggling to service a
population of 150,000 in 1986.35 The problem with this situation was that the
hospital, due to inadequate funding and lack of expansion, continued to operate
understaffed, with antiquated equipment, and the same number of beds (100) that
it started with in 1958. The problems of health care, however, were not
limited to government-run hospitals by any means. The poor conditions of health
services on the West Bank as a whole were highlighted in a report by a medical
team from the Palestine Solidarity Association of Sweden which stated, inter
alia, that:
Radiological services are poor and totally antiquated, the available
equipment being at least fifteen to twenty years old. Facilities are
available for skeletal and chest films, as well as some basic contrast
studies, but there is only one radiologist in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip . . . Some health services are totally lacking. For example, there are
no beds in the West Bank for chest diseases, or isolation rooms for
infectious diseases. There are no emergency or accident services and no






Under such circumstances, health care was bound to suffer with the local
Palestinian population paying the price with their lives. The obvious inability of
the health services of the West Bank to provide adequate pediatric care
commensurate with the needs of the community had led to an increase in the
infant mortality rate. In one year alone, the IMR jumped from 30.7 per 1,000
births in 1974 to 38.1 in 1975. In some districts in which births ranged between
2,500 and 2,700 the IMR rose from 70 in 1973 to 80.3 in 1975.38 Furthermore,
deaths among young Palestinian children on the West Bank climbed considerably
in the early and mid 1970's due to poor or non-existent health services. Deaths of
children up to one month in age rose from 238 in 1972 to 303 in 1975; deaths
among children between one month and one year in age soared from 430 in 1972
to 864 in 1974.39 Pediatric services in the Hebron and Nablus districts remained
sluggish throughout the 1970's and well into the 1980's. In the Ramallah district,
the situation became markedly worse. While the number of beds designated for
pediatric care dropped from 32 in 1971 to 23 in 1976, the number of children
admitted rose from 840 in 1971 to 1,200 in 1975. Moreover, the number of nurses
who specialized in pediatrics at the Ramallah Hospital fell from twelve to eight
during the same period.40 Following an in-depth study of health care in the West
Bank and Gaza in the summer of 1984, a Swedish medical team concluded that:
We have found little evidence to indicate that there has been any
significant improvement in health care facilities since 1967, when the
Israeli authorities occupied these areas. On the contrary, there are even




indications of a deterioration of heal* facili.ies during this per.od.4,
The horrendous conditions of health services in the West Bank and Ga,a
aue large,, .o^hindrance and manipulations, was e*acerba.ed bv outrign.
lack of .sraeli concern. The clMbg of the tuberculosis control cen.er in
Jerusalem, at . time when „„^^^ ^ ^
vutaerable to n,anv infectious disease, According .o the Wor.d Hea!,h
Organi,a.io» (WHO,( .he West Bank ^ Ga2a ^ endured
epidemic fron, 1,74 to l,80> .
ep.den.ic in *. early
goi.er, n^auria and in.es.inal parasites continued to afflict large enough
on .he West Bank to cause serio. concern." Therefore, though
to measure accurate.,, i. is reasonable to conCude tha, deterioration of
health services due to .srae.. practices had been de.rin.en.al ,o the popu.at.on
growth of the occupied territories.
ISRAELI r
Annexation
Den.ograph.caUv speaking, .he starkes. changes in a., of .he occupied
41Henley, p. 139.
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territories occurred in the city of Jerusalem. The two-track policy pursued by
Israel in East Jerusalem was nothing short of a systematic Judaization of the
Arab sector. The first track aimed at limiting the growth of the Palestinian
population in the city by largely restricting their construction within its
boundries. The second track of the policy was based on developing an ever-
expanding Jewish presence in the eastern part of the city and its environs.
Prior to implementing their designs for the city of Jerusalem in concrete
terms, the Israeli government sought to set the "legal" foundation for them
through annexation. On June 27, 1967, just two weeks after the war, the Israeli
parliament passed legislation which authorized the Minister of Interior, Haim
Moshe Shapiro, to declare all of Jerusalem a united city. On the following day,
East Jerusalem was formally annexed with the symbolic proclamation of Shapiro
and the publication of the pertaining legislation in the official Gazette as
"'Declaration of the Extension of the Boundaries of the Jerusalem Municipal
Corporation.'"^" Not only did Israel annex East Jerusalem with this declaration,
but also extended its boundaries southward to within one mile from Bethlehem,
eastward to the Mount of Olives, and northward to encompass Kalandia Airport
nearly nine miles away. A crucial feature of the new boundaries was that they
45James Feron, "Israel Approves Jerusalem Unity," The New York Times
(June 28, 1967), p.l.
46 "All Barriers in Jerusalem Are To Come Down Today," The New
York Times (June 29, 1967), p. 14.
47ibid.
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encompassed the greatest amount of land with the least number of Palestinian
inhabitants. An example of this Israeli gerrymandering was the inclusion of lands
to the west of Jerusalem belonging to Beit Hanina and Beit Iksa but not the towns
themselves. The towns of Abu Dis, Anata, Al-Azaria and Hizma which lie to the
east of Jerusalem also lost land to the Israeli annexation but were excluded as
well. The same policy was applied in the expansion to the north of Jerusalem
where the town of Al-Ram and the Kalandia refugee camp were also excluded.4**
Implementation of Israel's two-track policy was evident as early as 1970,
the first year since the occupation began in which the Israeli government granted
a mere fifty building permits to the Palestinians of East Jerusalem. Further
evidence of this policy was demonstrated in 1971 when the Israeli authorities
issued 400 building permits to the Palestinians and 7,000 to the Israeli settlers of
East Jerusalem. ' The housing problem for the Palestinian residents of
Jerusalem did not improve at all throughout the 1970's. Ibrahim al-Dakkak
asserted that East Jerusalem was in need of constructing 7,400 housing units
between 1968 and 1976 to accommodate its population growth. Instead, only
1,000 units were built, which meant there was an eight-hundred unit deficit for
each of the intervening years. ° Kate Maguire, author of The Israelisation of
48ibrahim Mattar, "From Palestinian to Israeli: Jerusalem 1948-1982,"
Journal of Palestine Studies (Summer 1983), p. 59.
49Abu Arafa, p. 73.
50lbid., p.75.
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Jerusalem, affirmed that the number of Arab building permits in the city of
Jerusalem between 1971 and 1980 did not exceed l,400.51 Describing the
physical and demographic changes in Jerusalem, Kate Maguire wrote:
Building permits for Arab applicants seeking to build within the Jerusalem
boundaries are almost impossible to obtain due to the special status Israel
has given to Jerusalem and the policies maintaining that status entails, and
to the scarcity of land and space which is a direct result of massive Israeli
building projects since 1967.52
An illustration of Maguire's point was the fact that the Jerusalem City Council
had, for nearly a decade, thrown obstacles in the path of a Palestinian housing
project sponsored by al-Waqf in Wadi al-Jouz area of Jerusalem. ' To cite
another example, the Al-Shaab newspaper reported in its edition of April 17,
1981, that sixty-four Palestinian houses were destroyed in Jerusalem in 1980
supposedly because they were built without a permit.
The second and equally crucial factor contributing to the Palestinians'
housing problem and subsequently to demographical changes in the Jerusalem
area was the expropriation of their land. The first large scale assault occurred in
January of 1968 when one thousand acres of privately-owned Palestinian land in
the Sheikh Jarrah and French Hill areas were confiscated to make way for two
Israeli settlements- French Hill and Ramot Eshkol. In addition, a sizable tract of
51Kate Maguire, The Israelisation of Jerusalem. (London: Arab Research
Centre, 1981), p. 46.
52lbid., p.43.
53ibid.
54Abu Arafa, p. 78.
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land was confiscated in the Bir-Nabala-Kalandia area and was turned into an
exclusively Jewish industrial park. In August of 1970, the Israelis launched a
series of land confiscations and appropriations for the purpose of encircling the
city with Jewish settlements to ensure its Judaization. The confiscations,
amounting to 12,680 dunums (about 3,200 acres), were carried out under the guise
of public domain on the orders of Israel's Minister of Finance. " The confiscated
Arab land was later distributed among the Jewish settlements surrounding
Jerusalem as indicated in Table 12.
TABLE 12
DISTRIBUTION OF CONFISCATED PALESTINIAN LAND SURROUNDING
JERUSALEM BY SIZE, LOCATION,AND BENEFITING JEWISH SETTLEMENTS57
Benefiting Settlement




Attarot (near Bir-Nabala and
Kalandia)
Shaikh Jarrah (North of Jerusalem)





















56Abu Arafa, pp. 84-85.
57ibid.
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Between 1970 and 1980, more Palestinian land was confiscated near Jerusalem
for expanding the existing settlements. Among the documented confiscations
were: forty dunums in the Sheikh Jarrah area; five dunums in the Mukkabber
mountain; one hundred dunums in Beit Haninah; 500 dunums from Kalandia were
added to the industrial park called Attarot; and four hundred dunums southeast of
Bir-Nabala were taken to benefit the Ramot settlement.58 In March of 1980, the
Israeli government confiscated a huge tract of land in the Nabi Yaccoub area,
approximately 1,100 acres, to establish the South Neve Yaccoub settlement north
of the old Jerusalem boundaries. ° Even the areas beyond the already expanded
and annexed Jerusalem did not escape Israeli interference in terms of
construction and building permits. The Israeli authorities, for example, had
prevented the completion of a housing project for teachers in an area between
the towns of Bir-Nabala and Kalandia, both of which lie north of Jerusalem. Two
members of the Bir-Nabala town council confided to this writer that they
suspected that the freeze on the teachers' housing project was just a prelude to
future Israeli expansion. As predicted, the nearby Jewish settlement of
Attarot did expand in 1987.
The annexation of East Jerusalem and most of the surrounding area, coupled
with the building of Jewish settlements, had a profound impact on the
demographic make-up of the city. Despite the increase of the Palestinian
population in the city of Jerusalem from 57,5000 in 1972 to 122,400 in 1983, their
58Abu Arafa, pp.84-85.
59Mattar, p. 62.
60personal interview in Bir-Nabala, West Bank, in July of 1986.
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percentage vis-a-vis the total population had decreased from thirty-six to
twenty-eight percent during the same period. The decrease was the result of a
tripling of the Jewish population which was largely due to the implanting of
Jewish settlements on Arab land.61 Moreover, Israel had built an intricate
infrastructure of roads and utilities and created an industrial zone which, through
its production and employment, served to perpetuate the demographic changes
effectuated by the Israeli government.^
Land Confiscation and Expropriation
Another major contributing factor to the demographic alteration of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip was the confiscation and expropriation of vast tracts
of Palestinian land by the Israeli authorities. On June 12, 1967, a mere two days
following the ceasefire with Jordan, the Israeli armed forces completely
destroyed three towns on the West Bank - Yalu, Beit Nuba and Emmaus.63 In less
than two years, the land of these villages was confiscated and transformed into
Israeli fields and what came to be known as Canada Memorial Park,64 This crude
method of confiscation soon gave way to more complex but not less pernicious
mechanisms for accomplishing the same goal. The Israeli authorities decreed
numerous orders and regulations to effectuate their land-grab schemes and give
them a shroud of legality.
61"Demographic Data Released," Palestine Perspectives





At first, large expanses of land were declared "closed areas" for military
training by invoking Military Order No. 3 of 1967.^5 Occasionally, however, such
lands were "transformed" into requisitioned areas for settlements. Kiryat Arba
and Beqaot areas were illustrations of such changes."" A second but commonly
used pretext for "closing" Palestinian land had been the raising of the specter of
security. Initially, most of the land affected by such policies were outlying areas
near the Jordan River and a buffer zone near Gaza. Order 151 (October 1967),
for example, decreed that a large area adjacent to the Jordan River, known as
Ghor al-Urdun, was a closed area for security reasons. In 1972, however, the
term "security" was given a much broader definition by the Israeli occupiers.
Order 391 of 1972, for instance, empowered the military governors to terminate
Arab construction in any area which they considered vital for "'the security of
the Israeli army in the area or for public order.1""**
Among the earliest measures employed by the Israelis to take control of
Palestinian land in the West Bank was the issuance of Order 58 of 1967. This
Order enabled the Israeli government to claim custody of property owned by the
Palestinians who left their land before as well as after the 1967 War without
65Benvenisti, p. 31.
66ibid.
67Military Orders, 1967 (Ramallah, West Bank: Law in the Service of
Man), pp. 314-315.
68janet Abu-Lughod, "Israeli Settlements in Occupied Arab Lands: From
Conquest to Colony," in I. Abu-Lughod, ed. Palestinian Rights: Affirmation and
Denial (Wilmette, Illinois: Medina Press, 1982), p. 6.
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providing them with a genuine legal recourse to claim back their property. °
Having designated itself as the "Custodian of Absentee Property," the Israeli
Military Administration had exclusive control of said properties.70 As a
result,Israel "leased" nearly 30,000 of the 430,000 dunums of "Absentee Property"
to Jewish agricultural settlements, primarily in the Jordan Valley.71 The
decreeing of Order 59 in 1967 was another early and sweeping measure in which
Israel laid claim to all of the land already registered to the Jordanian government
as state land. This order brought 750,000 dunums of Palestinian land under
immediate Israeli control.
To expropriate Palestinian land for Jewish use, the Israeli authorities
"amended" Jordanian Law No. 2 of 1953.7^This law, which was originally designed
to permit the government to expropriate land for public use, was amended by the
Israelis to bypass the established procedures of the Jordanian legislation. A
major part of the amending process was embodied in Order 172 which transferred
the property owners' right of appeal from the governing court to an "Objections







Further amending of this Jordanian law empowered the military commander to
remove resisting Palestinian property owners by force and sentence them to five
years imprisonment.75 The land acquired by this method of compulsory
purchases was largely used to provide Israeli settlements with roads, water
resevoirs and cesspools.™ To complete the legal facade and thus consolidate
their hold on the bureaucratic machinery concerning land laws, the occupation
authorities decreed Orders 450 and 451 in 1971 to transfer the powers vested by
Jordanian law in the Directors of Lands and Surveys and the Survey Department
to the "Person Responsible."77
To satisfy their ever-increasing appetite for Arab lands, Israeli "land
experts" proposed that Israel revert to the "national patrimony" policy which it
employed against the Palestinians following the 1948 War. In essence, the policy
called on Israel to claim all the land "except what the [Arab] villages can prove is
theirs under the narrowest interpretation of the law."7** To implement this
policy, the Israelis carried out a survey of the West Bank in 1976 which divided
the land into three categories: cultivated, arable but not cultivated, and non-
arable. 7 The Israeli aim behind this division was explicitly clear in the
directives of the Land Authority which stated that "'if the land is not registered
75Abu-Lughod, pp. 24-25.
76Benvcnisti, p. 31-22.




and land claims settled, one can assume that the area can be claimed as state
land, if the the land is not cultivated.1"80 Based on this criteria, according to
Benvenisti, two-thirds of the West Bank's territory was vulnerable to Israeli
absorption. Ian Lustick summed up the meaning of this Israeli policy rather
succinctly:
National Patrimony has consistently been taken to mean only the Jewish
population. Land settlements and development on areas adjudicated to the
state in all of its capacities—vacant land, public land, state domain, Arab
Absentee Property, etc.— have been assigned exclusively to Jewish
institutions, settlements and individuals.81
In the event that none of the pretexts to obtain the Palestinians' land
seemed to offer adequate justification, the Israelis generally relied on the
services of "armed agents" and Arab "front" men to do their bidding. The Israelis
were fond of citing the Jordanian "decree of death" to those who sell land to the
Jews as justification for their covert methods in acquiring Arab land.82 A
history professor at Bir Zeit University, however, offered a different explanation
for Israel's utilization of this methods. He said:
On the whole, Palestinians refuse to sell their land to the Israelis because
they consider it a national dishonor to do so and not because of any
unenforceable Jordanian decree. They are very aware nowadays that
holding on to the land is another means of resisting the occupation. Hence,
the Israelis resort to various means of trickery for procuring the
Palestinians' land. A favorite method of theirs is to use one or two of their
Arab lackeys, say from the Hebron area, to buy land in the vicinity of
Ramallah where they themselves are not well-known, and then transfer it to
SOBenvenisti, p. 32.
81lbid, p. 33.
82Yosef Goell, "The Promised Land," World Press Review
(July 7, 1983), pp. 39-40.
170
Israeli hands. This process is generally repeated in other areas until the
lackeys are identified and dealt with which is not always easy to do.83
Israeli Settlements
It is significant to note that Article 49 of the Geneva Convention which
prohibits the occupying power from deporting residents of an occupied territory
also prohibits the occupying power from moving its civilian population into the
occupied areas. The outright violation of this international law and the
enormity of the Israeli government's involvement in the building and populating
of Jewish settlements on the West Bank and Gaza were clear indications of
Israel's systematic effort to alter the demography of the occupied territories.
Israeli settlement of the the West Bank evolved in three distinctive stages:
oc
the Allon Plan, the Gush Emunim-Likud stage, and the build-up of Suburbia. 3
Scarcely one month after the 1967 War, the first concrete plan for settling parts
of the West Bank was submitted to the Israeli Cabinet in July of that year.
Named after its architect, Yigael Allon, the plan basically called for a string of
settlements along the Jordan Valley ostensibly to provide Israel with "new
political and defensible borders", with more emphasis on the latter rather than
the former. The plan also proposed the "annexation of the Etzion Block and
Latrun Salient," areas south and west of Jerusalem.**6 Even before the Allon
83perSonal interview of a Bir Zeit University professor in the West Bank





Plan received official approval in 1968, Israeli outposts were being established
along the Jordan River. By 1975, two strings of Jewish settlements, twenty-two
in all, were established on the rift bed and its western slopes.**7 In 1986, the
number of settlements in the Jordan Valley reached twenty-eight and more were
being planned.*^ (see map on p. 172).
The 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the political upheaval that was wrought in its
aftermath brought about a temporary lull in settlement building between
October, 1973 and October, 1975. The signing of the second disengagement
agreement between Israel and Egypt, however, marked the start of the second
stage of settlement construction. ° While this stage was largely fueled by Gush
Emunim's religious zeal, the government's role should not be underestimated.
This was clearly manifested in the perceptions of Israel Galali and Abraham Ofer,
heads of Committees on Settlements and Housing respectively. Whereas Galali
called for a liberal interpretation of the Allon Plan, Ofer promoted the concept
of encircling Jerusalem with a belt of Jewish settlements.*^ Following the 1977
Israeli elections, the settlement goals of the victorious Likud Party and Gush
Emunim confluenced in the Drobles Plan which stated, inter alia, that:
State land and uncultivated land must be seized immediately in order to
settle the areas between the concentrations of minority populations and
around them, with the objective of reducing to the minimum the possibility










for M.m^l. .1 —iwj A "a ~- Uldiaw* *■ tYf °* »ettlement that exists, the other the type that it
fot example, tlie symbol ^ denotes an existing yishiiv kehSati and a planned toshava.
Source: Meron Benvenisti, The West Bank Data Project, A Survey of Israel's
Policies (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public
Policy Research, 1984), p. 91.
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difficult for the minority population to form a territorial continuity and
political unity when it is fragmented by Jewish settlements.91
Once it was recognized that ideology and religious zeal were not sufficient
motivators by themselves to populate the West Bank, the Israeli government
embarked on a process of creating Jewish suburbs in the greater metropolitan
area of Jerusalem, and infused it with a massive subsidy program to attract more
settlers. This included selling developers land at a fraction of the cost and
providing settlers with outright grants and interest-free loans.^2 To attract
settlers, the following enticing advertisement appeared in Yiddish under a picture
of a 100 dollar bill on the front page of Hamodia, an Israeli newspaper, on
December 23, 1982: "They Are Giving You? Grab! What is being given away?
Land and housing subsidies, to settlers in new towns in Judea and Samaria."^
Beside settlers, however, the Metropolitan Plan had been "designed to bring more
areas of the West Bank under Israeli control, extending from Bethlehem in the
south to Ramallah and El Bireh in the north."94 While several settlements were
planned in this area, the master plan had already been anchored by three major
settlements: "Efrat, south of Bethlehem, with 5,000 apartments; Maaleh
Adumin, east of Jeruaslam on the road to Jericho, with 7,000 apartments; and
91 Ibid.
92Merle Thorpe, Jr., Prescription For Conflict, Israel's West Bank





Zeev Givon, south of Ramallah, with 5,000 apartments."95 Based on the amount
of money already spent, it had been estimated that for each settlers family on
the West Bank the Israeli government spent between $120,000 and $150,000.9^
This was undoubtedly a definite commitment to Jewish settlement on the West
Bank. The most obvious indication of this Israeli commitment, of course, was the
large number of settlements that were established since the advent of the
occupation as shown in Table 13. The increase in the number of settlements on
TABLE 13
NUMBER OF JEWISH SETTLEMENTS ACCORDING TO LOCATION IN THE


















































































































































the West Bank, particularly in the 1980's was accompanied with a substantial
increase in the number of Jewish settlers as shown in Table 14.
In the face of a relentless Israeli settlement-building program in the occupied
territories, the U. N. Security Council adopted resolution 446 on March 22, 1979.
In essence, the resolution called on Israel to "desist from any action which would
result in changing the legal status, geographical nature and demographic
composition of the Arab territories occupied since 1967, including Jerusalem."9®
TABLE 14
NUMBER OF JEWISH SETTLERS IN THE WEST BANK

























♦The above figures do not include the Jewish settlers in East Jerusalem.
98"Council Makes Unanimous Call on Israel to Dismantle Settlements,"
U.N. Chronicle. Vol. XVm, No. 3( New York: United Nations Department of
Public Information, April 1980), p.4.
99Meron Benvenisti, 1986 Report: Demographic. Economic. Legal. Social
and Political Developments in the West Bank (Washington, D.C.: American
Enterprise Institute, 1986), p. 46.Public Information, April 1980), p.4.
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Following the passage of this resolution, the U. N. Security Council set up a
Commission composed of Bolivia, Zambia, and Portugal to monitor the occupied
territories with regard to Israeli settlements. This Commission reported to the
U. N. Security Council on December 4, 1979 that "Israel was pursuing its
systematic and relentless process of colonization of the occupied territories in
complete disregard of United Nations resolutions and Security Council
decisions."100
Barring any major political or military changes favoring the Palestinians,
further Jewish settlement in the occupied territories appeared to be a certainty.
The 1984 power-sharing agreement between the two major Israeli parties, Labor
and Likud, stipulated that the unity government had the authority to build
twenty-seven new settlements in the occupied territories. Since only six
settlements were built during Shimon Peres term, it was expected that the
hawkish Itzhak Shamir will push for building the remaining twenty-one
settlements during his term as prime minister.101 On a different level, the Gush
Emunim movement, which advocated annexation of the West Bank, was clamoring
for further Jewish settlement in "Judea and Samaria." Moshe Levinger, a well-
known proponent of the settlement issue, asserted recently that Gush Emunim
will soon focus its efforts on establishing settlements in the heart of Jericho,
Gaza, Nablus, and Hebron.102
100"Council Makes unanimous Call on Israel to Dismantle Settlements,"
U.N. Chronicle, Vol. XVIII, No. 3( New York: United Nations Department of
Public Information, April 1980), p.5.
101"New West Bank Policy," U.S. News and World Report
(November 3, 1986), p. 51.
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The confidence exuded by Levinger and others about future Jewish
settlement in the West Bank was largely based on a number of measures which
the Israeli government had taken to create the "legal" structure for further
expansion. To begin with, any doubts about Israel's intentions regarding the
occupied territories were laid to rest by the Labor government in 1973 as it drew
up a manifesto which "explicitly stated that Israel would not return to the 1967
borders and that there would be no Palestinian state on the West Bank."103
Second, to facilitate the Israeli expansionist schemes and simultaneously restrict
Palestinian growth in the occupied areas, Israel had created the Supreme
Planning Council to oversee decisions of municipal governments of the West Bank
in the areas of planning, zoning, and general land use.104 Third, Jewish settlers
on the West Bank were not subject to any of the Israeli-imposed rules and
regulations which permeated every aspect of Palestinian life. Through Orders
783 and 947, Israel virtually created the framework for two separate societies on
the West Bank.105 Whereas Order 783 defined the jurisdictions of the Jewish
divisional councils on the West Bank, Order 947 created the "Civil
102"Levinger Unmasks Gush Emunim's Intentions to Settle in the Center
of Jericho and Nablus," Al-Fajr (August 12, 1986), p.2.
103william Wilson Harris, Taking Root; Israeli Settlement in the West
Bank, the Golan and Gaza—Sinai, 1967-1980 (New York: Research Studies
Press, 1980), p.126.
104Nakhleh, p. 3.
105"Annexation and Colonization," Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XII,
No.2 (Winter 1983), p. 183.
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Administration" for the Arab areas in the same territory.106 In effect, the two
Orders cited above had set the stage for two separate communities in which one,
the Palestinian, had no control over its own affairs.
106"Annexation and Colonization," Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XII,
No.2 (Winter 1983), p. 183.
CHAPTER SEVEN
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Within twenty years, the West Bank suffered two major blows which were
directly related to Israeli aggression—the first in 1948 and the second in 1967.
The first blow led to the dismemberment of Palestine and the severance of the
West Bank from the rest of the country,thus crippling it and making it an easy
prey to the power-hungry Hashemite regime of Jordan. The second and even
more devastating blow from which the West Bank has yet to recover from was
the Israeli occupation of the area in 1967. Therefore, it is not too presumptuous
to conclude that the West Bank has experienced two occupations since 1948—
Jordanian and Israeli.
Under Jordanian tutelage from 1950 to 1967, the West Bank endured both
political subordination and economic domination. While the Hashemite regime in
Amman committed itself publicly to equality between the two Banks as well as to
the liberation of Palestine, it labored consciously to dominate the West Bank
politically and economically and made sure that the subject of liberation
remained within the confines of rhetoric. For their part, most Palestinians
initially viewed Jordan's annexation of the West Bank as a temporary phenomenon
that would precede the liberation of their homeland. The mainstream
Palestinians at that time had two basic objectives: to have control over their
local affairs and to steer the Jordanian government toward adopting a policy that
would eventually lead to the liberation of occupied Palestine. The obvious
contradictions between the goals of the Jordanian regime and the Palestinian
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people and their subsequent collisions over the years shaped the course of their
relations throughout the Hashemite era which ended in June of 1967.
On the issue of political equality, the Hashemite regime focused on
formalities rather than substance. Throughout most of the Jordanian period,
Palestinians as a whole were rarely assigned sensitive political or military
positions. Nevertheless, to perpetuate the myth of political equality, West
Bankers were allowed to hold equal number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies
as did the East Bankers. The illusion of equality was further enhanced by the co-
optation of traditional Palestinian leaders who were largely guided by their self-
interests. The hard political realities of the Jordanian-Palestinian configuration,
however, were far different from the image which the Hashemite regime wished
to convey. On the local level, Palestinians had little control over their affairs as
the Minister of Interior controlled virtually all of the strings from Amman. On
the national level, political parties of every persuasion functioned under the
watchful eyes of the king's security services. Whatever limited successes were
achieved by the Palestinian-dominated parties in formulating Jordan's foreign
policies, such as the expulsion of British military advisors and the rejection of the
Baghdad Pact, they were the result of regional factors as much as they were of
internal pressures.
On the economic front, the West Bank was relegated into a secondary
position by the Jordanian government as the focus shifted to the East Bank.
With the exception of tourism, the West Bank lagged behind the East Bank in
terms of growth in practically every economic activity.
As a result of the Israeli blitzkrieg in June of 1967, the West Bank and Gaza
fell under Israeli occupation which has continued to this very day in 1987. To
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ensure total control over the occupied territories, the Israeli government
concentrated virtually all of the legislative and administrative powers in the
hands of the "Military Commander of the Area." Based on this total control, a
large number of military orders (about 1,200 thus far) had been issued to serve
the Israeli interests. While most of the orders in the early years of the
occupation revolved around the maintenance of control and security, their scope
widened considerably as the occupiers' intentions to keep some or all of the
territories became clearer. The net result of these orders along with the general
practices of military and non-military personnel have had such a highly negative
impact on the West Bank and Gaza that they were primarily responsible for their
underdevelopment in many respects.
On the political level, Israel has had one overriding obsession—to prevent
the emergence of a nationalistic Palestinian leadership on the West Bank and
Gaza. Practically every move, order, or tactic employed by Israel in this field
was designed to serve that goal. Israel's adoption of the punitive regulations
decreed by the British in Mandatory Palestine was one of the first and most
convenient tools for suppressing political expression. Another part of Israel's
strategy in this area was to basically maintain the archaic Jordanian system for
local rule which allowed the traditional leadership to keep vacuous positions
while the military government held all the power. Later on, Israel was compelled
to change its tactics as widespread support for the PLO in the occupied
territories was reflected in the resounding success of the Palestine National
Front candidates in the 1976 municipal elections. Obviously, Israel did not
anticipate such an outcome. Unhappy with the results, the Israeli authorities
used various methods to dispose of the new Palestinian leadership, clamped down
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on the PNF and its successor, the National Guidance Committee, and have
refused to hold municipal elections in the occupied territories ever since that
time. Meanwhile, Israel searched in vain for an alternate leadership on the West
Bank that could serve to discredit the PLO as the sole legitimate representative
of the Palestinian people and simultaneously collaborate with the occupation
authorities. In this respect, Israel has neither succeeded nor is it expected to in
the foreseeble future.
Taking into consideration all the punitive methods used by the Israelis to
hinder the growth of a genuinely nationalist Palestinian leadership on the West
Bank, it can be easily argued that the Israeli military government sought nothing
less than the Palestinians' political demise. To a large degree, the Israeli military
government succeeded in subordinating the structures of local government and
had effectively prevented the emergence of an authentic regional government on
the West Bank. Even when compared with the nearly autocratic Jordanian
system, the local political institutions on the West Bank had suffered a much
worse fate during the Israeli occupation. Not only were the West Bankers denied
any political freedom or control over their political institutions, but were even
stripped of the bare minimum of symbolic participation they had under the
Jordanian regime. Without a doubt, the first nineteen years of Israeli occupation
has resulted in the political underdevelopment of the West Bank.
Underdevelopment, however, was not by any means limited to the political
sphere. The economic pattern that developed between Israel and the occupied
territories following the 1967 War had all the earmarks of a core-periphery
configuration. Under the new conditions, the economic relationship between the
occupied territories and Israel was characterized by exploitation of the former by
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The paralysis of tourism and stagnation of both agriculture and industry on
the West Bank and Gaza had a telling effect on the occupied territories' trade as
well as its labor force. As the occupation dragged on, both occupied areas
became increasingly dependent on Israel in terms of trade. The trade deficits
between the West Bank and Gaza on one hand and Israel on the other increased
several folds between 1968 and 1984. This dependency of the occupied on the
occupier was another clear sign that the core-periphery theory was definitely at
work between Israel and the occupied territories. Similarly, the increase in
unemployment in the West Bank and Gaza which resulted from the general
slowdown of their economies made the Palestinian labor force highly vulnerable
to Israeli exploitation. Nearly 100,000 Palestinian workers were employed by
Israel in 1985. Unlike their Israeli counterparts, Palestinian workers were
generally exploited in terms of low wages, poor working conditions, and lack of
social benefits.
In the case of education, the process of underdevelopment came about in
slow and subtle ways at first, then accelerated considerably as Israel began to
perceive it as a source of danger to its occupation. Following the 1967 War and
the imposition of travel restrictions, the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza
found themselves largely cut-off from the educational institutions of the Arab
countries, namely Jordan and Egypt. This relative isolation necessitated an
inward search to fill that vacuum. Hence, the establishment of several colleges
and universities on the West Bank and Gaza to accommodate the rising local need
for higher education. The number of educational institutions beyond the high
school level rose from eight in 1967 to eighteen in 1982.
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Initially, Israel did not object forcefully to the establishment of such
institutions for two reasons: first, it appeared to serve its propaganda purposes
of claiming a benign occupation; and second, the trend was expected to fizzle out
in the long run due to lack of support. Contrary to the Israeli assumption, the
West Bank colleges and universities did not merely manage to survive but became
a hotbed of dissent against the occupation and a source of genuine leadership of
Palestinian nationalism. Israel's response to this phenomenon was the utilization
of several measures, all of which were designed to hinder the daily functions of
the universities as well as impede their long-term development. The Israeli
measures included student and faculty harassment, closure of educational
institutions, censorship, and restrictions on expansion. Virtually all of these
measures proved to be very damaging to Palestinian education in the occupied
territories. Israeli restrictions on Palestinian professors who were living abroad
but wished to return to the West Bank and Gaza had considerably reduced the
pool of teachers who were willing to work under such harsh conditions.
Harassment of students through delays at roadblocks, seizures of identity cards,
arbitrary detentions, and occasional physical attacks made the generally routine
pursuit of learning a very hazardous one. Moreover, the frequent closings of
colleges and universities by the Israeli authorities had clearly disrupted all facets
of academic life. Students and faculty members were almost constantly
rearranging their schedules for registrations, exams, meetings, and even
graduations. As a result of these disruptions, a greater number than usual
increasingly opted to complete their studies abroad.
Education on the West Bank and Gaza was further diluted by Israeli
censorship. While Israel's goal behind the use of censorship was primarily
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Poli.ical, .he censor, ne. inadverten.Iy ensnared many in.rinsic work, of poe.ry
««era.ure, his«ory, and even religion. The fac. tat these wotks^^^ '
convey any poli.ica. messages were .arge.ed by .he censor lends credence ,o .he
premise .ha.M was a.«emp.i»g t0 weaken .he Palestinians poU.ica.ly hy
^.roying .heir cultura. founda.ions. FinaHy, Israel's unwillingness .o pern.it
severa. colleges and universes in .he Wes. Bank and GaM .o expand, despi.e
the availabili«y of Parian and o.her Arah financing, was prohahly .he
Ceares. and most «angib,e indica.or of underdevelopmen. of Palestinian
education under Israeli occupation.
Unlike other occupying powers, such as France in Chad and Djihou.i or
Portugal in Angoia and Moza.hioue, fcrael did no. ,tai. i.s underdeve^en. of
the occupied terri.ories .o the areas of politics, economics, a^ education. Being
a settler-state, Israel, concern with .he demography of .he occupied areas was
Parana, Following .he ini.ial e-pulsion of over 200,000 people wi.nin .he firs,
few montts of .he occupa.ion, .he demographic changes encompa^ed .he Israeli
annexation of East Jerusalem and its surrounding area, the confiscation and
appropriation of ahou, sixty percen. of .he Wes. Bank, and ,he ouiidu.g of over
160 Jewish se.Uemen.s in .he occupied .erri.ories. These measures which
e^nced .he growth of .he Jewish presence on .he Wes. Bank were accompanied
by reguiations which were designed to produce the opposite effects for .he
Pales.inian community. Among these were the constrain* on Arab housing
particularly in Jerusaiem, and .he reduction of health services for ,he
Palestinians .hroughou. .he Wes. Bank. Ano.her favori.e mechanism used hy .he
Israelis for demography as well as o.her purposes was .he .oo, of deportation
* an attemp. to weaken .he Pales.i»ian communi.y, Israel deported over 1,500
187
individuals between 1967 and 1986, many of whom were leaders in their localities
or their professions. In addition to the "legal" tools in terms of orders and
regulations, several forms of intimidation were used by the Israeli military and
Jewish settlers to induce Palestinian emigration from the West Bank and Gaza.
While a large share of the intimidation and acts of violence could be attributed
to the Jewish settlers, it is rather pedantic to separate their actions from that of
the regular armed forces which provided them with arms, training, supplies, and
protection.
As one reviews the four areas under study (politics, economics, education,
and demography), it is relatively easy to discern that nearly all of the Israeli laws
and practices in the occupied territories dovetailed in the process of
underdevelopment. Based on historical experience, however, the exploitation of
the occupied by the occupier for political and economic hegemony is not an
unusual phenomenon. Therefore, one is bound to ask whether Israel's occupation
of the West Bank and Gaza fits that common historical model or not. If not, what
other goals did Israel hope to achieve through the pursuit of policies which were
basically designed to cause underdevelopment in the occupied territories?
From the very beginning of the Israeli occupation, there was no illusion
about its nature or its intentions. The nearly immediate annexation of East
Jerusalem following the 1967 War, the destruction of villages, and the
confiscation of land were very ominous signs for the Palestinians of the West
Bank and Gaza. Moreover, when several Israeli leaders, in and out of
government, spoke of the need to hold on to some or all of the occupied
territories, it became abundantly clear that annexation was the ultimate goal of
the Israelis. Israel's dilemma, however, was how to get the Palestinians' land
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without its people to ensure the Judaization of the newly occupied territories.
This was the critical factor which differentiated Israel's policies in the occupied
areas from that of most colonial powers. Even the most analogous situations to
the Palestinians' predicament in modern history, such as those of the Algerians
under French rule and the South Africans under the apartheid regime of Dutch
and British settlers, differed somewhat from the situation in Palestine in that the
occupiers of Algeria and South Africa did not seek to expel the indigenous
population completely out of their homeland as the Israelis were attempting to
do. To accomplish this pivotal goal, without incurring the wrath of the world's
public opinion, Israel had employed various means to achieve it. These means
encompassed the enactment of laws and adoption of policies that had unsettling
and suffocating effects on the occupied areas which led to their
underdevelopment in many spheres. The data presented here did confirm the
study's hypothesis that a clear and direct cause-effect relationship had existed
between Israeli laws and practices and underdevelopment of politics, economics,
education, and demography of the occupied territories. Israel, however, was not
using underdevelopment simply to gain hegemony in the occupied territories, but
as a vehicle to empty the land of its indigenous population. In other words,
underdevelopment was essentially providing the under-pinning of Israel's de facto
annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. However, since Israel has failed to
reduce the Palestinian population of the two territories during the first nineteen
years of occupation to a "manageable" level, it is bound to increase the pressure
on the people of the occupied areas to induce their emigration. Only if that
occurs will Israel consider formal annexation of the West Bank and Gaza. But
new Israeli pressures, not unlike previous tactics, will not operate in a total
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vacuum I, is an established fact that the Pa.es,inians of the occupied
dories, in spite of their meager resources, have aiwavs found ways to
con,™, «he occupation and resist i,s hegemonv in al> of its manifestation,.
Whtfe this stance varied f™ ttae t0 tIme, ftom ^^^^^^
one secto, of socie.v to the ne«, lhe continued occupation and its spring
-asu.es a,e^ ,0 .adicaii^e tHe ren.aini,g Paiestinian popu>a,ion and
s«ffen thei, resoive to end it. Therefore, i, would be reasonaoie to condude that
as long as the Palestinians are denied thei, inalienaWe right to self-
determination, continued strife and armed conflict are inevitable
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